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ABSTRACT 
 
An examination of the environmental policy process provides insight into the mechanisms of 
decision-making that create and implement policies, which in turn affect planning outcomes and 
development directions. Such in-depth scrutiny has rarely emerged in the East African context, with few 
studies providing an analysis of the entire policy process and the actor network involved. This study offers a 
thick, descriptive narrative of the environmental policy arena in Nairobi, where rampant environmental 
degradation due to unconstrained development is occurring despite the existence of an environmental 
regulatory framework. The effects of newly implemented constitutional and strategic development reforms in 
this rapidly evolving African metropolis are also interrogated. The study lens shifts from the macro-level 
perspective of the policy system and context, to the micro-level of the institutional and individual actors, 
examining their roles, authority, and the interconnections between them. 
A qualitative case study approach is utilized, consisting of 25 semi-structured interviews conducted 
with environmental policymaking leaders in Nairobi. Both deductive (themes are applied to the data) and 
inductive (themes are derived from the data) analyses are applied to examine the research data in detail. The 
primary data is supplemented with numerous secondary sources, which provide a practical grounding for the 
primary analysis. The narrative that coalesces around the data themes uncovers the underlying causes for poor 
environmental regulation thus far, prominent among them being a lack of institutional capacity in state 
agencies; corrupt and nepotistic governance; and the splintering of the environmental mandate among 
numerous state institutions, leading to competition and conflict among them. Adam and Kriesi’s Network 
Approach (2007) is then critically adapted and applied, revealing the concentration of power in state 
authorities and disproportionate distribution of influence among non-state actors in the environmental policy 
subsystem. This policy network analysis shows how these conditions create the potential for low to moderate 
incremental policy change going forward. 
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 Chapter 1
Introduction 
1.1 Background Summary & Research Objective 
As the capital of Kenya and its largest city, Nairobi is easily recognizable as the vibrant beating heart 
of the country. Nairobi has experienced phenomenal growth in the last five decades since Independence from 
British colonial rule was achieved in 1963, growing from just 350,000 residents then to a current population 
of approximately 3.14 million people (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2009). This increase in the urban 
population has placed a significant degree of pressure on natural and municipal resources, particularly with 
respect to land. Indeed, the burden of the population load of Nairobi is embodied in UNEP’s (2009:149) 
observation that ‘rapid population growth has outstripped the city’s ability to deliver adequate services such as 
education, health care, safe water, sanitation, and waste removal.’  
Despite the existence of an environmental regulatory framework that includes legislation which 
mandates Environmental Impact Assessments for all development projects since the late 1990’s, 
environmental planning in Nairobi has failed to constrain natural resource degradation - as demonstrated by 
mushrooming informal settlements, extensive water quality deterioration, soil and air quality pollution, and 
most prominently, by losses of forest cover and prime agricultural land (UNEP, 2009). These circumstances 
are fundamentally due to two major factors: the first is the absence of a comprehensive strategic development 
plan for the city - in effect, ‘most urbanization [in Nairobi] is taking place in a planning vacuum’ (City 
Council of Nairobi, 2007). The second is a failure to adequately or appropriately implement the existing 
policies and acts of the regulatory framework which governs environmental concerns in development 
(Kimani, 2010a; Mwaura, 2006; Kameri-Mbote, 2000), a gap which has also been acknowledged by the 
Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (2012), who has stated that ‘weak enforcement of laws and 
weak implementation of policies remains a major issue of concern in Kenya’s environment sector’ (National 
Environment Policy Draft v.5, 2012: 11). 
 As an emerging economy, Kenya has made great strides recently in reforming national development 
policy with a view to being more democratically stable as well as progressive with regard to concepts of 
sustainable development, as evidenced by the promulgation of a new Constitution in 2010 which places a 
strong emphasis on environmental conservation and public involvement in planning and decision-making 
(National Council for Law Reporting, 2010). The Constitution’s vision also calls for a renewed focus on 
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revising existing policies and legislation to align them with the principles of the reformed public agenda, as 
the country moves into a new era of highly devolved and decentralized governance. When combined with 
recent urban strategic planning including a new metropolitan growth plan for the city titled Nairobi Metro 
2030 developed in 2008 (Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development, 2008), it becomes clear that these 
recent policy shifts have set the stage for identifying and addressing existing gaps and challenges in both the 
policy and planning processes, so that these issues do not carry forward into forthcoming plans and policies, 
both new and revised. 
Environmental policies and the processes that create them are directly linked to planning and 
development, in that development should ideally evolve around sound planning practice, which in turn is 
guided by policy and legislation. This policy and regulatory framework is the product of the development 
process and actors that formulate and subsequently implement it (Kean, 1994, cited in Juma & Clark, 1995). 
As such, the motivations and priorities that are defined by the policy agents (and the networks they form) in 
creating policy will filter down to influence the direction that individual plans take, and the ultimate impact 
they have in achieving policy goals. As defects in policies themselves may stem from the process chain 
beginning at formulation through to implementation (as a function of both enforcement and compliance); 
(Keeley and Scoones, 2003), understanding the dynamics of the policy process is a significant component of 
wider policy and planning studies and would provide useful insights into any key gaps in the policy 
framework. More broadly, the distribution of decision-making power among the various actors involved in 
the policy process and the capacity to adequately incorporate citizen participation with respect to 
environmental management decisions is a measure of the true level of democratic governance (Birkland, 
2005), both for Nairobi as a city and Kenya as a nation.  
The environmental policy process is therefore also a crucial component of the wider governance 
scheme, as it forms the basis for all future environmental legislation at the national level as well as at the 
county level (Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, 2012). The process of policy creation is an 
area of study within the realm of environmental policy which has not been particularly focused on, and which 
is therefore of both academic and practical interest (Adger et al., 2003). As the African region has begun to 
carve out an ever-increasingly important niche in global economic affairs, there is an imperative for greater 
attention to the processes of development and growth as regulated by policy and legislation. The position, 
roles, and power of actors within the policy network is drawing greater attention, and there is therefore a call 
for widening environmental research to include the policymaking process, and ‘broadening the range of 
problem-definition claims, and negotiating outcomes among an extended peer group of actors’ (Leach & 
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Mearns, 1996). Furthermore, as Keeley and Scoones (2003: 5) state, in the African policy realm 
‘understanding policy processes means understanding the interaction of networks and relationships, agency 
and practice, and knowledge and power dynamics in particular contexts’. While there have been previous 
studies examining the structure of policy networks in Kenya (Ryan, 2004; Kameri-Mbote, 2005; Kimani, 
2010b; Coleman & Fleischmann, 2011, etc.), an in-depth examination of interactions and decision-making 
mechanisms from the perspective of actors within these networks in Nairobi has not been covered by the 
existing literature.  
This study thus makes a critical contribution towards the growing body of research on policy process 
in Africa’s developing urban context through an investigation of the environmental policy subsystem in 
Nairobi. This is done at a higher level through the macro-scale perspective of the policy system and context, 
to a more detailed examination at the micro-scale of the institutional and individual actors, examining their 
roles, authority, and the interconnections between them. As such, this study incorporates the following areas 
of scrutiny: how actors in the environmental policy network in Nairobi interact to form policy; how 
contextual factors in the arena of politics, economy, and society help to shape decision-making, particularly 
given the current environment of policy and legislative reform; how key gaps and challenges in the 
implementation process can be considered and addressed in the context of future growth, development, and 
governance; and how the perspectives and priorities of actors within the network translates into specific policy 
goals and statements.  
The offerings of this exercise are found in a more holistic understanding of the wider contextual 
factors that affect decision-making and thereby lend insight to the potential reasons for policy success or 
failure on the ground. Furthermore, in applying policy network theory to the study data, the implications of 
network arrangements for policy outcomes are revealed. The theoretical contributions of the study are 
outlined in Section 1.5. This study is grounded in the underlying context of Constitutional reform and the 
ensuing social, political and economic context of Nairobi described in more detail in the next section.  
 
1.2 Policy Context of the Study 
In the environmental governance arena, Kenya in comparison to its neighbours in the region has 
been both a trend and a precedent setter with regard to the formulation of policies and regulations. It is the 
first country in Africa to have instituted the practice of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) into law 
(Okidi, Kameri-Mbote, & Akech, 2008), and is home to the worldwide headquarters of the United Nations 
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Environment Programme (UNEP). The presence of UNEP among other international development 
organizations, private corporations, and academic institutions has led to a continuous flow of expertise into 
the country, and has arguably in certain instances benefitted Kenya’s ongoing policy development efforts 
(Cohen, 1992; Sharkansky & Dresang, 1974). Environmental research both in Nairobi and across the 
country has also expanded with the benefit of local and international donor funding, and numerous studies 
have emerged focusing on various aspects of environmental governance. In particular, public participation and 
the role of civil society in environmental decision-making (Kameri-Mbote, 2000; Kimani, 2010a; Kimani, 
2010b) and environmental legislation and institutional structures (Okidi et al., 2008; Devas & Grant, 2003; 
Kameri-Mbote & Cullet, 1997) have been key areas of focus in published research on Kenya.  
The environmental policy and planning stage in Kenya is set to change dramatically in the coming 
months. A number of reforms in recent years have caused fundamental shifts in both the governance scheme 
as well as the planning direction across the country and particularly in Nairobi - notably, a long awaited 
Constitutional referendum passed in 2010 has created a new system of devolved government in Kenya, 
dividing the nation into 47 counties as opposed to the previously existing framework of eight provinces, 
subdivided into over 170 municipalities (National Council for Law Reporting, 2010). The implication is that 
some of the existing municipalities will be combined to form counties, with a view to transferring more of the 
central decision making powers to local commissions in each county and bringing decision-making power 
closer to the citizenry through increased public participation (Nyanjom, 2011). The autonomy and control in 
county governance is envisioned through further decentralization at the county level to create sub-counties, as 
described by Article 184 of the Constitution which calls for urban management practices to be developed by 
each county (Ibid.). This unprecedented shift in the regulatory management scheme may act as a catalyst for 
more structured, bespoke planning guidelines to be developed for each urban county in the country. The new 
Constitution does not specify the guidelines for authority distribution at the sub-county level, leaving it to the 
discretion of elected county governors (Ibid).  
Consequently, at this stage of the research process the future administrative framework is to some 
extent speculative, as the specific arrangements at the sub-county level remain undecided. Nairobi has been 
ascribed the dual status of county and city under the new Constitution, and will remain the national capital 
(National Council for Law Reporting, 2010). The environment has been given a distinctive level of attention 
in the Constitution, which calls for greater attention to the effects of growth and development on the natural 
environment, and greater access to environmental justice through legal instruments and judicial reforms 
(Odote, 2012; Kibugi, 2011). This concern has precipitated a new wave of reforms in environmental 
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regulations and policy. While environmental planning in Kenya is governed by a mixed bag of policies and 
legislation (see Chapter 3 for a discussion), there is no precedent for a cohesive umbrella policy that would 
guide the actions of the numerous administrative structures whose activities impact on both the natural and 
built environs. In recognition of this, the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources is currently 
spearheading the effort to collaborate with stakeholders and draft a maiden National Environmental Policy 
that will operate in concert with the new Constitution and more authoritatively structure environmental 
planning at a national level going forward (Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, 2012).   
Another recent defining planning act for Nairobi came in 2008, when the newly instituted Ministry 
of Nairobi Metropolitan Development (MNMD) expanded the urban boundary of the city to cover a gross 
area of 32,000 km2, close to a fifty-fold increase over the previous 696 km2 area, as part of the city’s Metro 
2030 Strategy (MNMD, 2008). This decision holds important implications for the creation and 
implementation of urban environmental policies, particularly with respect to the protection of arable and 
forest lands that were previously not considered part of the metropolitan region, and which will now likely be 
held to metropolitan population density targets (Mwongela, 2011). Figure 1 shows depicts the expanded 
metropolitan growth boundary for Nairobi in comparison to the former municipal area. 
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Figure 1 EXPANDED METROPOLITAN REGION OF NAIROBI AS OF 2008, INDICATED BY THE THICK BROWN BOUNDARY 
LINE (TOTAL AREA OF 32,000KM2). THE YELLOW AREA ABOVE THE CENTER OF THE MAP SHOWS THE FORMER 
MUNICIPAL JURISDICTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF NAIROBI (APPROX. 700KM2). Source: Ministry of Nairobi 
Metropolitan Development, 2008. 
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At this pivotal juncture in the country’s history, the challenges of navigating the decision-making 
process under an emergent urban framework will have a significant impact on policy development moving 
into the next several years. As such, a review of the existing policy making structure and the nuances of its 
operations from the perspective of the actors therein is important for the purpose of understanding 
impending changes, to provide a basis for comparing future environmental policy governance in order to 
determine whether policy reforms have in fact effected the desired changes to the decision-making process. At 
the practice level, understanding the policy process particularly with respect to the implementation stage lends 
insights into the reasons for existing gaps and challenges to environmental planning which can be addressed 
before they are embedded into the norms and practices of the forthcoming governance structure.  
 
1.3 Research Focus 
The key questions to be answered through this study are:  
How does the environmental policy process take place from the perspective of individual actors and stakeholders 
within the current policy framework, and  
How will changes to the urban framework under the reforms of the Constitution affect the policy process and 
structure?  
The underpinnings of this research question are Constitutional reform, collaborations and the distribution of 
decision-making power within and across the policy process. This lead question is explored through the 
following investigative queries, which further elaborate on the components of governance through the 
mechanisms of stakeholder consultation and participation in decision-making, and the implementation 
process which represents the crucial link between paper policy and planning on the ground: 
1) How does decision-making take place during the environmental policy formulation process? 
a) Who are the actors that get involved in environmental policy formulation in Nairobi, and 
how is authority divided among them in the actor network that forms? 
b) How do individual policy actors within the networks view the needs and issues affecting 
environmental policy formulation and implementation? 
c) How will Constitutional and strategic reforms change or otherwise impact upon existing 
policy formulation processes? 
2) How does environmental policy implementation take place? 
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a) Who are the actors who play a role in policy implementation, and how do implementation 
and monitoring activities provide feedback to formulation processes? 
b) What are the gaps in policy, particularly from an implementation and compliance 
perspective, and how can these be addressed in order to improve results for long-term 
environmental planning?   
c) How will Constitutional and strategic reforms change or otherwise impact upon existing 
policy implementation processes? 
3) How does policy network theory aid in explaining the environmental policy subsystem in Nairobi, 
and what can it tell us about the future outcomes of policy activities? 
These queries hold importance with respect to the wider objectives of sustainable urban growth and 
environmental planning. While the conditions of the governance scheme present at the time of this study (in 
2012) are subject to change following the General Elections held in March 2013, the processes and practices 
relating to policy development and implementation will be much slower to change, particularly given the 
shortfalls in institutional capacity and political will (Kimani, 2010a. 2010b; Thomas & Grindle, 1990). Thus 
this study provides meaningful insights regarding current policy process which may carry forward into the 
new political scheme, highlighting the key challenges currently impeding the implementation of existing 
policies, and ultimately offering recommendations for structuring the future policy framework to help 
overcome barriers to more efficient policy processes. For an administrative structure that is currently in flux, 
there will certainly be a need to revisit current and forthcoming policies periodically over the coming years in 
order to ensure that they remain relevant to the country’s future needs (Flanagan, Urayya, & Laranja, 2011).  
 
1.4 Overview of Methodology 
The methodology for this study follows a qualitative approach, integrating triangulation in order to 
increase the validity of the research findings. The three data components involved were: firstly, the primary 
data, comprising of twenty-five (25) in-depth, semi structured interviews with a range of policy actors divided 
across five categories: State environmental agencies, non-governmental/civil society organizations, 
international donor agencies, private organizations, and university-level academic researchers involved in 
policy formulation; secondly, document sources internal to the policy process such as reports and policies 
from stakeholder institutions across the various sectors; and thirdly, secondary data sources external to the 
policy process, including media sources such as articles from local and international news outlets, and 
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available academic literature. By combining these three data sources via triangulation, the validity of the 
qualitative approach is enhanced, because ‘researchers go through this process and rely on multiple forms of 
evidence rather than a single incident or data point in the study’ (Creswell and Miller, 2000: 127). 
The data analysis stage involved separate processes for handling of these key data types. The interview 
data analysis took the form of an initial deductive stage to process the themes identified by the interview 
questionnaire (Appendix C), followed by an inductive stage to identify emergent themes. Both analytical 
approaches, were utilized in order to garner the advantages of each – in the deductive instance, certainty is 
increased because the themes were identified before the interview and therefore specific detail gathering was 
guided, reducing the possibility that the targeted processes would not be clearly explained at the participant’s 
discretion (Yin, 2011). Given the wide breadth and complexity of issues concerning the policy process and 
environmental planning, this is a highly important advantage for this study. However, the certain degree of 
leeway proffered by the semi-structured interview method used allowed for participants to elaborate on 
particular concepts that they considered important, and which may have been previously unknown to the 
researcher or unacknowledged by the guiding interview questions (Yin, 2011). The inductive method thus 
brings these concepts to light, and in this thematic analysis was based on the step-by-step framework proposed 
by Green et al. (2000) from data immersion, to coding, to creation of categories, and ultimately identifying 
themes in the data. The findings from the interview analysis were compared with the literature on policy 
formulation in a developing context, in order to draw out the distinctive features of the Nairobi case study 
and provide a more comprehensive set of recommendations on best practice and strategic environmental 
policy creation.  
For the sake of analytical practicality, the policy process has been approached in this study on the 
basis of two key policy activities: formulation and implementation. While it is a reductionist approach (see 
Chapter 4 for a discussion), addressing the policy process in this manner allows for important insights into 
how policymaking and implementation are approached in the environmental arena in Nairobi, in order to 
explain why planning activities on the ground have not benefitted from the presence of environmental 
regulations and policies in place. A highly descriptive narrative of both policy formulation and 
implementation are therefore provided. As Dowding (1995:15) proclaims, ‘Formalism in political science is 
to be encouraged, but we should not have inflated expectations of how much it will teach us. In the end the 
descriptive approach, bounded by a formalized theory, will prove most fruitful’. To this end, the descriptive 
narrative is then supplemented by a theoretical analysis of the actor network that is responsible for these 
policy activities, applying the Network Approach (Adam & Kriesi, 2007) to the study data. This is done in 
   10 
order to determine what, if anything, network theory can tell us about the policy outcomes that have thus far 
manifested in environmental and developmental planning, and what changes can be expected as a result of 
Constitutionally mandated devolution and decentralization going forward.  
It should be noted that this qualitative study is a snapshot in time, focusing on a ‘certain context, at a 
certain time, with certain people’ (Stake, 2010). Indeed, the policy process is by its nature in a continuous 
state of evolution (Weible, Heikkila, Deleon, & Sabatier, 2012; Juma & Clark, 1995), and this characteristic 
creates cause for policy systems to be studied at various points in time, to track progress and aid in identifying 
challenges which may inhibit goal achievement or successful progress. Given the transitional, and in fact 
evolving, status of Kenya’s current governance scheme, this exploratory study seeks not only to identify 
patterns and practices at the micro-level through interactions between actors, but also describe the macro, 
system-level phenomena that structure the policy process in Nairobi which go beyond the administrative 
framework.  
 
1.5 Summary: Research Significance, Assumptions and Key Findings 
In summary, the theoretical contributions of this thesis pertain to the application of existing 
theoretical concepts and models to the analysis of the environmental policy process in Nairobi. Extending 
from the policy process analysis is a review of the implications for environmental planning practice that arises 
from the implementation of policy, and this study attempts to elucidate the critical gaps and challenges that 
have thus far impeded efficacious policy implementation, with a view to providing recommendations for 
future policy development that would be better suited to the emerging governance scheme. From a 
methodological standpoint, the in-depth interview method has been applied in a variety of previous studies, 
but a detailed analysis using both inductive and deductive approaches has not previously been applied to the 
context of Kenya, and has rarely been applied in the wider African regional arena as well. It is anticipated that 
the current system of high diversification of the environmental mandate among state authorities will have led 
to competition and conflict rather than harmonization of activities.  
In addition, the low implementation record of existing regulations was expected to link to deficits in 
funding, capacity, and awareness on the part of the general public as to the ramifications of development 
activities for the environment. Indeed, these assumptions proved to be correct, although the complexity of the 
environmental subsystem was revealed to be far more complex. There are both systemic and procedural causes 
that have led to the failure of the existing regulations to adequately constrain the deleterious effects of urban 
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development on the environment in Nairobi. Among them are cultural barriers to sharing information, 
command-and-control centric measures to regulations which have alienated residents, corrupt governance 
practices, and the highly politicized policy environment. Further, the potential benefits and challenges of 
forthcoming devolution and decentralization for environmental governance were explored, with the finding 
that while there may be increased potential for citizen engagement in decision-making, inter-county conflicts 
and capacity challenges will likely continue to persist.  
The Network Approach, as described by Adam and Kriesi (2007), is utilized as the key framework for 
analyzing the underlying mechanics of the policy network. This framework was selected for its applications in 
describing the roles and attributes of actors in the policy network, and the interactions between them, that 
form the basis for policy activities. Network theory has not been commonly been applied to environmental 
case studies in Africa, hence this study aids in assessing the applicability and usefulness of Western-centric 
methods for policy process analysis in a developing urban context in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
1.6 Thesis Organization 
This research thesis is segmented into multiple components, with a literature review (Chapter 2), case 
study background summary (Chapter 3), and description of the research methodology (Chapter 4). The first 
main data discussion component is an examination of how decision-making takes place during environmental 
policy formulation, qualitatively assessing the actor networks that form and the perspectives of the actors 
within them regarding environmental policy and planning issues on the ground (Chapter 5). The second 
component scrutinizes environmental policy implementation in Nairobi, in order to assess the key challenges 
and gaps in policy that are impacting planning (Chapter 6). Thirdly, these Chapters are followed with a 
theoretical analysis of the entire environmental policy process through the lens of the Network Approach put 
forward by Adam and Kriesi (2007);(Chapter 7). Each of these three components generates analytical, 
evaluative, and prescriptive knowledge, thereby providing a theoretical and conceptual contribution to current 
research on the area of urban environmental policy and governance in the Kenyan context in particular and 
the African region more generally. The findings and contributions of the thesis are summarized in Chapter 8. 
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 Chapter 2
Literature Review 
This study investigates the processes and actors involved in the environmental decision-making 
process in Nairobi, in order to determine how existing challenges and the forces of decision-making culminate 
in actual policies, which in turn manifests in implications for environmental planning on the ground.  The 
following literature review therefore outlines the key theories, concepts, and phenomena that are associated 
with this research course - specifically, an overview is provided as to who the actors are that generally get 
involved in policy making, what are the major current theories of the policy process that explain its 
functioning and complexity, how the decision-making process is shaped by contextual factors both external 
and internal, and how policy change, success and failure relate to the policy making and implementation 
processes.  
These various components of the policy process are intrinsically linked – as Linder and Peters (1991: 
125) argue, ‘a policy analyst's claim to expertise is a combination of instrumental rationality and sensitivity to 
process and context that constitutes a technology for solving public problems.’ As such, this Chapter also 
offers a review of existing literature on the policy process from studies based in Africa, in order to place this 
study within the context of current academic research and create a basis for the theoretical contributions of 
this study.  
 
2.1 Policy Processes: Concepts, Theories, and Frameworks 
2.1.1 What is the Policy Process? 
As this study is grounded in an investigation of the environmental policy process, it is necessary as an 
initiation point to define the specific parameters of this construct. From a contemporary standpoint, the 
policy process as a component of governance has been defined as ‘the study of change and development of 
policy and the related actors, events, and contexts’ (Weible et al., 2012: 3). In general use, the phrase 
‘policy process’ refers to policymaking procedures and associated processes. Policies, for purposes of this 
thesis, are understood from the stance of the environmental governance arena as the actions of government 
and intentions that determine those actions (Cochran, Mayer, Carr, & Cayer, 1999). Given the practical 
implications of the subject matter, the policy process as discussed in the upcoming sections has been treated 
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primarily from the perspective of the implications for environmental planning, while integrating the 
concurrent relationships in the political and socioeconomic arenas that interact with the policy process - as has 
been done in similar environment-oriented policy studies (c.f. Keeley & Scoones, 2003; Leach & Mearns, 
1996).  
To begin with, it is important to first identify and categorize the actors involved in the policy process, 
in order to create a basis for exploring the interactions between them. The types of institutions that cohere 
around a particular policy issue would vary widely across geographic and socio-economic contexts, and would 
include government, private organizations, civil society or non-governmental organizations (henceforth 
referred to as CSOs), foreign agencies, and academic institutions (Sutton, 1991; Keeley & Scoones, 2003). 
Government agencies would include those operating at all scales, from the national to the local level. The 
roles and responsibilities of each agency would differ based on the policy exercise and the reach of the 
document in question; further, the administrative framework of the country would dictate the sharing of 
power and decision-making authority across the range of agencies (Keeley & Scoones, 2003).  
The state occupies a particularly significant role in managing the environment and natural assets in 
African contexts, and as a result, these agencies often hold some degree of vested interest in maintaining 
decision-making power, as ‘stewardship over natural resources is properly the responsibility of the state. It 
depends on and serves to perpetuate the conventional view that local inhabitants are incapable of acting as 
resource custodians’ (Leach & Mearns, 1996: 457). Private organizations frequently participate in 
policymaking in an advisory capacity, seen as a pool of expertise and an authority on the practical implications 
of implementing policy (Fritzen et al., 2009). CSOs have had a historic leg-up with respect to goal-
achievement on small-scale environmental and agricultural projects in Africa, and represent an important 
sector in the effort to fill the service and welfare gaps left in the economy by government institutions (Bratton, 
1989; Kameri-Mbote, 2000). CSOs also work to create levels of dialogue between government and citizens 
and often represent the voices of marginalized groups at the decision-making table, a role which may create 
tensions between them and their government counterparts (Bratton, 1989). Adding to this complex 
relationship is the control that public agencies often exert over the operations of NGOs and CSOs, effectively 
restricting their activities and realm of influence (Bratton, 1989; Kameri-Mbote, 2000). In Kenya, the role of 
NGOs has evolved over time, moving from philanthropic and welfare services oriented functions in the 
colonial era, towards activism and drivers of change in the form of legislative and societal reforms in a more 
contemporary timeframe (Kameri-Mbote, 2000). 
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In the developing world, the common types of foreign agencies with operational influence include 
multilateral organizations including bodies of the United Nations, as well as lending institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank in addition to the aid offices of foreign governments operating 
out of embassies in their host countries (Thomas & Grindle, 1990; Goode, 1984). The experts working out 
of foreign offices may then be referred to as ‘policy entrepreneurs’, given their influence in directing and 
affecting the outcome of policy development (Mintrom & Norman, 2009); as these networks of experts 
spread across transnational boundaries, they form ‘epistemic communities’, acting as conduits for the spread 
and transfer of knowledge across contexts (Adler & Haas, 1992). These individuals represent an imported 
segment of knowledge on policy issues; as Weiss (2010: 4) notes, ‘international organizations live or die, 
thrive or shrivel up, by the quality and relevance of the policy ideas that they put forward and sustain.’ 
However, their involvement in development and analysis of policy is a function not only of their contributed 
input, but also of the agents that carry that contribution as well as how that input is incorporated in policy 
documents and implementation plans (Juma & Clark, 1995).  
In instances where support is offered restrictively in the form of project funding, it is often directed 
through reliable CSOs, often with certain conditions attached with regard to the positions taken by those 
CSOs in policy debates; in the same vein, aid channeled directly through government may carry the caveat of 
required ‘structural adjustment policy reforms’ regarding the appropriation of funds (Bratton, 1989: 570). 
This mixed-bag of activities thus affords foreign offices with a significant degree of sway with official public 
agencies in developing countries, creating a niche for them as decision-makers or at the very least as important 
stakeholders in the policy making process (Thomas & Grindle, 1990).  
The environmental arena in Kenya displays the fingerprints of foreign expertise and funding in 
multiple areas, including energy, agriculture, conservation, forestry, and water management (The World Bank 
Group, 2012; Community Development Trust Fund, 20021). The United Nations (UN) represents another 
level of foreign involvement in the local affairs of developing economies. Offices of the UN Environmental 
Programme (UNEP), UN-Habitat, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) all play a role in 
influencing environmental policy and governance, usually through under the auspices of binding Multilateral 
                                                      
1 The Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF) is a joint venture between Kenya’s Ministry of Finance and 
Planning and European Union member states, founded in 1996 to provide funding and program support for 
community-based economic development and environmental initiatives (CDTF, 2012). 
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Environmental Agreements (MEAs) between bodies of the UN and local government (Fritzen et al., 2009). 
Expert advice is also garnered from the academic realm, with researchers and academicians from local and 
international institutions often being called upon to provide a broad based comparative perspective on past 
policy experiences across contexts (Ibid.).   
 
2.1.2 Theoretical Frameworks of the Policy Process 
In order to properly discuss the various levels of analysis of the policy process, it is important to first 
distinguish between the types of theoretical organization that can be applied. As Carlsson (2000: 511) asserts, 
‘frameworks should be understood as broad conceptualizations, heuristics provide aid to learning, discovery, or 
problem-solving but are otherwise unjustified. Models are precise assumptions about specific relations between 
variables and their outcomes, while theories can be described as deductive systems of hypotheses or 
propositions’ (emphasis in original). Hence an investigation of the policy process may be approached from an 
array of angles, and researchers have frequently opted to focus on one specific dimension or stage of the chain, 
such as implementation. One highly common tool to describing the policy process in this manner is through 
the stages heuristic, which portrays the policy process as either a linear or unidirectional, cyclical process, 
going from agenda setting to policy formulation and legitimation, implementation and ultimately, evaluation 
(Sabatier, 1991). This approach has somewhat gone out of vogue in recent years, perhaps aided by criticism of 
this analytical lens from some academic scholars (Sabatier, 2007), under the pretext that the linearity of its 
derivation belies the reality of the policy process, which is in fact a much more complex system where these 
stages often overlap and are informed by one another through feedback and monitoring (Ibid.).  
Thus in favour of adequately representing the complexity of the policy process, a number of 
alternative theoretical frameworks exist to aid in analyzing and evaluating a given policy setting. These 
frameworks vary and can be grouped based on the unit of measurement selected for an inquiry - more 
specifically the actor, the institution, groups of institutions, or from a systemic, broad-based perspective of the 
policy system as a whole - although some frameworks overlap and integrate more than one lens at a time in 
their investigative models. Beginning from the broadest level, policy can also be viewed through the lens of 
discourse (Keeley & Scoones, 2003). The objective in adopting this perspective would be outlining the key 
participants in the policy process and dividing them into populations based on common goals and activities, 
thus examining their roles and viewpoints that form the basis for collective action. In a discourse analysis, the 
mandates of various institutions and individuals are of importance to their contributions toward the wider 
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policy issue, not just the context within which they operate. Another option in this broad based narrative is an 
approach to assessing the policy mix, for example through the innovation framework, which provides a 
pathway to understanding the ways in which policies are accepted or rejected in a given area (Berry & Berry, 
2007). This approach involves describing the ‘evolutionary process wherein multiple policies are considered 
across different contexts (e.g., organizations, sub governments, governments) with some policies selected and 
others rejected’ (Weible et al., 2012). 
Alternatively, and still from a system perspective, it is the contextual triggers of policy change that are 
the focus of Punctuated-Equilibrium (PE) theory (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). PE theory contends that 
issues arising in the public agenda of a given context direct policymaking, and thus it is the prominence of 
these issues that would determine the nature and amount of policy interventions that are developed. In recent 
years, the complexity of transnational policy systems has received greater attention in the literature, through 
the parameters of innovation and diffusion models and comparative studies which encompass a large sample 
base, also known as large-N comparative studies (Sabatier, 2007). Policy process analysis may also be 
approached from a political perspective, examining the partisan objectives and approaches to policy issues 
based on ideological motivations. Fundamentally, this perspective is geared towards multi-party economies in 
the developed world, and from a cursory review conducted by this researcher, many of the studies 
encountered that are based on this approach are drawn from the USA and Western Europe.  
A third framework that bases the level of inquiry on the policy process as a system is the Multiple 
Streams Framework (Kingdon, 1995) which divides the activities of institutions and actors into three 
‘streams’ according to their perceived motivations, and then addresses the ambiguity that arises when all three 
streams act in concert (Zahariadis, 2007). The streams in question include a problem, or issue stream; a 
politics stream, defined by the ideological leanings of the parties involved; and a policy stream, which 
encompasses the various approaches of stakeholders in deciding on policy matters (Ibid.). The outcome of a 
given policymaking venture would depend ultimately on the ways and degrees to which the three streams 
interconnect at the final stage of policy creation (Kingdon, 1995). Kingdon was one of the first theorists to 
acknowledge and attempt to theorize on the ‘stochastic’ nature of policy, given the ostensibly random 
outcomes of policy creation exercises that at times could not be explained by the actors involved (John, 2003). 
Thus the MS framework addresses the ambiguity inherent within the policy process due to range of 
points of view held by the various actors involved in any given policy exercise; hence the ‘garbage can model’ 
analogy, whereby decision-makers and policy formulation participants are depicted as ‘dump(ing) largely 
unrelated problems and solutions. No one person controls the process of choice, and fluctuating attendance, 
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opportunities and attention give the process highly dynamic and interactive qualities’ (Zahariadis, 2007:66).  
This model of selecting between policy alternatives as adopted by Kingdon, soon became a popular metaphor 
for the un-relatedness between a policy problem and the final policy solution adopted, a disjuncture explained 
on the basis of political and economic conditions prevailing during the decision-making process (Zahariadis, 
2007).  
Traditional approaches have, to a large extent, adopted the institution or institutional networks as the 
core units to explain structures and processes in a policy subsystem; the frameworks that utilize these two 
lenses thus overlap and the inquiry can be focused at either level depending on the purpose of the study.  
Further, agenda setting, political influences, and wider contextual factors are all integrated into the analysis, 
creating links with the ‘system’ lens already described. Each of these frameworks approaches the roles and 
interactions of policy institutions in different ways, and is therefore useful in different contexts. The 
combined lens of the institutions and institutional networks that aggregate around a policy issue, effectively 
termed a ‘policy subsystem’, emerges most prominently in the focus of two key frameworks: First, the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2005), which provides a coherent 
framework for dissecting the involvement of the various institutions involved in decision making, and the 
actors within them. The IAD approach can be applied to a wide range of social contexts, referred to as ‘action 
situations’, and is versatile enough to apply to system-level analysis as well as zoom in to the actor level. 
Individual action is seen as the product of institutional structures, their operational procedures, and associated 
norms (John, 2003). Thus the values, beliefs, and norms that structure individual action are of fundamental 
importance to the IAD framework, and as such a large amount of in-depth information on these factors is 
necessary when applying it as an analytical model.  
Second, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), proposed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988) 
creates a basis for the investigation of the roles of and interactions between institutions in the policy process. 
ACF theory is built on the assumption that within a policy subsystem, policymaking is carried out by 
specialists in the particular field in question - while these individuals and institutions are influenced by 
contextual political and socioeconomic factors, for purposes of understanding the policy process they can be 
organized into a set of ‘advocacy coalitions’ based on their policy position (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). 
Therefore, ACF theory suggests that the influence of participants is predicated on their ability to assume a 
particular policy position and advocate for it successfully, thus bringing their point of view to bear within the 
decision making process (Ibid.).  
Narrowing the focus further, as Birkland (2005) notes, since the 1950’s policy research has started to 
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pay greater attention to the actions and influence of individual policy agents, as opposed to institutions – a 
change in the analytical paradigm of institutionalism2 towards behaviorism3, or what is now known more 
commonly as neo-institutionalism, a method by which political and policy related issues are studies on the 
basis of the institutions, both formal (such as the legislative and executive arms of the government) and 
informal, such as political arrangements and systems; and on the basis of actors and the networks they form in 
creating policy (Ibid.) Within institutions, the actors who hold the decision-making power often form 
collaborative and interactive networks with one another. These policy networks4 tend to cohere around a 
policy issue, and their structure therefore fluctuates depending on the issue du jour and the policy positions 
taken by the actors involved.  
In Third World networks, forging a partnership with a local experienced policy practitioner is an 
effective way for newcomers to gain an understanding of the nuanced forces at work and thereby develop 
successful strategies to influence the policy process (Weible et al., 2012). There are two kinds of policy agents: 
official, and unofficial. The former refers to those hosted by administrative structures involved in the process 
by virtue of powers entrusted to them by law, while the latter are usually affiliated to institutions with a 
particular interest in the type of policy being developed. These agents are termed the ‘policy elite’ (Grindle & 
Thomas, 1989) for their impact on formulating and even implementing policy. Beyond these individuals, the 
wider public in democratic settings may get involved in providing feedback to inform and guide the policy 
process; however, depending on the context, their power to truly influence outcomes varies (Kapoor, 2001).  
Some of the frameworks described previously do provide a level of theoretical analysis that elucidates 
the roles, connections, and power of individual actors within institutions, such as Ostrom’s IAD framework, 
and concepts such as that of the ‘policy entrepreneur’ described previously can aid in further explorations of 
the actor unit across theories. Another group of theories that aids in mapping actor relationships is policy 
network theory, which can be applied in any of three ways: first, to describe a policy network as a new 
                                                      
2 Institutionalism: ‘The study of politics and policy based on the interaction of formal institutions in government.’ 
(Birkland, 2005: 52) 
3 Behaviourism: A method of studying and analyzing phenomena based on the behaviour, both observed and postulated, 
of the individuals involved (Birkland, 2005: 52). 
4 Policy networks are defined by Henry (2011: 361) as networks that ‘describe the patterns of interaction among actors 
working a particular policy system or decision-making process, in reference to a particular type of relationship such as 
information exchange or political coordination.’ 
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governing structure existing outside the traditional hierarchy of authority by focusing on horizontal 
arrangements between public and private actors; secondly, to describe existing interconnections between 
actors without introducing the policy subsystem as a new arrangement; and third, to quantitatively map the 
relationships between actors while not particularly considering their individual characteristics (Adam & 
Kriesi, 2007). In particular, the relationship between the State (as the main anchor for policy development 
and implementation) and other actors is of crucial importance, as Coleman & Perl (1999: 696) explain, actors 
within a given policy network would - 
‘…interact strategically, while engaging in exchanges involving the sharing 
of information, expertise, and political support. Some of the participants in 
these exchanges will be state actors, with access to a very particular resource: 
their decisions are considered binding on society and are backed by the 
possibility of the legitimate use of force. The manner in which state actors 
share this resource and the resulting distribution of resources among 
community members create different patterns of public – private 
relationships, or policy networks that provide the context for policy 
deliberations.’ (Coleman & Perl, 1999:696).  
These relationships can be described on the basis of links between actors, forged through ‘participation in 
decision making, membership in representative bodies, communication, information exchange and other 
resource flows’ (Schneider, 1992:110).   
Policy network studies have drawn strongly on the idea that networks should be classified on the basis 
of interactions between the state and other stakeholders (Waarden, 1992). Building on the work of Atkinson 
& Coleman (1985), Schneider (1992) offers three categories of structures for policy networks: corporatist, 
wherein the policy process is led by the state and only a limited number of interest groups interact with public 
agencies in creating content; pluralist, whereby policy is informed by numerous actors interact across sectors 
interacted through a variety of pathways with the state apparatus; and clientelist, which creates a dichotomy 
between ‘strong’ actors (most commonly the state) who control opportunities for involvement in the policy 
process, and ‘weak’ actors who compete with one another for resources and privileges including access to 
participate in governance activities. Jordan and Schubert (1992) point out that ‘there is a tendency in the 
basic models to associate competition and bargaining with pluralism, and to associate collaboration and 
consensus with corporatism.’   
There are a number of objections to describing policy networks through these three forms, primarily 
that the use of discrete labels exempts a more detailed and nuanced description of the true realities of policy 
arrangements on the ground, which are very rarely easily categorized as one or the other of these three types 
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(Jordan & Schubert, 1992; Waarden, 1992). In addition, there is a call for more empirically sound methods 
of analyzing policy networks, in order to increase the ‘explanatory power’ of network theory by treating 
networks as independent variables in the context of policymaking (Carlsson, 2000).  
As such, it is more useful to focus the application of policy network theory on two key dimensions: 
the attributes of actors themselves, and the relationships between them (Wassermann & Faust, 1994; 
Adam & Kriesi, 2007). To this end, Adam and Kriesi (2007) propose the ‘Network Approach’, consisting of 
an ‘analytical toolbox’ that aids in assessing a policy network based on these two dimensions. There are five 
key variables used to describe a given network: the number of actors; the complexity of the network, which is 
also a function of the number of actors within it; the degree of self-referentiality of the network, which is to 
say the extent to which the network is permeable to external actors or conditions; conflicts of interest between 
the actors involved; and the costs of network management, in situations where this is a formal arrangement. 
The benefit of the Network Approach is that it applies a specific typology which can then be utilized to 
predict the policy outcomes and types of policy change that would emerge as a result of various kinds of 
policy network arrangements. 
However, social interactions are invariably affected by their social and material surroundings, and in 
the case of environmental policy, additional elements at play include political and economic considerations as 
well as a complex set of circumstances relating to both the natural and built environs. All these factors play a 
role in shaping the policy network and its operational structure. By proposing the idea of a network, this 
approach does not ignore the unique traits or viewpoints of individuals within these structures but rather 
emphasizes that each actor is influenced and perhaps even directed by interactions with others in the same 
social situation. Thus the approaches and attitudes towards policy making favoured by one party would have 
knock-on effects throughout the network, and so on. Network theory shares some parameters with the IAD 
framework but can be altered to focus on varying aspects of actor-oriented activities and viewpoints. Hence, 
attention to the nuances of the individuals contained in policy networks at a given point in time is of 
importance for learning about network structuration and the ways that policy decision-making can be 
improved.  
The theoretical frameworks described above provide a backdrop for organizing the data collected 
during policy research studies, which have in recent times, and to a larger extent, come to incorporate 
qualitative methods (Srivastava & Thomson, 2009; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994; Rist, 1994). Under this 
umbrella of qualitative methodologies, the most prominent approaches used to answer the ‘how’, or process 
related questions in policy studies (as explicated by the theoretical underpinnings of the various frameworks 
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discussed thus far), are participant observation, focus groups, and interviews, used to generate the types of in-
depth data sources that can be analyzed to draw valid conclusions in answer to research questions (Ritchie & 
Spencer, 1994). The narrative method5 is often central to this approach, particularly through the collection of 
first-hand accounts from those participating in the policy process through in-depth interviews, thereby 
allowing for a rich level of detail to be derived from the study of a specified area of policy (Keeley & Scoones, 
2003). Bevir and Richards (2009), in their push for a greater diversity and cultural focus in policy studies 
through what they term ‘decentered theory’, explain: 
‘A decentered theory posits that networks cannot be understood apart from 
traditions. The people whose beliefs, interests and actions constitute a 
network necessarily acquire the relevant interests and beliefs against the 
background of traditions. In other words, there is no essentialist account of a 
network, but only the several stories of the participants and observers. So 
there can be no single tool kit for managing them. Instead practitioners 
learn by telling, listening to and comparing stories’ (Bevir & Richards, 2009: 
7).  
Indeed, a review of case studies on policy process reveals that first-hand accounts are drawn upon as a basis for 
explaining the nuances and motivations behind focused decisions, and explicates the complex inner workings 
of a subsystem that a pure content analysis of policy would likely fail to capture. The theories of the policy 
process described thus far are explanatory in nature, positing various models and approaches to understanding 
the complex phenomena comprising of social and human behaviour that comprise the decision-making 
process.  
 The application of these various Western-based theories to an African context may prove problematic 
in some respects, particularly given the disparity in cultural, administrative, and economic conditions between 
the two contexts (Honadle, 1999). However, as noted previously, the involvement of foreign agencies and the 
relics of colonial occupation have in many instances introduced and cemented Western modes of thought, 
analysis and practice in the policy and legal frameworks of many African countries - as Leach and Mearns 
(1996: 447) observe, ‘In many cases, the ideas that drive contemporary environmental policy in Africa can be 
traced back to early colonial times.’ These policies have been perpetuated through the influence of foreign 
development agencies, and often this type of ‘received wisdom’ is embedded in within the cultural dynamics 
of policymaking to the extent that is becomes indiscernible from indigenous ideas (Hoben, 1996). 
                                                      
5 The narrative inquiry method, as defined by Robert Yin (2011: 17), refers to a type of qualitative research wherein the 
researcher ‘constructs a narrative rendition of the findings from a real-world setting and participants, to accentuate a 
sense of “being there”.’ 
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Adjacent to this discussion is the way in which policy change may occur, that is to say how the 
particular policy position adopted either on a local or national level might shift. While policy change is 
usually incremental (Birkland, 2005), radical shifts do occur, given the right confluence of conditions. 
Grindle & Thomas (1989) suggest that reforms occur either under conditions of duress or during periods of 
more normal operations; determining whether change is occurring under one or the other of these conditions 
is a matter of investigating ‘the stakes involved in reform, the type of public official involved in decision 
making, the degree of change introduced, and the timing of decision making’ (Ibid: 216). In more baseline 
conditions, change can occur through the actions of actors, or pressure from external forces such as 
international bodies through multilateral treaties, although in many instances the onus would be on the 
proponents of change to prove its benefits to decision-makers, who are characteristically risk-averse (Mintrom 
& Norman, 2009). One of the key theories of incremental change is evolutionary theory, which suggests that 
change is an inevitable consequence of the fluctuating nature of policy systems (John, 2003).  
One example of radical change in the administrative or political structure of a state is that of 
devolution and/or decentralization. As Leach & Mearns (1996: 459) contend, these kinds of shifts could have 
the potential to reduce the hegemony of the state in environmental management, allowing for changes in the 
way that policy decisions are made: 
‘If orthodox thinking about natural resource stewardship provides the raison 
d’être for certain state institutions, it is relevant to ask whether it might 
change along with a change in political context. How much room for 
maneuver is there to shift the environmental agenda? Periods of transition 
from one political regime to another may provide an opportunity for [...] 
resistance to be voiced more strongly.’ 
In the case of nation-wide policy, devolved governments face the added challenge of attempting to apply a 
top-down policy that may not necessarily meet with local goals, objectives or even requirements. 
Decentralization in the African context has shown results across a spectrum, and is becoming an increasingly 
popular choice for reform movements across the region. Nonetheless, the actual impacts of devolution and 
decentralization do not always manifest in the same way as theory would suggest (Ribot, 2002) – as such, the 
idea of a more pluralistic policy environment through decentralization should be approached with some 
skepticism.  
It is thus necessary to further explore how the mechanisms of decision-making operate, with regard to 
sources of information, stakeholder collaboration, and the distribution of authority among policymakers. 
While the theories of the policy process described achieve this end in various ways, the following section 
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further details some of the important aspects and concepts of the decision-making process from a theoretical 
standpoint. 
 
2.2 Decision-making and Environmental Governance within the Policy Process 
Moving beyond the characteristics and interactions of the policy elite, of key concern to 
understanding the policy process are the ways that policy is developed through individual and collaborative 
decisions, the main goals and values that are central to environmental decision-making, and the gaps therein 
that impact on policy outcomes. Decision-making may be defined as ‘a process which proceeds via a series of 
stages or phases as part of a problem-solving exercise’ (Adger et al., 2003: 1095). As such, the notion of 
‘governance’ refers to the distribution of authority and power among the myriad of state and non-state actors 
who come together in the decision making process, as opposed to the concept of ‘government’, which would 
refer more exclusively to state administrative process. This is a significant distinction under modern 
conventions of democracy. In addition, the link between policy process research and governance is 
underscored by the fact that ‘understanding the structure of networks is also relevant to the praxis of 
policymaking because policy networks are a key part of the context that shapes the success or failure of 
governance systems’ (Dietz & Henry, 2008 - cited in Henry, 2011: 361). 
In particular, the role of consultation and collaboration is of concern in environmental governance, 
especially in the urban realm where the implications of policy for development impact on the livelihoods and 
quality of life of large and ever-expanding populations. Thus the involvement of the wider public in decision-
making, particularly those groups most affected by a given policy, is crucial to ensuring the validity of its 
objectives and implementation measures (Juma & Clark, 1995). However, in the context of complex or 
broad-based environmental policy, the complication of explaining scientific evidence and the more high-level 
details of policy contents can prove an impediment to inclusive public participation (Keeley & Scoones, 
2003). The integration of public opinion may therefore be considered a necessary evil in democratic process, 
given the implications for more protracted decision-making time frames and a considerable investment of 
resources.  
Modes of decision-making are an important concern for policy theorists, as they form the basis for 
understanding the distribution of power and authority, which in turn would determine just how democratic 
or collaborative the governance approach of a policy subsystem actually is. Both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches have their advantages and setbacks, and each approach is variably effective based on the size of the 
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policy net. Top-down approaches often work best when the scale of the program goes beyond local municipal 
boundaries, while bottom-up approaches are more suited to local-level programs so as to allow for the creation 
of more bespoke and nuanced policy options (Birkland, 2005). Expert advice is also a much sought-after 
resource in determining the potential consequences and efficacy of policy (Juma & Clark, 1995), and given 
the interdisciplinary nature of environmental policy, these experts may be drawn from a variety of fields and 
sectors. These experts form ‘epistemic communities’ (Adler & Haas, 1992), creating a niche for themselves as 
a recognized authority on the spectrum of policymaking methods and their relative efficacy, and acting in an 
advisory capacity transnationally (Peck & Theodore, 2010). Those with specialized scientific or technical 
knowledge, particularly those in the employ of government institutions, think tanks, and multi-lateral bodies, 
form a type of ‘knowledge elite’ – labeled as technocrats, these individuals have a large role in formulating 
evidence-based policy statements (Fischer, 2000). 
Given the wide array of stakeholders and groups of actors involved in the policymaking process, 
arriving at policy decisions which can be agreed upon by all involved is notoriously difficult to achieve (Leach 
& Mearns, 1996). As such, it is expected that there would be a disproportionate distribution of power among 
stakeholders, creating a hierarchy which would lend final, authoritative say to one or a small group of parties 
(Ibid.). State actors are often the major conveners of policy exercises, directing the process and taking 
responsibility for final content (Ibid.). This top-down approach has important implications for the 
democratic value of decision-making procedures and process; as Kapoor (2001: 269) notes, ‘there is an 
emerging body of literature supporting a participatory approach which is decentralized, community oriented 
and holistic in its view of the environment. Participation here is aimed at making environmental decision-
making socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable’. Thus from a governance perspective, leadership is 
an important component of the decision-making process, but by the same token, the input of stakeholders is 
required to be given due consideration in order to provide a legitimate final output for policy.  
Stone et al. (2001) suggest four main conceptions of decision-making in the policy process: the first is 
the rational comprehensive model (RCM), which is highly dependent on the use of expert opinion and values 
the use of empirical research. The second is the ‘muddling through’ approach, which espouses the notion of 
‘bounded rationality’, explained as an approach that ‘focuses on the boundary between rational and the non-
rational aspects of human social behaviour. Decision-makers, accepting the limits of their situation, choose 
compromise policies that satisfy (rather than maximize) organizational goals, and which are acceptable in the 
face of competing demands’ (Ibid: 5). In the environmental policy arena, scientific evidence is a key 
component of deciding policy content. The concept of ‘bounded rationality’ appears repeatedly in models of 
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policy decision-makers who make choices based on the information available to them, seeking not optimal 
results but rather the closest satisfactory outcomes within the limits of the resources available (Grindle & 
Thomas, 1989; Ostrom, 2005).  
The third conception proposed by Stone and her colleagues is that of the knowledge utilization 
model, which is based on authoritative decision-making derived from incremental knowledge growth over a 
protracted policymaking timeframe (Stone et al., 2001). Similar to the RCM, the knowledge utilization 
model lends credence to the use of expert opinion (Ibid.). Lastly, the fourth option is the use of particular 
policy paradigms to dictate decision-making – these range widely, essentially forming a continuum at one end 
of which incremental policy changes are preferred, and at the other end, radical shifts in position (Ibid.).  
It is important to note that the process of decision-making can be optimized, but ultimately there is a 
wide range of factors at play that would affect the outcome of those decisions. For this reason, scholars agree 
that the important social, political, and economic conditions of the context in question should be considered 
when investigating decision-making in the policy process (Grindle & Thomas, 1989). Adger and his 
colleagues propose a set of four criteria which can be applied to judge and compare environmental decision-
making across contexts (Adger et al., 2003: 1098-1099). The first of these is efficiency, which targets the 
incorporation of a range of values and interests across stakeholders, although often a particular emphasis is 
paid to the issue of economic advantage through payments for ecosystem services. Secondly, effectiveness is 
used as a metric for gauging how well the stated policy is at producing the intended results, while a third 
criterion is equity, emphasizing the environmental justice through the distribution of benefits drawn from 
environmental decisions. Fourthly, legitimacy guides the discussion on power sharing and the rules that are 
employed to make decisions, as a way to determine the ‘procedural justice’ of the decision-making process.  
In developing contexts, the persistence of ideas and conceptions of local ecological and environmental 
functions as developed by foreign experts is of some concern, given that in some cases these ‘received 
wisdoms’ were either completely lacking in any form of empirical justification, or worse, were based on 
superficial and therefore misleading data (Leach & Mearns, 1996). For instance, the carrying capacity of land 
areas in Africa based on the observations of colonial settlers were often underestimated in cases where the 
population, thought to be at its peak, was in fact suffering from losses due to environmental or social stressors 
(Brockington & Homewood, 1996; Anderson & Grove, 1987 – cited in Leach & Mearns, 1996). Thus, the 
‘broader economic, political and institutional context shape the manner in which science is put to use in 
public policy’ (Leach & Mearns, 1996: 453). In addition, some current policies which have lingered on from 
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the colonial era were originally drawn from the experiences of settlers in alternative settler outposts, creating a 
thread of consistent policy measures adopted across these contexts (Leach & Mearns, 1996).  
In addition, in the developing world particularly, factors external to the discussion of the 
environment itself often take a more central role in shaping decisions – for instance, the evaluation of policy 
options as part of decision-making inevitably integrates the inherent values of the actors involved, which in 
turn will vary based on political and personal interests (Bracken, 1999; Weible et al., 2012). More specifically, 
in considering the various dimensions of environmental issues, individual perception is subject to a number of 
non-professional related variables, including ‘mental set, self-interest, and local norms’ (Sharpes, Hess & 
Rayes, 2007). These nuances are important because policy decision-makers often act with a degree of 
autonomy while still being limited by their environs (Grindle & Thomas, 1989), and as such the choices they 
make and methods they adopt to make decisions are the product both of who they are as well as their 
operational context.  
Thus in order to better address the complex layers and connectivity of policy statements, a deeper 
exploration is required as to how the policy objectives were derived, not just in terms of the formulation 
process, but also in terms of the theory and assumptions behind these objectives. For instance, consider the 
use of labeling in the context of policy formulation, which refers to way certain descriptions or labels are 
ascribed to populations or ‘“target groups” as passive objects of policy (e.g. the “landless”, “sharecroppers”, 
“women”), rather than active subjects with projects and agendas of their own’ (Leach & Mearns, 1996: 445). 
Furthermore, narratives that weave a particular storyline around these target groups have an important role in 
the types of policy options that are adopted to deal with the environmental challenges they face - as Hoben 
contends, ‘the environmental policies promoted by colonial regimes and later by donors in Africa rest on 
historically grounded, culturally constructed paradigms that at once describe a problem and prescribe its 
solution. Many of them are rooted in a narrative that tells us how things were in an earlier time when people 
lived in harmony with nature, how human agency has altered that harmony, and of the calamities that will 
plague people and nature if dramatic action is not taken soon’ (Hoben, 1995:1008). 
The use of labels and corresponding narratives in shaping policy should therefore also factor into an 
evaluation of policy in order to determine the basis for recommended actions. While policies do tend to 
compress or simplify the problem or issue at hand, it is crucial to examine how this reduction is approached, 
and whether it is legitimate in the context of serving the wider public interest (Crabbé and Leroy, 2008). For 
instance, Cocklin (1988) in his description of land preservation issues, notes that the motivations of policy 
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should be deciphered beyond their stated objectives, for there may be a trade-off between these two elements. 
He states:  
‘It is in the policy arena that the spatial element has even further significance 
relative to the land transferal issue. This is because it might, for example, be 
in the interests of a particular municipality to zone land at the urban 
periphery for residential and industrial use. Not the least important 
justification would be an enhanced rating base. However, the zoning may be 
counterproductive relative to national food supply goals. This would be the 
case particularly if the land had some special significance in terms of food 
production’ (Ibid: 97). 
The values endorsed by a policy thus form the basis for the types of objectives and interventions that it 
prescribes. When evaluating a policy, it is useful to understand the standpoint from which the problem it 
addresses has been framed. 
Interestingly, a review of the literature reveals a cleavage between investigations of policy formulation, 
and policy implementation. Numerous scholars over the years have argued against this separationist paradigm, 
noting the fallacy of segregating these elements of the policy process and advocating for more feedback-
oriented approaches that favour information exchange and adaptation of policy development based on 
implementation challenges on the ground, such as Juma and Clark (1995) who advocate that in practice, 
implementation should inform formulation, and vice versa. Furthermore, while scientific evidence has a use in 
informing policy decisions, it is important that science is not used as a means to undermine the value of 
inclusive stakeholder input, but rather as a means to optimize the development of the most mutually 
beneficial approach (Keeley & Scoones, 2003). Likewise, monitoring and feedback practices from the 
implementation of policy then informs scientific research, which in turn would communicate its findings to 
policymakers. In this manner, concurrent iterative processes would develop in a nexus of policy development, 
science, and implementation (see Jäger, 1998, for a discussion on the science-policy feedback loop).  
These elements of the decision-making process thus create a theoretical setting for understanding 
how policymakers are influenced by factors both within their policy subsystem and beyond, taking into 
account the sources of information, the partnerships and alliances that form between actors, and the ways in 
which decisions taken at one point in the policy process would come to impact upon other points and stages 
in the process. For any given policy initiative, the process of decision-making will vary (Grindle & Thomas, 
1989); this lack of constancy means that policy studies remain a dynamic and ever-evolving arena, with 
lessons to be learned from every policy experience. The following section further explores the linkages 
between policy formulation and implementation in the context of the consequences of policy for subsequent 
   28 
planning and development projects on the ground.  
 
2.3 Operationalizing Policy Through Implementation: Linking Policy with Practice in 
Planning 
As noted in the preceding discussion, the area of environmental policy has the potential to impact 
greatly on the planning process on the ground. Given that this thesis is towards a Master of Environmental 
Science in Planning, it is important to more concretely link the narrative of policy formulation with that of 
planning process. Traditionally, the fields of urban planning and policy analysis, particularly environmental 
policy, have had a distinctive level of overlap, although in recent times a greater degree of labour division 
between these two fields has emerged (Alterman and McRae, 1983). Nonetheless, exercises in policy 
formulation and implementation are usually ingrained in the activities of planning departments, particularly 
at the local level (Ibid.). In addition to this, policy as a regulatory mechanism has a clear relevance to planning 
practice, given that all plans must adhere to the same framework of laws in order to allow for structured 
development. Given the complexity of modern developing urban contexts, it is logical to anticipate the ideal 
merger of the expertise of policy development and analysis with planning practice. For planning practitioners 
to function effectively in an urban environment, an understanding of the motivations behind policy and the 
processes that form it is essential to influencing the content of policy and subsequently the ultimate outcome 
of planning proposals – as Lucy (2007: 306) argues, ‘planning academics and practitioners should consider 
expanding, rather than limiting, their roles and subjects, in particular by overlapping more into public 
administration and policy analysis’.  
While policy is a critical component of environmental governance as it aids in bringing together the 
interests and perspectives of the target population, policies are also a predecessor to the more specific acts or 
legislation that convert them from intent to practice. Zube (1984: 17) states, ‘(…) policies, which tend to be 
generalized statements, need to be expressed in more specific terms as goals and objectives in order to facilitate 
policy implementation in programs and projects’. It therefore follows that the considerable majority of 
planning and development undertakings are hinged on the existence of a well-structured, collaborative, and 
ethical policy decision-making framework, which includes both compliance with and enforcement of legal 
statutes (Keeley & Scoones, 2003). In common with planning interventions, policy decisions may sometimes 
culminate in unintended consequences, creating or compounding conditions that are in opposition to their 
intended purpose (Adger et al., 2003).  
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 Thus, policy is in reality constantly in a state of change, and particularly in Africa’s developing 
setting, the capacity to adapt to change and develop flexible policy interventions is crucial to maintaining 
growth and progress (Juma & Clark, 1995). Given this requirement of adaptability, an important aspect of 
the policy process is the monitoring and feedback mechanisms that would identify gaps and challenges 
presented by existing policy, and create room for constructive review and amendments that would then be 
integrated during policy revision exercises. As such, the area of policy evaluation and analysis is a critical 
aspect of policy review. The following section explores some relevant examples of existing environmental 
policy studies that have been conducted in the African context, in order to provide some background on the 
particular aspects of environmental policy that are of interest in the region, and the theories and methods used 
in their research. 
 
2.4 The Current State of Research on African Environmental Policy Process  
The available literature on policy process in the African context is severely limited; while numerous 
studies (described below), have examined the role of foreign aid, expert knowledge and scientific information 
in policy creation, issues such as agenda setting, decision-making frameworks and the influence of political 
and cultural norms have not featured significantly in the existing discourse. Indeed, knowledge of the policy 
process is considered to be one of the most important and largely ignored spheres of policy research in the 
developing world (Juma & Clark, 1995). In recent years, attempts have been made to reduce the existing 
research gap, and these research studies often adopt a case study approach, focusing on a particular location 
and type of policy in order to provide in-depth, real world information (Yin, 2011) on the policy process in 
that context.  
Policy studies in the African region have often been interested in the role of foreign agencies and 
governments in local affairs, with a range of opinions on the positive and negative consequences of such 
international partnerships in guiding governance and development. The role and influence of foreign aid 
agencies in shaping policy discourses has been explored by multiple scholars, including Norton-Griffiths, 
(2010) who argues for the reduced role of foreign NGOs in Kenya, and Svensson (2000) who claims that aid 
has been beneficial for supporting the policy process in developing economies, and that conditional aid can be 
effective under conditions of mutual commitment between donors and recipients, a view supported by the 
work of Goldsmith (2001). The phenomenon of co-production of science and policy and the various 
international agencies that play a role in the environmental policy process in West Africa are explored by 
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Fairhead & Leach (2003). The World Bank view on policy process in the developing world, with particular 
attention to Africa, has been elucidated by Sutton (1999), who looks at the major concepts and influencing 
factors in policymaking and the roles of the various stakeholders involved from a general perspective in 
developmental policy. 
Several policy studies have emerged as an extension of research into particular areas of environmental 
science, such as the dynamics of soil nutrient balance (Scoones & Toulmin, 1998), or particular aspects of the 
policy process, such as multi-stakeholder collaboration or public participation. This is embodied by the work 
of researchers such as Kameri-Mbote (2000) and Kimani (2010a; 2010b) on participatory governance in 
Kenya; Devas & Grant (2003) on municipal-level decision-making in the context of decentralization and 
citizen involvement in governance in Uganda and Kenya; and Menezes and her colleagues (2009) on the 
various stakeholder institutions involved in fisheries regulation in Mozambique. Ikdahl and her colleagues 
(2005) discuss the complex issue of land rights, which ties into almost every area of national policy, with 
reference to Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The System-wide Program on Collective 
Action and Property Rights (CAPRi, 2009) has also published the work of numerous scholars on land issues 
from a developmental and progress-based perspective in the African region.  
In addition, policy implementation is a key area of interest in the literature, and numerous studies 
have examined the factors that influence policy success or failure at this stage of the process. As Kimani 
(2010a) observes from interviews with policy actors in Kenya and across East Africa, implementation failures 
could potentially be caused by unrealistically ambitious policy statements, deficits in capacity of institutions, 
strategic shortfalls in regulations, or even the cultural and intellectual values of officials charged with 
implementation. Kameri-Mbote has written on a variety of legal issues relating the implementation of various 
environmental protocols, policies, and acts, including the Cartagena Protocol in Africa, which regulates the 
GMO industry with respect to transgenic crops (Kameri-Mbote, 2000), as well as the Environmental 
Management and Co-ordination Act of Kenya, in collaboration with Okidi and colleagues (2008), and more 
generally regarding the environmental management framework in Kenya and the historic shaping forces from 
the colonial era (Kameri-Mbote & Cullet, 1997).  
In recent years there appears to be a growing interest in applying dominant models and theories to 
test their applicability to the policy context in Africa. Some examples include Ridde (2009), who applied the 
Multiple Streams (MS) framework developed by Kingdon (1995) to investigate health policy implementation 
in Burkina Faso, West Africa, using a case study methodology that integrated in-depth unstructured 
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interviews, focus groups, document analysis and field observation. In this study, Ridde applied the notion of a 
‘coupling’ between the problem stream (in this case care for the indigent) of the MS framework and the 
problem stream (in this case public health policy), during implementation.  
In an environment and resource management context, Tewari (2000) selected the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF) proposed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) as a theoretical basis in her 
study on the prospects and sustainability of commercial forestry in South Africa. Interestingly, this particular 
study did not integrate any qualitative research methods, but appears to be drawn on the author’s knowledge 
of the real-world setting and supported by secondary data sources. Huntjens et al. (2011) also experimented 
with the applicability of ACF theory to their cross-national research on policy learning and water 
management regimes on three continents (including Africa), but ultimately decided that it was inadequate in 
explaining their observations and instead proposed their method of modeling the various levels of learning on 
the part of decision-makers during the policy process. Huntjens and his colleagues selected a questionnaire as 
their method of data collection, with qualitative data coded according the indicators they were targeting. 
Phillips and Seck (2004) have compiled a set of studies on policy issues and processes in seven African 
countries, albeit from a primarily fiscal and economic point of view. Their book on the subject is a 
compilation of studies by various authors on the ways in which African economies apply public policy, 
particularly with respect to various market sectors.  
Notably, the work of Keeley and Scoones (2003) provides an in-depth look at the policy process in 
Ethiopia, Mali and Zimbabwe, with a focus on the management of agricultural resources and policy debates 
on soil fertility. The roles and mutual interactions of various policy actors with the environment they manage 
have been explored in the context of South Africa and Ghana by Leach, Mearns, and Scoones (1999). 
Network approaches have contributed extensively to the work of all these scholars, although policy network 
theory has been more prominently applied in Western contexts, where as Primmer (2011: 133) notes, 
‘network analyses have paid attention to ways in which actors communicate relative to, learn about, and 
influence natural resource management.’ There is therefore a significant precedent for the applicability of the 
various theories discussed in this chapter in both an environmental as well as an African context. The 
following section summarizes the key points of this literature review and the way forward to applying some 
selected theories to this research study.  
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2.5 Summary and Theoretical Framework for the Study 
As this literature review demonstrates, the policy process in any given arena, be it the environment or 
any other, is a complex area of study and there are a number of multifaceted perspectives and lenses through 
which it can be approached. The underlying basis of this study is that the mechanics of the environmental 
policy process in Nairobi and the subsequent content of the policy that is its outcome, together form the basis 
for the implementation of policy, on which developmental planning is predicated. As such, the challenges of 
protecting natural resources and regard for environmental services in the course of planning can be traced to 
the decisions and values that are held by those involved in the early stages of policy formulation. In effect, in 
order to understand why existing environmental policies and laws have failed to adequately provide for 
environmental considerations in planning, one must go back and examine every stage of the policy process 
from the beginning.  
To that end, this thesis provides an in-depth look at how decision-making in the environmental 
policy process in Nairobi takes place, both during the formulation as well as the implementation of said 
policy. The objective, in doing so, is to shed light on the particular reasons why policies either succeed or fail 
on the ground, what sorts of challenges are faced under the current system of environmental policy decision-
making and governance, and offer suggestions how these challenges may be addressed under the reformed 
structure of devolution and decentralization that Kenya is moving towards. For purposes of this thesis, given 
the focus on both the roles of the various institutional and individual actors involved in the policy process as 
well as the power and authority associated with the positions held by these actors, a combination of both the 
political and institutional lenses was adopted. A case study methodology was adopted, as is the most common 
approach in policy process research. The specific aspects of the qualitative methodology are charted in detail 
in Chapter 4 of this thesis, and a summary of the key theoretical underpinnings of the methodology is 
outlined below.  
There are three components to this study of the environmental policy process in Nairobi. The first is 
the policy formulation process, examining which particular agencies play a role in the policy process, how 
networks and authority distribution form between these actors, and the contextual climate in which decision-
making takes place (in terms of the political and social forces that shape the policy content development 
process). Secondly, following on the formulation process, the implementation of policy also merits scrutiny, 
particularly given the realm of influence of environmental policy in affecting planning and development. 
Implementation is a highly context dependent process, as Kemp and Pontoglio (2011: 35) conclude from 
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their study on the innovation effects of environmental policy: ‘policy impacts depend on the design of the 
policies and context in which they are used. Research should be more concerned to the generation of robust 
knowledge than it presently is... there is no single truth about it: the influence of policies is bound to differ 
across places and sectors.’  
Thirdly, the policy network approach (Adam & Kriesi, 2007), was selected as the ‘analytical toolbox’ 
for understanding the layers and complexity surrounding the interconnections and relationships between 
participants in the policy making and implementation processes. The network approach was selected over the 
other policy process theories and frameworks described in this Chapter because of its focus on what network 
arrangements can tell us about the way that policy is formulated and implemented, and the link between 
network types and policy outcomes, which provides the connection to planning on the ground. This 
approach has been adapted to Nairobi’s developing context with respect to the types of agencies that typically 
participate in policy development and implementation, and with respect to cultural considerations regarding 
practices on collaborative governance and public participation in decision-making. The application of the 
network approach is tested for its potential contribution to current knowledge on how major urban centers in 
developing countries, particularly in Africa, create and operationalize policy in an environment where foreign 
agencies are also actively involved as key stakeholders in the governance scheme. A more detailed description 
of the analytical tools used in the Network Approach is laid out in Chapter 7. 
This study yields insights into the character of the policy process in an urban developing context; the 
conclusions drawn, while primarily embedded in Nairobi’s specific circumstances, also have to the potential 
to extend to other urban centers in the country, and create a basis for future research as to the impacts of the 
reforms the country is currently undergoing with respect to governance restructuring and growth. Table 1 
provides a summary of the key aspects and variables selected for this study, and the corresponding analytical 
approaches that were adopted to examine and measure them.  
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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
ASPECT 
VARIABLES ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Formulation: Decision-making during 
policy formulation 
1) Stakeholder collaboration and 
public participation in decision-
making 
2) Authority and power distribution 
in the actor network 
3) Critical environmental concerns 
in Nairobi County 
4) Gaps in existing policies or 
processes 
5) Uses and sources of scientific or 
fact-based evidence and data 
6) Implications of policy and 
administrative reform 
 
Use of a case-study, narrative based 
approach to examining the 
formulation and implementation 
processes of environmental policy. 
Implementation:  Challenges, existing 
gaps between policy and practice and 
the reasons for these gaps 
Analysis of the environmental policy 
network as an indicator of future policy 
outcomes 
1) No. of actors in the network 
2) Complexity of the network 
3) Degree of self referentiality of the 
network 
4) Conflicts between actors 
5) Costs of network management 
 
Variables and typology laid out by 
Adam & Kriesi (2007) in their 
assessment of the Network Approach, 
and supplemented by additional 
policy network theorists as applicable 
to the study data 
Table 1 SUMMARY OF ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
As Keeley and Scoones (2000: 90) contend, ‘policies…are culturally embedded, and understanding 
how national and sub-national political and administrative histories and practices shape policy processes is 
key’. With this in mind, the next Chapter (Chapter 3) explores the history and current administrative and 
institutional structure of the environmental planning arena in Nairobi, with respect to both policy and 
practice.  
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 Chapter 3
Environmental Policy in the Kenyan Context: Case Study Background  
A discussion of the environmental policy subsystem (as defined in the literature review) in Kenya 
would not be complete without a description of the macro level setting within which it operates. Indeed, 
Birkland (2010) indicates that the physical, cultural and legislative conditions of the wider country framework 
must be understood in order to adequately address the functioning of the policy arena. As the literature review 
showed, the arena of environmental policy is often closely intertwined with that of planning, and this is no 
less true in Kenya. The city of Nairobi has been at the center of Kenyan political and legal reform since 
Independence from British colonial rule was attained in 1963. As an emerging urban region, current 
challenges on the path to sustainable development include: a lack of cohesive administrative guidance in 
urban planning, in that the aspects of urban planning are segregated across a range of institutions with 
overlapping mandates; a distinct lack of a well articulated strategic framework or masterplan for the city’s 
growth; and a burgeoning population as a result of increased rural-urban migration from around the country, 
natural increase, and the expansion of the urban boundary (Cohen, 2004; UNEP, 2009).  
The following sections summarize the general history of planning and environmental policy over the 
course of Nairobi’s development history, the current state of planning within the urban boundary, and the 
anticipated changes to the governance structure following the General Elections held in March 2013. An 
exploration of the environmental governance system in Kenya and at the local level in Nairobi is provided, in 
order to identify the key actors in the environmental policy subsystem in Nairobi. This is important because, 
as Weible et al. (2012: 6) explain:  
‘For individuals wanting to achieve their goals, understanding the structure 
of policy subsystems—e.g., who is involved, what are the boundaries of an 
issue, how is information shared, how are decisions made—is critical 
because goal achievement usually requires attention to policy issues within 
an existing government program or policy or groups of policies and 
programs. Knowing the policy subsystem helps simplify a macro-political 
system by bounding individuals and issues and removes those policy issues 
and decisions that are irrelevant to the issue of concern.’  
While it is outside the scope of this background study to fully trace the history of colonial control in 
Kenya, some of the salient events of the most recent settlement, that of British origin, are briefly revisited in 
order to paint a portrait of the urban regime that existed leading up to independence and its influence on 
contemporary urban planning in Nairobi.  
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3.1 Historical Context of Planning and Environmental Regulations, Strategies and 
Policies in Nairobi 
Urban planning in Kenya has been strongly influenced by British colonial rule, and several of the 
laws and policies enacted prior to the achievement of independence in 1963 are still in place (Otiso, 2005; 
Klopp, 2000).  A timeline of planning developments up to 2009 is provided in Appendix A. The British 
colonial empire arrived in Kenya in the late 1800’s, and selected Nairobi to be one of the major settlement 
points along the Uganda Railway (Otiso, 2005). A trading economy was soon established based on key cash 
crops, particularly tea and coffee. In 1948, a masterplan for the city was produced that outlined some of the 
main objectives for development (Ibid.). Seen as a plan for the establishment of a predominantly colonial 
settler town, the design put in place a land zoning scheme that allocated 90% of land to white settlers and 
10% to the Asian population, leaving the marginalized African labour population to fend for themselves in 
squatter abodes that had begun to mushroom around the town periphery (Aschwanden & Vogel, 2007). 
These informal settlements continue to persist and have been the object of recent upgrading schemes, with 
varying results. The urbanization of larger sections of the urban periphery will require the relocation of some 
of these populations, which introduces further complexity in terms of preserving indigenously owned land 
that may be drawn upon to create future settlements.  
Kenya once again became a sovereign nation on 12 December 1963, witnessing the withdrawal of 
British colonial control and the rise to power of the first president, Jomo Kenyatta. Kimani & Musungu 
(2010) summarize the creation of policy and legislative acts passed to guide construction and city building in 
the early years of independence. Prominent among these was the Land Planning Act of 1968, which was 
formulated along the lines of the previously existing Town and Country Planning Act; as the building by-laws 
were not suited to the urban challenges of a rapidly growing city, a low-cost housing building by-laws review 
was conducted in 1979 (Ibid.). The modified standards met with Cabinet approval in the mid 1980’s. The 
guidelines were designed to improve access to affordable housing within the urban center of Nairobi and 
provide a framework to ensure that construction met with certain standards of quality and design, although 
there was no clear regulation on environmental protection in the course of urban development. The impetus 
for this early planning act came primarily from the unmitigated growth of informal settlements along the 
outskirts of the city, which were becoming increasingly difficult for the city to police and service.   
The Land Planning Act of 1968 was repealed in 1996 with the institution of the Physical Planning 
Act (Kimani & Musungu, 1979). The new language in the legal framework addressed development at three 
levels: national, regional, and local, an improvement over the 1968 act which was limited in its inclusion of 
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rural areas (Ibid.). The 1996 act also empowered local municipalities with the decision-making authority to 
formulate, execute and enforce additional by-laws and standards as appropriate to their circumstances (Ibid.). 
However, the weight of the act was impeded by a distinct lack of capital both in terms of material and labour 
across municipalities as well as a missing support structure to provide assistance through the federal 
government (Ibid.). In order to enforce greater accountability in terms of environmental and resource 
preservation, the Environmental Management and Coordination Act (EMCA) was passed and implemented 
in 1999 (National Council for Law Reporting, 1999). The EMCA works in tandem with the Physical 
Planning Act, laying out specific procedures and requirements for environmental protection and impact 
assessment (Kameri-Mbote, 2005) that insure that these aspects of development are adequately considered 
alongside the issues of morphology, density, and design. In addition, the EMCA empowers individual citizens 
by codifying their right to take legal action to ensure environmental justice. This is evident in clauses 
pertaining the polluter pays principle, sustainable development, rights to information, and precedent setting 
locus standi in case of legal disputes that can be brought to the attention of the court system (EMCA, 1999; 
Kameri-Mbote, 2005). 
The first comprehensive development strategy for the city after independence was produced in 1973, 
and was designed to carry the city to the year 2000 (Ministry of Lands, 2008). Titled the ‘Metropolitan 
Growth Strategy’, the plan was a distinct shift from the colonial period plans, with the key contrast being that 
much of the legalized racial bias with respect to development objectives was largely eliminated. The 1973 plan 
also used highly conservative population estimates as provided by the Ministry of Lands to outline a growth 
corridor for the installation of public infrastructure to guide development; this stretched well outside 
Nairobi’s Central Business District to the rural highlands of Ruiru and Thika (Aschwanden & Vogel, 2007). 
The strategy was not well implemented and the growth corridor has not been realized, as much of the 
intensification has taken place on a more concentrated scale within Nairobi’s urban core (Kimani & 
Musungu, 2010). Ultimately, the command-and-control framework institutionalized by the Colonial 
administration, and which to a large extent persists today, has been seen as inadequate to fulfilling the 
environmental management needs of Kenya and other countries with similar tenets in place (Kimani, 2009).  
 
3.2 Urban Administration: The Institutional Framework  
In contemporary Nairobi, one of the key issues that plague the arena of urban governance is the 
fragmented state of the planning legislature and statutes described in the first section of this chapter, which 
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are spread across several ministries and are often in conflict with one another – for instance, the Ministry of 
Lands is the primary source of regulatory land management for all areas of Kenya, although the Ministry of 
Public Health wields a significant amount of sway over the development of housing (through the mandate of 
the Public Health Act of 1972, drafted to mitigate the potential for overcrowding and unsafe or unsanitary 
dwellings). The Ministry of Regional Development handles more large-scale planning but does also have an 
impact on city level planning, as well as the Ministry of Public Works dealing with infrastructure, Ministry of 
Roads and Ministry of Housing which all have a seat at the table in planning decisions for Nairobi. 
The environmental policy process in Kenya is spearheaded by the Ministry of Environment and 
Mineral Resources (MEMR), which oversees the activities of subsidiary offices including the National 
Environment Council (NEC) on policy creation, the National Environment Tribunal on environmental legal 
disputes, and the National Environment Action Plan (NEAP) which brings together a cross-sectorial 
committee to develop strategic proposals for environmental management in the country. The implementation 
process falls under the purview of another MENR subsidiary, the National Environmental Management 
Authority (NEMA). NEMA operates as an independent commission responsible for the enforcement of 
policies and regulations developed under the auspices of the Ministry of Environment. These two government 
bodies thus form the core of the environmental governance process in Kenya. However, as the literature 
review depicts, the environmental agenda in Kenya is further divided at the public level between a number of 
arms of government, including the Ministry of Lands, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Water, Ministry of 
Agriculture, and the Ministry of State for Planning, National Development, and Vision 2030. All of these 
offices are considered stakeholders in the governance process, and provide input into new policies formed by 
the Ministry of Environment. At the level of Nairobi County, the Nairobi City Council through its 
Directorate of Environment and Department of Planning oversee the majority of environmental management 
issues for the county. 
In recent years, public disapproval of the ad hoc structure of planning in Nairobi has led to the 
creation of the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development (MNMD) in 2008 by presidential decree.  
The MNMD holds a mandate for ‘equitably distributing resources and development throughout the country, 
providing a framework for sustainable urbanization through providing capacity for urban and regional 
planning, provision of adequate housing for all, replacement of slums with affordable housing, improve and 
enhance proper infrastructure and sanitary facilities, among others’ (MNMD, 2008). The MNMD released 
the ‘Nairobi Vision 2030’ strategic plan in 2010, a document that has been met with mixed reviews by the 
urban population it speaks for. As mentioned, the Plan 2030 document envisions a much wider urban 
   39 
boundary for Nairobi, a point of contention for some planners who have criticized the expanded scope as 
being motivated by political interest and profit rather than being derived from sound planning principles 
(Kigada, TEDx Conference Presentation, 2010). At the national level, the Kenya Vision 2030 development 
program was launched in 2008, and has been designed as a strategic plan aimed at developing the country’s 
the economic capacity by capitalizing on local assets and greater urbanization through infrastructure 
improvements (Kenya Vision 2030, 2008). This document does not prioritize environmental management, 
but incorporates it into the ‘social’ projects arm of the plan, thus hinting at the federal government’s level of 
commitment to environmental issues.  
The permutation of all these separate arms of government agencies sharing a stake in environmental 
planning and policy makes for a complicated and lengthy process in deciphering the planning code and 
dealing with bureaucratic elements along the way. The nascent and unconfirmed governance structure under 
the new Constitution may lead to significant changes in the mandates of these public entities, some of which 
may be subsumed under local county leadership. The issue of institutional capacity and efficiency would need 
to be revisited by the legislature following the General Elections, expected to cement the roles of leadership 
structures.  As Flanagan et al. (2011) observe, the existence of a ‘policy mix’ can lead to certain conflicts 
between stakeholders, depending on the degree to which they are complementary or incompatible. 
Disagreements may thus arise between policy rationales, policy goals, and/or implementation approaches 
(Ibid: 709).  
Going beyond public institutions, as mentioned in the previous chapter, there are a number of 
additional stakeholders involved in environmental governance, both at the national and at the local level. The 
private sector often participates in the policy process through public forums, or on a consultancy basis on 
particular projects. These institutions are often seen as possessors of practical knowledge garnered through the 
implementation or application of policies and laws in planning and development projects, and are therefore a 
valuable contributor to the strategic components of policy. In contrast to their counterparts in the private 
sector, civil society groups in Kenya have an active presence in policy debates and processes. There are a wide 
variety of CSOs working at the grassroots level, and community economic development often intersects with 
environmental sustainability in their activities. CSOs are governed by legal mechanisms, and may be 
considered a conduit for public interest. However, foreign donors frequently provide aid to CSOs, thereby 
exerting significant influence on activities and the types of engagements pursued based on the conditions of 
the funding (Bratton, 1989). Aid agencies of foreign governments and multilateral bodies like the United 
Nations Environment Programme and UN-Habitat have a long history in Kenya, and have been involved in 
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shaping the environmental and urban development framework which currently governs Nairobi (Kimani, 
2010a). 
Academic institutions have long been held as the centers for expertise and specialized knowledge. In 
recent years, the level of academic involvement in policy affairs in Kenya has decreased. Nonetheless, 
individual researchers often participate in policy teams and provide expert advice on content and reforms. In 
recent years, there has been increased attention in Kenyan academia with regard to environmental 
management and policy affairs, as evidenced by the institution of the Department of Environmental 
Management and Planning in 1991 at Kenyatta University, one of the country’s largest institutes of higher 
learning, as well as a local branch of the Swiss-based International Environmental Law Research Center 
(IELRC), and the Center for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and Policy (CASELAP) at the 
University of Nairobi Faculty of Law which opened in 2010. 
In addition to these formal institutions, there are a number of informal community organizations, 
CSOs, and individuals working at the grassroots level to manage resources and who often play a role in micro-
level environmental management - in some instances, the goals of these entities may conflict with that of the 
administrative apparatus (Kameri-Mbote, 2005). Some of the challenges that may arise from this contentious 
relationship between the public and nongovernmental sectors are discussed in the next section.  
 
3.3 Contemporary Environmental Planning Challenges in Nairobi 
Rapid urban expansion has contributed significantly toward environmental degradation of land and 
waterways in recent years (Mundia & Aniya, 2006). In 2010, a landmark referendum was passed and 
promulgated for the new Kenyan Constitution, following over two decades of reform negotiations between 
government, the civil sector, and international human rights groups (Githinji & Holmquist, 2011). The new 
Constitution makes several amendments to the national land rights policy with a view to increasing ownership 
security and preventing malpractice, corruption and land grabbing (Hansen, 2011); however, as the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies notes, ‘land remains closely tied to the electoral dynamics of Kenya, 
meaning that many vested interests will stand to lose if these reforms are successfully implemented’ (Kennedy 
& Bieniek, 2010).  
In essence, land tenure and environmental justice are closely linked, and the consequences of 
annexing ex-urban land into the metropolitan boundary (as determined in the Nairobi Metro 2030 Spatial 
Plan of 2008) has already raised conflicting interests, since land ownership is linked to tribal heritage in 
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Kenya. For instance, the Maasai Tribal Community of Kajiado has filed a public declaration opposing the 
creation of the new urban policy boundary, with the contention that their ancestral land has been 
expropriated in the process (Kajiado Declaration at Isinya, 2009). The institution of a new metropolitan 
boundary is a crucial turning point in the urban development of Nairobi, particularly since food security and 
climate change adaptation are closely entwined with political conflict in Kenya and across Africa (Boone, 
2007; Eriksen & Lind, 2009). 
Land use planning in Nairobi has been impeded by a lack of spatial data, legislative deficiencies and 
decision making difficulties caused by conflicting user demands (Mundia & Aniya, 2006; Kameri-Mbote, 
2005). Table 2 below shows how land uses have changed in Nairobi between 1976 and 2000, with a notable 
increase in the built-up component of 351% and a 74% reduction in forest cover. Conservation of natural 
parks is the cornerstone of the natural tourism economy, and protection of wildlife reserves falls under the 
purview of the federal government (Akama, 1996). The effects of climate change in recent years have 
manifested in severe drought conditions, creating food shortages and loss of life in many arid parts of Kenya 
(Eriksen & Lind, 2009). Urban agriculture in urban Nairobi was barred during colonial rule but has emerged 
in the years since independence as a subsistence-oriented activity, primarily undertaken by migrants to the city 
(Lado, 1990). 
YEAR 1976 2000 
LANDUSE CLASS Area (km2) % (of total area) Area (km2) % (of total area) 
Urban/Built-up 13.99 1.90 61.23 8.58 
Agriculture 49.83 6.98 87.78 12.30 
Forests 100.15 14.04 23.56 3.30 
Bushlands 154.48 22.35 95.98 13.45 
Mixed Rangeland 357.32 50.08 237.63 33.31 
Shrub/bush range 25.22 3.53 170.78 23.94 
Open/transitional 6.92 0.96 32.72 4.58 
Water 0.50 0.07 3.77 0.53 
Total 713.41 100.00 713.45 100.00 
Table 2 LANDUSE CHANGES IN NAIROBI BETWEEN 1976 AND 2000. Source: Mundia & Aniya (2006: Table IV) 
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Environmental protection and public consultation are two areas that have been strongly influenced 
by international legislation, with Kenya as a signatory to multilateral agreements which help provide citizens 
with a platform to campaign for the protection of natural habitats (Kameri-Mbote, 2000). Kenyan federal 
legislature does not contain explicit statutes on the implementation of public information sessions or 
consultation, nor does the Constitution contain a proviso on the right to information. However, public 
participation particularly where environmental issues are concerned does extend from the rights and 
protection of life in the Constitution (Ibid.).  
The issue of sustainable urban development practice is intricately linked to public process; both of 
these are predominantly foreign aid causes. As Myers (2008) describes it, the ‘donor-driven character of much 
urban policy and urban research in sub-Saharan Africa keeps the neoliberal SUD [Sustainable Urban 
Development] approach to the fore regardless of injustice or the absence of urban democracy’. In Kenya, the 
World Bank has had a significant impact in developing environmental governance, particularly with respect 
to EIA procedure and inclusion of public opinion, as the Bank makes public participation in mandatory 
environmental assessments of projects a condition of aid continuity  (Kameri-Mbote, 2000). For the most 
part, the consultation process tends to include some influential NGOs and public interest groups, along with 
developers and government stakeholders. Public meetings are not a regular part of the proceedings, despite the 
success of some in incorporating the views of community participants for the betterment of project 
performance (Chege, 2006). Particularly in regard to issues of land tenure and rights of the urban poor as 
discussed above, the voices of the marginalized are silenced (UN-Habitat, 2009). As Kameri-Mbote (2000: 
12) points out, ‘although regulations on the right of public participation in environmental decision-making 
have been promulgated, overall assessment indicates that these rights have not been realized in practice’.  
Regular Kenyans have thus found alternative ways to express their concerns over various development 
projects. One of the most poignant examples of this is can be seen in the campaigns against land grabbing and 
deforestation in the Karura Forest, the last remaining natural forest reserve in Nairobi (Klopp, 2000). The late 
Wangari Maathai led the campaign, along with local NGOs and concerned citizens, who opposed the 
clearance of the forest and were instrumental in its preservation (Maathai, 2004). Maathai was one of the co-
founders of the Green Belt Movement, a civil rights and environmentalist movement that had at its 
foundation a group of remarkable, organized and purposeful Kenyan women who believed in the cause of 
conservation and environmental protection (Nixon, 2011). Even in the face of police brutality and 
government opposition, the advocacy campaign had the effect of securing the protection of hundreds of acres 
of natural forest and planting over 30 million trees (Maathai, 2004).  
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Another landmark project is Operation Firimbi (‘whistle’ in Kiswahili), an NGO-led drive to reduce 
corruption and land grabbing by providing whistle-blowers with a platform to be heard nationally. This 
campaign has received international acclaim due its success in raising awareness and a sense of patriotic action 
among private citizens (Klopp, 2000; UN-Habitat, 2006). The initiative included the dissemination of 
educational and awareness building materials to inspire public interest and action, by identifying three main 
categories of property rights: public, private, and community land (Mazingira Institute, 2010). A hotline was 
put in place to take calls from citizens when corrupt procurement of land or expropriation was witnessed; in 
September 2010, the Mazingira Institute reported that ‘Over 300 of these cases were presented to the 
Commission of Inquiry into Irregular and Illegal Allocation of Public Land, commonly known as the 
Ndung’u Commission’ (Mazingira Institute, 2010). In particular, forest has successfully been protected 
through this mechanism of facilitating public awareness, in a way that existing environmental policies have 
failed to achieve. The civil sector thus provides citizens with access to due process, facilitating the 
circumvention of barriers to class and ethno-tribal exclusion (Fox, 1988). Indeed, Njeru (2010) asserts that 
governance decisions that led to the protection of the much-contested Karura Forest (one of the last 
remaining vestiges of urban peripheral forest land in Nairobi) were precipitated by pressure from the domestic 
civil sector as well as international observers, rather than an interest in the civil rights of the urban poor.  
 
3.4 National Environmental Policy in Kenya 
Kenya’s first ever National Environmental Policy is currently in its fifth draft, and as per legal 
procedure will be submitted for Parliamentary review within the next few months once stakeholder 
consultations are deemed complete by the Director of Policy at the Ministry of Environment and Mineral 
Resources (MEMR). The saga of events leading up to the current version of the NEP dates back to 2007, 
when an attempt was first made by the MENR to assemble a team with a mandate to craft such a document 
(Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, 2007). This first team was eventually disbanded, and over 
the intervening years since then, the policy formulation process was largely handed over to private consultants 
external to the MEMR as a means to expedite the outcome (Interview, GOVT1; Interview, GOVT2). 
The delay in creating the NEP may stem from the colonial legacy of sectorial environmental policy, 
which in many cases lays out a distinctive divide between the mandates of the various environment-related 
ministries, and creates a culture of parochial attention to specific issues rather than a system wide approach to 
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environmental management (Kimani, 2010a). Kimani (2010a: 39) describes the clear directional procedure 
involved in creating environmental law, which largely resembles the policy creation procedure: 
‘First, a national consultant’s review of national environmental law and 
policy takes place, which is followed by a draft law. Next, a national 
consensus-building workshop is held to review the draft law’s overall 
normative prescriptions, procedural requirements and institutional 
arrangements. Here, the national consensus-building workshop offers the 
40-60 individuals, drawn from different sectors such as agriculture, wildlife 
and fisheries, an opportunity to make recommendations for improvement of 
the draft law. Finally, following satisfactory review by national stakeholders, 
the final legislative report is submitted to the respective government 
ministries for eventual presentation to Parliament in accordance with the 
national Constitutional procedures.’ 
Thus, the final outcome of the policy process is at the mercy of bureaucratic process as represented by 
the power of Members of Parliament to modify, reject, or accept the policy as they deem fit. However, under 
the impending system of devolved government, policy creation and implementation will be to a greater extent 
the purview of local county governments – in Nairobi’s case, this entity would be the Nairobi City Council. 
Nation-wide entities such as NEMA will still hold the mandate for federal environmental policy 
implementation, and in this scheme a form of sharing of responsibility will likely emerge, with new networks 
of local and state-level actors involved. In particular, there has been a greater push for the NEP to include a 
more multi-sectorial approach to environmental management, in order to counter the existing culture of 
separating environmental issues from those of economic, social, and developmental planning, as Oulu and 
Boon (2011) note, in Kenya ‘the country’s development planning framework is clearly separated into socio-
economic…and environmental planning processes, with few inter-linkages.’ (Oulu & Boon, 2011: 221).  
 The success of the National Environment Policy in achieving its goals is contingent on a strong 
cooperative framework for implementation, and a dedication from all actors involved to ensure that the policy 
statements are converted into strategic plans and provided with the resources to be operationalized. As such, 
the attitudes and perceptions of actors in the network and the challenges inherent in policy implementation as 
a result of the network structure are of crucial importance and interest in predicting the outcomes of policy 
change such as that being proposed by the NEP. The following chapter lays out the methodology for studying 
and analyzing the policy formulation and implementation in Kenya and in Nairobi in particular, in order to 
better understand the implications for policy reform based on the policy process.  
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 Chapter 4
Methodology 
4.1 Overview of Conceptual Framework  
The existing research on environmental policy in Kenya and across the African region (described in 
Chapter 2) provides a window to public policy discourse in Africa. However, the current state of research 
shows a need for a greater in-depth analysis into the mechanics of this process. The core contention of this 
thesis is that contemporary environmental planning challenges are the product of deficiencies in the policy 
(and subsequent legislative) framework that guides development, and that these deficiencies can be traced 
back to root causes in the policy formulation process that creates them. The rationale for this study is that the 
views, values, and priorities of actors within the environmental policy subsystem in Nairobi link to policy 
content and therefore point to the reasons for existing gaps. These policy gaps in their most damaging form 
result in policy failure manifested in poor planning of the built environment and consequential environmental 
degradation. Figure 2 provides a broad overview of the conceptual framework for this study within the 
context of environmental policy and planning practice. The dotted line indicates the core area of research 
focus. 
This study firstly interrogated actor roles and interactions at the policy formulation level, examining 
the particular considerations of each actor category in contributing to policy content. Secondly, the 
implementation stage was scrutinized as the key juncture at which policy outcomes are determined, and the 
challenges faced in implementing policy which are indicative of the reasons for policy failure or success. 
Thirdly, the structure and internal attributes of the policy network were theoretically analyzed, in order to 
link the descriptive narrative provided in the first two components to the potential and types of policy change. 
The combined analytical and evaluative knowledge that was generated from these three components of the 
study was used to inform the generation of prescriptive knowledge, in the form of recommendations to 
decision-makers.  
The research approach was built on a theoretical and conceptual framework that draws from a variety 
of fields, primarily the social science research and public policy literature. Broadly, the joint political and 
institutional lens of this study draws on the constructivist paradigm, which emphasizes the contextualized 
nature of a research subject, focusing on a detailed narrative utilized in order to gain an appreciation of the 
subject matter at that particular point in time and place (Creswell and Miller, 2000). As described previously, 
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the narrative method involves ‘construct(ing) a narrative rendition of the findings from a real-world setting 
and participants, to accentuate a sense of “being there”’ (Yin, 2011: 17). As an extension of the constructivist 
lens, the ‘naturalistic’ paradigm (Guba, 1981) is employed. One of the most prominent forms of naturalistic 
study is ethnography, which involves immersion in a given context in order to provide an insider perspective 
and detailed analysis of the subject matter. One major variant of ethnography is the case study approach, 
recommended by Yin (2008) for in-depth investigative inquiries. This approach entails a study of the 
phenomenon, (in this case the environmental policy process), in its real world context, (in this case Nairobi 
County); (Ibid). Table 3 provides an overview of these elements of the conceptual framework. The key 
theoretical framework used to inform this is the policy network approach, based on the work of numerous 
theorists (but in this study draws strongly on the work of Adam & Kriesi (2007)), which was used to provide 
a depiction of the interactions and interdependencies between the various stakeholders and actors involved in 
the policy process. Further details of how the case study method has been deployed are described in the next 
section. 
 
Figure 2 CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH STUDY 
 
4.2 Research Design  
The research design of this study was constructed around two key research questions:  
How does the process of environmental policy formulation take place from the perspective of individual actors and 
stakeholders within the current policy framework?  
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How will changes to the urban framework under the reforms of the Constitution affect the policy process and 
structure?  
These lead questions in turn are further specified to reflect the three key components of the study 
(formulation processes, implementation challenges, and policy network analysis) 
1) How does decision-making take place during the environmental policy formulation process? 
a. Who are the actors that get involved in environmental policy formulation in Nairobi, and 
how is authority divided among them in the actor network that forms? 
b. How do individual policy actors within the networks view the needs and issues affecting 
environmental policy formulation and implementation? 
c. How will Constitutional and strategic reforms change or otherwise impact upon existing 
policy formulation processes? 
2) How does environmental policy implementation take place? 
a. Who are the actors who play a role in policy implementation, and how do implementation 
and monitoring activities provide feedback to formulation processes? 
b. What are the gaps in policy, particularly from an implementation and compliance 
perspective, and how can these be addressed in order to improve results for long-term 
environmental planning?   
c. How will Constitutional and strategic reforms change or otherwise impact upon existing 
policy implementation processes? 
3) How does policy network theory aid in explaining the environmental policy subsystem in Nairobi, 
and what can it tell us about the future outcomes of policy activities? 
The individuals as actor units within the environmental policy network are seen representatives of the 
institutions within which they operate (Atkinson & Delamont, 2006), and were examined from the 
perspective of their individual approaches and contributions to environmental policy creation. The study 
combined this first-hand narrative from policymakers and implementers with policy theory to provide an in-
depth examination of the environmental policy process in Nairobi.  
The first two questions are answered through a detailed, descriptive narrative of the mechanisms of 
policy formulation and implementation, a necessary prelude to the application of policy network theory in 
answering the third question. This approach was selected because network theory has a basis for application in 
understanding policy network arrangements and the resulting policy outcomes, but is limited in its capacity to 
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provide a thorough description of all facets of a policy subsystem (Dowding, 1995; Thatcher, 1998; Adam & 
Kriesi, 2007). In addition, network theory has the potential to elucidate the link that this study makes 
between policy processes and planning outcomes, for as Provan and Kenis (2007: 229) proclaim, 
‘understanding the functioning of networks is important since only then can we better understand why 
networks produce certain outcomes, irrespective of whether networks result from bottom-up processes or are 
the product of strategic decisions made by network participants or government officials.’ 
A qualitative descriptive research design was utilized in order to provide detailed information on the 
‘how’ and ‘why’ aspects of the study, and similarly in applying theoretical explanations to the research data 
(Adam and Kriesi, 2007). Sandelowski (2000) gives an interesting interpretation of descriptive qualitative 
research, and insists that this type of in-depth study can have useful outcomes and contributions without 
necessarily requiring additional follow-up research studies. She states: ‘I see qualitative description as a 
categorical, as opposed to “non-categorical alternative” for inquiry; that is, the method already exists but is 
relatively unacknowledged... Second, I see qualitative descriptive studies as less interpretive than “interpretive 
description” in that they do not require researchers to move as far from or into their data. Third, they do not 
require a conceptual or otherwise highly abstract rendering of data’ (Sandelowski, 2000: 335). Descriptive 
research from this point of view allows the researcher to delve into the details of the phenomenon at hand by 
developing indicators that are directly measurable from the available or collected data, without becoming 
confused by arbitrary definitions of concepts.  
For such in-depth research, the case study approach fits as a method of choice, and has been used 
prolifically in policy studies (see Chapter 2). Yin (2011) suggests four different conceptualizations of the case 
study method: the first is the descriptive case study (answering ‘what happened’ questions); the second is the 
explanatory case study (answering ‘how and why’ questions); the third is a cross-synthetic form which 
integrates multiple smaller case studies into a larger whole; and fourth is the application of the case study 
method to evaluate an initiative. Of these four types, the explanatory case study fits with the objectives of this 
study best, as embodied by the research questions above.  
Given the highly context-dependent nature of policy research, the case study approach integrated 
components of narrative inquiry, in order to draw on the experiences and opinions of policy decision-makers 
who are regarded as experts given their position of authority within stakeholder institutions. As Flyvbjerg 
(2006: 225) notes, ‘Case studies often contain a substantial element of narrative. Good narratives typically 
approach the complexities and contradictions of real life.’ Carrying forward from the theoretical framework 
provided at the end of Chapter 2, the variables selected were measured via indicators and techniques that are 
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both integral to case study and narrative inquiry and also popular among policy researchers. The following 
section explores how each of the techniques was applied to measure the intended variables, and the 
corresponding analytical procedures that were applied to the collected data in order to generate analytical, 
evaluative, and finally prescriptive knowledge from them. 
 
4.3 Data Collection Techniques 
This study employs multiple data sources: the primary data were derived from in-depth, semi-
structured interviews, and secondary data from numerous policy documents, journal articles, organization 
publications and reports, and media sources. This section describes the procedures entailed in collecting, 
managing, and analyzing the data in order to achieve the study objectives.  
4.3.1 In-Depth, Semi-Structured Interviews 
Expert opinion is an important resource in case study research, as Flyvbjerg (2006: 222) points out: 
‘Common to all experts…is that they operate on the basis of intimate knowledge of several thousand concrete 
cases in their areas of expertise. Context-dependent knowledge and experience are at the very heart of expert 
activity. Such knowledge and expertise also lie at the center of the case study as a research and teaching 
method or to put it more generally still, as a method of learning’. The narrative approach was therefore 
applied (within the context of the case study method), through the use of in-depth interviews. This allows for 
a deeper investigation into the personal and even cognitive attributes of individuals, which guide their 
decision-making capacity and which are therefore highly relevant to their involvement in the policy process 
(Weible et al., 2012). The interview technique is recognized for its effectiveness in teasing out details and 
revealing layers of complexity in real-world situations which would otherwise be missed through other 
methods. For example as Yin (2011:5) suggests, "your overall goal would be to unravel the power control and 
other relatives each conversant might be pursuing… in their real-world settings”. This tool is popularly 
employed in environmental policy research (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994; Keeley & Scoones, 2003), and has 
been previously utilized in policy process research in the African region (Keeley & Scoones, 2003; Kimani, 
2010a; Ridde, 2009).  
The semi-structured interview entails having ‘a number of interviewer questions prepared in advance 
but are designed to sufficiently open that the subsequent questions of the interviewer cannot be planned in 
advance but must be improvised in a careful and theorized way’ (Wengraf, 2001: 5). The semi-structured 
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format allows the researcher leeway to ask additional questions based on preceding responses, thus expanding 
on themes or concepts that may unexpectedly arise during the course of the interview. The flexibility allows 
for deeper analysis of the attributes and influence of individual actors. In addition, in-depth interviews create 
a context for exploring a wider range of variables in the operational context of the individual actor, which are 
indicative of the providence of their policy positions.  
As discussed in the literature review, the private, civil society, and international donor sectors in 
Kenya play a critical role in influencing environmental governance and shaping policy. For this reason, 
stakeholders from all of these sectors of the economy were interviewed, with the aim of adding salient insights 
to the ground-level practicality and implementation extent of existing policy. In developing a conceptual 
approach to investigate the research questions, the governance framework was carefully considered. Due to 
restrictions on time and resources for the study, a selection of actors within each of the agency groups were 
selected to be part of the interview course. The sampling process to determine which institutions would be 
included in the interview group was based on a combination of considerations, most importantly the 
relevance of the individual institution’s contribution to policy generation or implementation. Indeed, the 
policy literature attests to the influence of individual actors within institutions (Mintrom, 2000; Kingdon, 
1995) as the key drivers of the policy process.  
Existing environmental regulatory documents available through the public domain of the Ministry of 
Environment and Mineral Resources were reviewed to determine which institutions were most commonly 
cited as being part of the content development process for that policy. Purposive sampling was utilized to 
target the specific institutions known to be involved in the policy process. From a preliminary analysis, the 
participants were categorized across five sectors operating within the policy realm in Nairobi, namely the 
government (public) sector; non-governmental/Civil Society Organizations (CSOs); the private sector; 
international donor agencies and multilateral bodies; and academic researchers and institutions. The sampling 
technique applied to recruit participants remained fairly constant between these groups, with the exception of 
the Government Sector, as explained in further detail below. Figure 3 provides a summary of the 
organizations in each sector that were included in the sample.  
In each case, once the target institutions were identified, each one was contacted by telephone with a 
request to speak to the relevant person engaged in policy related projects for the organization. An interview 
time and place was arranged with the key informant, and an email sent to each one prior to the interview to 
formally thank them for their willingness to participate and detailing the confidentiality procedures for the 
study. Snowball sampling (‘the selection of participants or sources of data to be used in a study based on 
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referrals from one source to another’ (Yin, 2011: 312)) was then employed to gather recommendations for 
participants beyond this initial sample set, and further interviews were arranged based on the referrals 
received. The table in Appendix B shows the number of interviews conducted for each category of 
participants, along with the format for coding of participant identities in order to retain their anonymity 
where their interview data is referenced in this thesis.  
The majority of the primary research (data collection) phase was carried out in situ in Nairobi 
County from the period June 15, 2012 to July 30, 2012. There were 23 in-person interviews were carried out 
during this period, with an additional 2 interviews conducted via Skype and personal correspondence between 
31 July and 10 August 2012 (for a total of 25 in-depth, semi-structured interviews). All the interviews were 
conducted in accordance with the ethics guidelines of the Office of Research at the University of Waterloo, 
and confidentiality maintained for all participants.  
1) Government Sector: Due to the time constraints on this study, it was not possible to include participants 
from all the separate offices of government involved in environmental policymaking. Thus, the key 
departments operating in Nairobi County as mentioned above were targeted, in addition to the Ministry 
of Environment and NEMA. To supplement these interviews, a more general view of the policy process 
in Kenya was acquired from the Kenya Institute of Governance. At each government office, the Director 
of Environmental Affairs, Policy or Planning was approached in person to request an appointment or 
referral to a point of contact for an interview. In the majority of instances with this approach, the 
researcher was welcomed and directed to the most informed department official, who was then contacted 
and an in-person interview arranged.  
2) Private Sector 
The private sector corporations included in this study were selected firstly on the basis of their activity in, 
and therefore perceived knowledge of, environmental planning and policy affairs in Kenya, and secondly 
using snowball sampling, whereby participants in the interview process were asked for recommendations 
on the individuals they perceived to be in a position of expertise regarding environmental policy issues. 
Three consultants from institutions in the private sector were included in the sample.  
3) Non Governmental / Civil Society Organizations 
In a similar method to the selection of private sector participants, a review of environmental policy 
conference proceedings and web-based searches to determine the involvement of carious CSOs in policy 
proceedings was conducted to identify the participants in this category. A total of four individuals from 
as many CSOs were interviewed. 
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4) Foreign Multilateral Agencies and International Donor Groups 
The participants belonging to this sector were selected based on their recent involvement in policy issues 
related to the natural and built environs in Kenya. The selection process involved a careful perusal of 
conference proceedings and sector publications, which provided information on participation in previous 
policy reviews. While there are a large number of aid agencies and foreign offices operating in the 
environmental sector in Kenya, those involved in high-level environmental policy development are 
relatively few, as was ascertained from initial interviews with sector participants. As such, a total of six 
different bodies were targeted, and seven interviews performed with individuals in key policy related 
positions within those institutions.  
5) Academic Institutions:  
The targeted institutions in this sector were the planning and environmental studies departments of the 
main post-secondary academic institutions in Nairobi, specifically the Department of Urban and 
Regional Planning (DURP) at the University of Nairobi and the Department of Environmental 
Planning and Management at Kenyatta University. Subsequently, an interview was also arranged with a 
professor at the Center for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and Policy (CASELAP) at the 
University of Nairobi Faculty of Law. 
During and after each interview, detailed impression notes were made to supplement the interview 
process. Following each interview, a letter of appreciation was sent to the participant. Each interview was 
audio recorded with the permission of the participant. These were then played and summary notes taken to 
note the themes or points discussed during each segment of the interview, in place of full transcription of the 
interview material.  A brief summary of the transcript was then emailed to the relevant participant to request 
their input and advise on any editions or modifications to the content. A period of seven days was afforded for 
feedback to be received. In applying the in-depth interview method to multiple participants from various 
sectors, it is acknowledged that there is a relativistic facet to the research, in that it is expected that the 
viewpoints of the various participants would vary based on their perspective and position, but would also be 
similar in some respects (Yin, 2011).  
 
4.3.2 Interview Analysis 
The value of qualitative research is largely predicated on the extent to which data analysis provides a 
coherent structure for recognizing the relevance or importance of a given study. Further, in order to place a 
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given qualitative study within the wider context of theoretical debates, it is necessary to apply some form of 
reductionism that allows themes to be identified, and which can then be linked with the literature and 
contemporary thought on the subject matter. The use of the thematic method of analyzing the interview data 
revealed the continuum along which the participants’ views converge and diverge on the issues of 
policymaking and environmental planning at hand. Precedent for the use of thematic interview analysis as a 
methodology in public policy research can be found in studies originating in Africa, including Ridde’s (2009) 
study of the implementation stage of the public health policy process in Burkina Faso, where the author 
applied Kingdon’s Multiple Streams (MS) framework to reveal critical insights into the reasons for gaps and 
failures in implementing health policy at the district level.  
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Figure 3 ORGANIZATIONS BY SECTOR INCLUDED IN THE INTERVIEW SAMPLE (NON-HIERARCHICAL) 
 
Thematic analysis is of two types: inductive themes, which come from the data, and deductive 
themes, which are known beforehand and are subsequently applied to the data. Both methods have their 
benefits and drawbacks, and can be applied in the case study approach. In particular, deductive analysis, such 
as through the use of a theme-centered interview, offers a more focused approach to the analysis, and ‘aims to 
decode manifest as well as defended and latent meanings of communication’ (Schorn, 2000). At the same 
time, this approach limits the potential for capturing important concepts or phenomena at work that would 
be better revealed through an inductive approach. However, the inductive strategy is also highly subjective, 
and creates problems with the validity of the conclusions drawn from it, requiring repeated checking and 
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several passes through the data, preferably through the eyes of a second researcher, to reduce this effect 
(Burnard, 1991).  
Thus in order to focus on the specific areas of interest in this study, the deductive approach was 
applied. The key themes were filtered from the interview questions, which focus on the various stages of the 
environmental policy process in order to present a definitive structure of decision-making authority within the 
actor network. The interview questions were, prior to the interview process, categorized according to the 
policy process stage to which they referred. This made it fairly simple to deduce the key characteristic themes, 
which could then be applied to sort responses. The themes are: 
1) Stakeholder collaboration and public participation in decision-making 
2) Authority and power in the actor network 
3) Critical environmental concerns in Nairobi County 
4) Gaps in existing policies or processes 
5) Uses and sources of scientific or fact-based evidence and data 
6) Implications of policy and administrative reform (through the revised Constitution, Nairobi Vision 
2030, and other plans).  
Some of these themes are consistent with previous policy studies which have utilized the in-depth 
interview in their methodology, although in some cases these were emergent themes rather than pre-defined 
through the questionnaire. For instance, Dongol & Heinen (2012)’s review of the implementation of the 
CITES convention in Nepal revealed the recurrence of issues such as accountability, management capacity, 
political stability and/or influence, corruption, and penalties or sanctions, which are all sub-categories in the 
themes for this study. In order to facilitate the narrative flow in describing the policy process, the themes are 
not been addressed individually, but rather integrated as part of the overall policy process analysis.  
 
4.4 Policy Network Theoretical Analysis 
As the authors of the network approach selected for the theoretical analysis phase of the study note, 
‘Network structures are not only connected to specific policy outcomes (“what”), but also to the type of 
change (“how”) that creates these outcomes (Adam & Kriesi, 2007: 152). The typology these authors offer is 
applied to the research data and secondary sources to provide a theoretically-based portrayal of the 
environmental policy actor network in Nairobi, with a view to better understanding the roots of policy 
outcomes and the consequential implications for practical environmental and development planning.  
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The five key variables outlined by Adam and Kriesi were used to further filter the policy formulation 
and implementation process analyses. The portrait of the policy network painted by the descriptions of the 
five variables was then treated with the Network Approach typology to produce schematics pertaining to the 
influence of power and interaction types in determining policy outcomes.  
 
4.5 Credibility and Validity 
The issue of validity in qualitative research has been oft debated, given the perceived subjective nature 
of the interpretation of qualitative data. Given that multiple interpretations of the data would exist based on 
the research lens and the perspective of the researcher, in using such reductionist techniques, the researcher is 
prone to interlacing their own preconceived notions and interpretations with that of the participants (Yin, 
2011). In order to reduce this subjectivity and bias which would potentially invalidate the research findings, 
the following steps were taken.  
Credibility for this qualitative study is built by integrating three key endeavors into the course of the 
research, analysis, and conclusions, based on recommendations of Yin (2011: 19-20): firstly, transparency, 
which entails a clear description of all assumptions and methods used in the study as well as provision of data 
used in the analysis; secondly, ‘methodic-ness’ (Ibid: 19) which requires that a clear procedure was adhered to 
in both the collection of data as well as the analysis; and thirdly, adherence to the evidence, in order to 
provide rigor and support to findings from the data and other sources and acknowledge evidence that both 
supports and is contrary to the arguments made in this thesis.  
While the case study approach inherently involves a certain degree of ambiguity associated with it due 
to the wide variability of its applications (Yin, 2011), there remains a distinct notion of fine grain, context-
specific information that can be garnered from its use (Verschuren, 2003). The use of ‘multiple sources of 
evidence’ (Yin, 2011: 8) is also a core component of qualitative in-depth research. Validity is thus bolstered 
through the integration of several key measures, based on recommendations provided by Maxwell (2009; 
cited in Yin, 2011): first, a spectrum of interviews were collected with participants from the sectors involved 
in environmental policy-making, in order to gather an array of available viewpoints and perspectives. This 
type of detailed and varied data increases the likelihood of gathering a wider net of perspectives and provides 
opportunities to reveal contradictions or important points from the interviews; secondly, triangulation was 
adopted by integrating the interview data with sources internal to the policy system such as policy documents 
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and reports from stakeholder institutions, and sources external to the system such as articles from local 
newspapers and published research from the academic community; thirdly, these alternative secondary data 
sources used in the triangulation scheme were studied to interrogate the interview data in terms of both 
discordant and supporting evidence; and fourthly, where statements from the interview data could be 
compared with existing statistical data from reliable academic or institutional sources such reports from 
NGOs, the UN or other funding agencies, this was done to determine whether normative statements could be 
justified based on statistical evidence. Validity, as an attribute of the analysis, is therefore targeted through a 
combination of triangulation and thick description of the context (Creswell & Miller, 2000). 
Consequently, while there are limits to the generalizability of the study, through the application of 
theoretical models it is possible to identify trends that place the study within the wider geographic, social and 
cultural context of the region. From an analytical standpoint, an effort was made to utilize ‘disconfirming 
evidence’ (Creswell & Miller, 2000: 127) as a tool to compare themes from the interview data with secondary 
data sources in order to lend rigor to the conclusions drawn. With regard to the impact of this study, given its 
qualitative nature there are certain limits to the generalizability of the portrait of the policy process offered, 
but these do not preclude the extension of the study findings to other developing contexts. In particular, the 
actor network that is described may be unique in some respects to the Nairobi context, but there are 
commonalities across the region with regard to the mix of actor types and even the perspectives held by 
stakeholders involved in the policy process. Thus, there would be useful analytical generalizations (Yin, 2011) 
involving certain concepts inherent to the research course, such as stakeholder engagement in the policy 
process or the authority of public institutions, which could then hold comparative value in the context of the 
wider African region for future cross-national research purposes. Furthermore, the use of policy network 
theories (Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Schneider, 1992; Coleman & Perl, 1999; Adam & Kriesi, 2007) tests the 
applicability of these theories and their usefulness in explaining policy process phenomena in the context of 
both a developing and an African context.  
 
4.6 Research Timeline 
The timeline for the study was divided into three main phases:  
1) Initial research planning, proposal development and construction of a preliminary literature review, 
which was approached over a seven-month time frame from December 2011 to June 2012. During this 
time, ethics clearance was obtained from the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo.  
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2) Research implementation in Kenya, from June 16 – July 30 2012. Upon arrival in Kenya, a permit to 
conduct research was sought from the National Council of Science and Technology. As part of this 
application, affiliation with a University planning or environmental studies department in Kenya was 
required. This was obtained in the form of affiliation with the Department of Environmental 
Management and Planning at Kenyatta University. Thereafter, the process of recruiting participants and 
conducting interviews was initiated. Additional interviews were conducted via Skype, telephone and 
personal correspondence up to August 10 2012. 
3) Writing and thesis development, and results analysis for policy recommendation reporting, from August 
2012 to June 2013.  
 
4.7 Ethics Approval 
This study was conducted under approval and full ethics clearance from the University of Waterloo 
Office of Research Ethics (ORE), received on 11 May 2012 following submission and acceptance of ethics 
review documentation prior to the primary research phase. In addition, research approval was obtained from 
the Kenya National Council of Science and Technology (NCST), once the researcher arrived in Kenya, as 
required by the state regulations on academic research. As part of this latter application, affiliation during the 
research course was obtained from the Department of Environmental Planning and Management at Kenyatta 
University. The affiliation involved a procedural agreement between the researcher and Kenyatta University as 
a formal requirement of the research approval from the NCST, but did not entail any assistance in developing 
the thesis or conducting research.  
 All requirements of the ethics approval from both the ORE and NCST were met and adhered to in 
this study, including procedures for ensuring the anonymity and confidentiality of key informants. 
 
4.8 Summary: Overview of Methodology 
Table 3 provides a summary of the three dimensions of this study and the data sources and 
measurement tools associated with each.  
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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
ASPECT 
VARIABLES DATA SOURCES/ 
MEASUREMENT TOOLS 
PART I: Formulation: Decision-making 
during policy formulation 
1) Stakeholder collaboration and 
public participation in decision-
making 
2) Authority and power distribution 
in the actor network 
3) Critical environmental concerns 
in Nairobi County 
4) Gaps in existing policies or 
processes 
5) Uses and sources of scientific or 
fact-based evidence and data 
6) Implications of policy and 
administrative reform 
- Review of past policy documents - 
Analysis of in-depth interview data 
(each of the variables is represented by 
specific interview questions) 
- Use of secondary data sources to 
confirm/disconfirm stakeholder 
testimony  PART II: Implementation:  Challenges, 
existing gaps between policy and 
practice and the reasons for these gaps 
PART III: Policy Network Analysis: 
Explicating the interactions, power, and 
influence in the network and the 
potential and types of future policy 
outcomes 
1) Number of actors in the network 
2) Complexity of the network 
3) Degree of self referentiality of the 
network 
4) Conflicts between actors 
5) Costs of network management 
 - Applying theory to the detailed 
narrative in Parts I and II using Adam 
& Kriesi’s (2007) Network Approach 
and complementary concepts from 
other policy network theorists 
Table 3 SUMMARY OF DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT TOOLS 
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 Chapter 5
Tracing the Environmental Policy Formulation Process 
The administrative procedure for developing and implementing environmental policy in Kenya (as 
described in Chapter 3) is fundamentally a government driven initiative, with the Ministry of Environment 
and Mineral Resources as the lead agency in charge of this venture, and the National Environment 
Management Authority in charge of implementing policy and regulations. As discussed previously, there are 
also numerous Ministries and their subsidiary agencies involved in environmental management and therefore 
in policymaking, including the Ministry of Lands, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, the Ministry of 
Forestry and Wildlife, and the Ministry of Tourism. This fragmentation and overlapping of the 
environmental mandate between these national, sub-national and local institutions presents complications for 
effective development and implementation of policy.  
Although there has been some attempt to use Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) to 
harmonize objectives between select natural resource management authorities, there continue to be conflicts 
regarding the roles and authority of the various state actors involved (Matiru, 1999). As one UNEP officer 
put it, ‘you have different people  coming from different ministries with different views, and these trickle 
down to the country itself, where…different partners within the ministry don't agree or don't talk to each 
other. So it's kind of difficult really to get a coherent approach…it's a very practical thing but it has a huge 
influence on the decision-making process.’ (Interview, INTL1). For this reason, this Chapter examines the 
policy formulation process from the perspective of how the key national environmental institutions operate 
and collaborate with local level agencies in Nairobi, thus painting a truer portrait of the challenges and gaps 
that currently exist with regard to pressing environmental planning challenges as they relate to progress and 
development. The description offered here aims at combining instrumental rationality and sensitivity to the 
policy process, as the key goals in policy analysis as prescribed by Linder and Peters (1991). 
 
5.1 Overview of the Environmental Policy Formulation Process: Actor Roles, Power, and 
Authority 
With the variation in sectors associated with policy-making in Kenya, there are a number of pathways 
to influencing policy processes for the actors involved. This section provides an overview of the main 
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institutions and sectors involved in Nairobi’s environmental arena, along with the inter-linkages between 
them that influence the way they interact and contribute towards policy.  
5.1.1 Government Agencies: Leading the Process 
Stakeholders in the environmental policy process are accustomed to participating under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (MEMR), as the key institution housing all levels of 
environmental policy exercises. The National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), acting as a 
subsidiary body of the MEMR, is responsible for the ‘general supervision and co-ordination over all matters 
relating to the environment’ and ‘the implementation of all policies relating to the environment’ (National 
Environment Management Authority, 2013). In this manner, the agency is largely supported by ‘internally 
generated funds’ accrued through the levying of fines, or for services such as conducting Environmental 
Impact Assessments on behalf of development investors (Bird & Kirira, 2009). The pressure to collect 
sufficient income through monetary sanctions would have implications for the integrity of the institution, 
which are discussed further in Chapter 6. In terms of policy contributions, NEMA officers are often called 
upon to provide expert advice, making them integral to the development of policy content – as one NEMA 
official outlined,  
‘…We are supposed to do the implementation, but we are also considered to 
be within the ministry, so when the ministry calls for technical officers we 
would be part of the team…but that process will be driven from the 
ministry because it's their job, their role and their responsibility to deal with 
policy formulation issues. But I can say that NEMA issues or gives technical 
support, because there is a lot of expertise in different areas resident in the 
institution.’ (Interview, GOVT4).  
Another NEMA official clarified that although technical officers were often appointed to be part of 
policy formulation teams at the behest of the MEMR, ultimately a policy would be instituted at the approval 
of a Parliamentary sub-committee: 
‘The Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources is well placed in 
terms of policy to guide the process. So…the PS [Permanent Secretary] has 
to write…to the Cabinet, [saying that] “we have produced this policy which 
will be the subject of discussion.” And then it will be presented to the 
Cabinet, and also be presented to members of Parliament – so those are the 
policymakers at that high-level. So at that high-level now they have received 
all the input from the technical partners and also other sectors.’ (Interview, 
GOVT3).  
Therefore from a formulation perspective, the MEMR and NEMA are the two main national-level 
government institutions involved in overarching environmental policy. However, input is sought from other 
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government ministries associated with an environmental or resource management mandate, such as the 
Ministry of Water, although these institutions have their own policies as well which may overlap with and in 
some cases contradict MEMR policies (Bird & Kirira, 2009; Wamicha & Mwanje, 1999; Interview, INTL6); 
in addition, some environmental projects are co-facilitated between agencies. For instance, the country’s 
climate change policy is coordinated by the Office of the Prime Minister, while the National Climate Change 
Response Strategy is housed under the MEMR (Norrington-Davies & Thornton, 2011).  
At the local level in Nairobi County, the City Council (NCC) conducts planning and environmental 
management activities, including the formulation of internal policies and by-laws to aid regulation (Mittulah, 
2010). In particular, the NCC’s mandate with regard to the environment focuses on service provision in the 
urban realm, particularly waste management, noise pollution, and maintenance of landscaped areas. The 
organizational structure of the NCC was explained by a staff official as: 
‘Two distinct authorities, that is the one that deals with the politics, [called] 
the civil authority; and the technocrats. The civil wing is led by his worship 
the Mayor, and it has…17 assisting committees, that run the different 
departments of the Council. Each and every committee has a chairman and 
a deputy. The main functions of these committees are to formulate policy 
for the different departments of the Council. Once policies have been 
formulated, through…various committee meetings within the Council, they 
ratify through…a full Council meeting…after ratification, [the policy] has 
to go to the Ministry of local government for further scrutiny and final 
approval.’ (Interview, GOVT7).  
However, the interviewee noted that in a more practical sense, policy is in fact formulated by the 
technocrats within the various departments of the NCC, which include Planning, Environment, Engineering 
and Enforcement wings, for the following reason: 
‘…What we need to appreciate is that as much as we have vested a lot of 
responsibility on the civil wing of the Council, the capacity is relatively low. 
So what they normally do once we formulate these policies is just to rubber 
stamp [them], because they have a limitation on capacity. So the bulk of the 
policy originates from the technocrats within these departments after 
vigorous consultation with the stakeholders within those departments.’ 
(Interview, GOVT7). 
Indeed, the NCC has long been viewed as lacking the technical expertise and manpower to adequately meet 
the challenges of a rapidly urbanizing capital city (see Oyugi & K’Akumu, 2007). Further environmental 
management responsibilities including the protection and conservation of forests and waterways, regulation 
and monitoring of agricultural and food production activities, and wildlife conservation all fall under the 
mandate of numerous alternative national-level institutions, even if the resources concerned are within the 
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County boundaries. Furthermore, the Nairobi City Council appears to play a conspicuously limited role in 
the formulation of both national as well as sub-national environmental policy, as expressed by the views of the 
NCC interview participant, who insisted that there was ‘very little’ interaction between the NCC and the 
MEMR in matters of policy formulation, and that it was an issue ‘we really need to work on. For us to 
achieve the goals as they are, we need to work as one entity and coordinate as much as possible’ (Interview, 
GOVT7). 
To further complicate the relationship between national and local-level institutions, the NCC 
appears to also have had a limited role in the environmental management strategy of the Nairobi Metro 2030 
spatial plan, which was created by the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development (MNMD): ‘it will all 
again boil down to the relationship between the Ministry of Local Government and Ministry of 
Metropolitan, because all local authorities are answerable directly to the Ministry of Local Government…for 
Ministry of Metropolitan to deal with any local authority, it’s just natural that they go through the Ministry 
of Local Government. So there is also duplication at that level’ (Interview, GOVT7). The MNMD thus to 
some extent usurps the role of the NCC in creating local planning policy and strategic plans. This may in 
some part be due to a perceived lack of capacity within the NCC, leading the national government to create 
an entirely new agency to take over strategic planning. As Mundiya and Aniya (2004) note, referencing a 
1993 report by the City Hall of Nairobi (Karuga, 1993): ‘The NCC is endowed with extensive development 
control powers but these have not been effectively enforced. As a result, current zoning patterns no longer 
protect the quality of life and the resulting environment is costly to maintain and service’.  
It should be noted however, that the highly politicized nature of environmental policy and planning 
in the context of development, means that some decisions would be made based on non-public interests – in 
the words of one government researcher, ‘with politics nothing is impossible [and] with bad politics, you 
might find cases where what could have been implemented is delayed because of some political interests.’ 
(Interview, GOVT9). This apparent disjuncture between the local and national levels of environmental 
management and policy creates a schism which reduces the potential for successful outcomes and produces 
major challenges in city planning for Nairobi, including a lack of certainty that operationalized plans and 
policies will remain in effect for the required duration of time (Interview, GOVT7).  
Co-ordination between the various agencies concerned with environmental management and policy 
therefore becomes more crucial and simultaneously, more complicated, particularly when the high turnover 
rate in leadership of high-level institutions is considered (Ryan, 2004). As one policy staffer at the MEMR 
pointed out, ‘the manpower keeps on changing - that's part of the problem. How can we have permanent 
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secretary when after two years he has moved?’, while another agreed emphatically, exclaiming, ‘sometimes 
even after two months!’ (Interview, GOVT1 & GOVT2). Indeed, the policy process in Kenya is significantly 
shaped by the Minster in charge at any given time. One staffer at the Kenya Institute for Governance noted 
that ‘the individual character and desire of a minister in position has a lot of impact on how much 
government drives environmental governance…that personal energy of the individual…translate(s) into a lot 
more attention to the issues at hand.’ (Interview, GOVT8). Thus, the potential for a policy to complete the 
drafting procedure and be presented to Parliamentary Committees to decide its fate is hinged on the 
commitment of the top official at the MEMR (Bird & Kirira, 2009), as attested to by numerous other 
interview participants as well (Interview, GOVT3; Interview, GOVT8; Interview, CSO1; Interview, INTL6).  
This complexity in coordination and distribution of authority notwithstanding, policy staffers at the 
MEMR stressed that the incorporation of input from all affected government ministries was prioritized in the 
drafting of the National Environment Policy (NEP), for instance. ‘We used a wide range of sources, through 
the process called SWAP - sector wide approach to planning – so they collected the input from all the 
ministries and also took data from research, various studies that had been done, in order to ensure that it was 
a cross-cutting formulation process’ (Interview, GOVT2). In contrast to this claim, there appears to be a 
strong bias against the sharing of data between separate government agencies that was attested to by various 
informants and that therefore disputes this claim. The subject of the data sources that guide policy 
formulation is further scrutinized in Section 5.2. 
Finally, one of the last stages in the policy formulation process (prior to submission of the policy to a 
Parliamentary Committee for approval) is a review of the policy by the National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC), a review body responsible for development and implementation of socio-economic policies, 
as well as monitoring and evaluation of economic trends with a mandate to create recommendations for 
Cabinet approval; the Council consists of ‘heads of several sectorial ministries, representatives of the private 
sector, professional societies, labour unions, farmer associations, academia, private healthcare providers and 
nominated international experts’ (Oulu & Boon, 2011: 222). Whilst the Minister for Environment holds a 
seat on the NESC, environmental experts from NEMA or alternative agencies or non-state actors are absent 
(Ibid.). Given the importance of the NESC for approving environmental policies (Interview, GOVT1), the 
structure of the Council constitutes a major gap in the representation of environmental considerations in 
developmental planning. A schematic of the various organs involved in environmental management is 
provided in Figure 4 below.  
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Figure 4 STRUCTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION BODIES IN KENYA PRIOR TO THE 
PROMULGATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (2010). Source: Benthem and Holmes (2010: Figure 2). 
  
The ultimate stage in policy formulation is the submission of a draft policy to a Parliamentary 
Cabinet Committee, comprised of elected officials who may not have the right level of technical expertise to 
evaluate policy content and quality (Interview, GOVT3; Interview, CSO1; Interview, CSO2; Interview, 
INTL5). In some instances, political interference at this stage creates a logjam in the process; effectively 
freezing the policy before it can be institutionalized, or alternatively, a parliamentary committee could 
autonomously introduce modifications to the policy, which are only revealed once the policy has been 
approved (Interview, INTL5; Interview, CSO2). One World Bank informant described the frustration of this 
scenario: ‘I would say that we do monitor whether our advice was taken on board but it is often the case that 
Parliament at the very last stage of this process changes aspects of the policy. And we don't know about that 
until after the policy has already been adopted…So there's nothing you can do then, except start lobbying to 
get amendments made to the policy…’ (Interview, INTL5). Thus, there are many opportunities for non-
environmental interests to hijack the formulation process, and the roles of non-state actors becomes much 
more crucial both in terms of providing input but also as overseers of state-led actions. These roles are 
examined in the upcoming sections. 
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5.1.2 Civil Society Organizations, International Agencies and Foreign Donor Agencies: 
Influencing the Agenda and Representing the Public? 
There are a growing number of environmental CSOs that are active in Kenya and in Nairobi in 
particular, although their activities are not currently coordinated through a formal network (Interview, CSO2; 
Interview, CSO3). In 2006, the Heinrich Böll Foundation of East Africa (a Dutch international NGO) 
compiled a list of then-known environmental NGOs in the country, stating that it was an effort ‘towards 
creating some order, nurturing healthy open information sharing networks, and hopefully nurturing a vibrant 
environmental movement in this sector, which has very many actors doing wonderful work but who often do 
not even know of each others’ existence’ (Gikang’a, 2006: vii). This list has not since been updated, and some 
of the organizations contained appeared to have closed down when the fieldwork segment of this study was 
conducted in the Summer of 2012.  
The portrait of Civil Society engagement in environmental policy as described by informants 
indicated an association with policymaking on a sliding scale, motivated by the specified directions attached 
to the funding received from donor agencies (both foreign and local). In addition, this sector is controlled and 
constrained by political influence from the government (Kameri-Mbote, 2000). One CSO participant 
bemoaned the limits of civil sector influence:  
‘…You discover quickly…that while here you are, working very hard as an 
environmental organization, promoting this, promoting that, all these good 
methods - that somebody is busy grabbing forestland, and all these resources 
are going, and your natural forest cover is going - Because of political 
decisions made elsewhere. You're seeing the forest and that kind of stuff, 
[while] they are seeing land - not from an environmental point of view, but 
as a source of political power. Both monetary and political power, because it 
was very powerful to own land. If you’ve got land than you’ve got money, 
and then you [can] convert that into political patronage’ (Interview, CSO1).  
The concept of environmental management is thus inextricably linked with issues of land ownership and 
tenure, and the processes of urban sprawl and development which places protected areas such as forests at risk.  
In some respects, the civil society sector in Kenya represents the interests of the citizenry at the policy 
table, particularly when it comes to seizing the opportunity provided for under the Constitution for the 
public to provide their input in environmental governance matters, although they are not solely dedicated to 
this cause. As one CSO informant noted: ‘I don't think [civil society is] all the time representative [of the 
people], but I think civil society plays a major role because…[it] has been pushing for policy, has played a 
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significant role in the formulation of policy, whether it's a housing act, the land act that are presently in 
place…’ (CSO3). The contribution of civil society is also rooted in their ability to perform bridging functions 
between the government and local citizenry in terms of policy gaps, bringing attention to the needs that the 
public administration has failed to fulfill (Bratton, 1989; Kameri-Mbote, 2000). As one UNEP staffer 
remarked: 
‘In terms of environmental policy, it could be there on paper but are we 
translating it into action? So when you find that there is a lot of 
governmental organizations in some of these areas, it means there is a 
challenge of the formal system; system that works very well in a city or in a 
country with always fill in the gaps and you will not need NGOs or CBO's 
to fill it in - but when you have all these, you know a lot of 
nongovernmental organizations trying to address the gap, it means there is a 
failure somewhere and that is where I think a policy should come in’ 
(Interview, INTL2).  
However, these organizations are subject to government regulation which in some cases further 
impedes their ability to act in the public interest, particularly in cases where such interests are at odds with the 
regime (Kameri-Mbote, 2000).  
Thus CSOs do have an important role to play in policy formulation, although their positions would 
also be influenced by their mandate, which in turn is often subject to the conditions attached to the funding 
under which they operate. Ultimately, the capacity of CSOs to engage with and influence policy directions 
varies widely and on a case-by-case basis. Kameri-Mbote (2000: 20) notes that  
‘There is arguably need for more political space for NGOs to contribute to 
political processes in the country…Policy participation by NGOs and civil 
society is always labeled political activism and discouraged if not 
restricted…Government agencies fail to understand that democratic 
government is strengthened and not weakened by an active society. 
However in the midst of all that, there is no doubt that NGOs have 
influenced outcomes of policy-making processes at different levels either 
directly or indirectly’. 
It is at this point in the discussion that the role of foreign and donor agencies becomes highly important, 
given their impact on development through direct investment with the government, and through CSO 
funding. Foreign and donor agencies represent an interesting stakeholder in the policy process given that these 
organizations are subject to both Kenyan regulations as well as internal protocols, which in some cases may be 
at odds, as in the instance of an electricity generating project that one foreign consultant at the World Bank 
described:  
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‘Our environmental policies require environmental impact assessments, lots 
of consultations, and if there is any grievance over this, the parties who are 
agreed can actually go to what’s called the inspection panel - it’s an 
independent body made of experts who will come and investigate a claim if 
they feel it is a credible claim…A sub station was built in a neighbourhood 
in violation of the zoning laws of the government, and consultation process 
surrounding the impact assessment process was done in a superficial 
manner. A special panel has come to investigate this case; I do not know 
what the outcome will be…so there is a lot of opportunity. The bank insists 
that it’s own policies are followed, and there is a lot of opportunity for 
citizens to also insist on that…The thing is that we don’t oversee the 
implementation of these things so carefully, they’re very a much on the part 
of the government to manage what’s happening on the environmental side.’ 
(Interview, INTL5). 
The multifarious nature of foreign involvement in policy directions in Nairobi appears to be 
governed largely by the internal interest areas identified by international agencies, tempered by the perceived 
capacity of the Kenyan government to carry out projects (Interview, INTL6; Interview, INTL5). As one 
UNEP staffer explained, ‘UNEP for instance would serve both in advisory as well an advocacy capacity in 
their role as a stakeholder in policy formulation’ (Interview, INTL1). The involvement of foreign agencies can 
help facilitate the engagement of resources to create policy and foster support for environmental projects. For 
instance, the same informant noted, ‘…you have the expertise aspect but also the political aspect of…pushing, 
because if the country can say that we have a project with UNEP or any other international agency it [creates 
a] push within the parliament…to do something…So the technical people use this kind of strength to get 
people at the top to pay attention and say okay this is what we need to develop.’ (Interview, INTL1). Donor 
agencies have a vested interest in the content of policies due to the links with development projects on the 
ground – for instance, in the case of water sector policies, as one World Bank informant explained: 
‘The Constitution gives the [private] water companies back to the county 
governments…and the local authorities have an incentive to use the 
revenues raised for every other thing aside from water and sanitation 
provision. So that makes us very nervous, that all the investment that we’re 
putting in right now, we won't be able to recover the costs ultimately, and 
that the services will not be provided. So that's a very concrete example of 
why policy matters to the projects and why we pay careful attention to the 
policy areas that are of interest.’ (Interview, INTL5).  
Several interview participants commented that the engagement of foreign agencies is often routed 
through the national-level of government administration (Interview, INTL6; Interview, INTL7; Interview, 
GOVT1; Interview, GOVT7), and in the case of environmental policy in Kenya this would be through the 
MEMR, specifically the National Environment Council (NEC) which is provided for under the 
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Environmental Management & Coordination Act (Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources, 1999). 
Kenya has received growing foreign aid assistance over the last several years to the environment sector; OECD 
statistics indicate that the environmental protection, forestry, water and sanitation sectors have received a total 
of US$ 21.79 million in 2007, up from US$ 5.84 million in 2002 (cited in Bird and Kirira, 2009). With 
respect to policy specifically, this aid applies to funding the acquisition of expert consultants from the private 
sector and abroad to aid in policy formulation, as well as to training and capacity building of local officials to 
enable them to take charge of the policy process and ensure that input is relevant to the local context 
(Interview, INTL6; Interview, INTL7). Government informants voiced their approval for this approach, 
while also asserting that local expertise is fundamental to successful policy formulation and implementation – 
as one MEMR officer insisted: ‘we don't dispute [that] the kind of training they offer [and] the kind of 
expertise they offer is what we need...But [only up to] to a certain level, where we want to be able now to do it 
on our own. I want to wake up in the morning and say “I am a competent policy officer”...I don't have to 
keep on referring [to external experts] or…on calling expatriates.”’ (Interview, GOVT1).   
As noted previously, foreign agencies concerned specifically with donor support do also channel 
funds through the CSO sector (Kameri-Mbote, 2000; Norton-Griffiths, 2010), in effect shaping the policy 
positions of these organizations through the weight of conditionalities attached to funding – up to 80% of 
NGO funding in Kenya is from foreign sources (Institute of Development Studies (IDS), 2007, cited in 
Norton-Griffiths, 2010). This point was further stressed by CSO interview participants, one of whom 
explained that: 
‘...Donors influence what civil society says, which is not good and again it's 
not bad, depending on how you argue it. It's not good to the extent that you 
are limited in what you engage in but it is not bad because it can focus you 
on one aspect…because what donors do, and it’s unfortunate, is to pick the 
environment policy, if they are supporting you to promote gender, they 
search how many times the word gender is appearing in the document. 
Then they say, “Previously before we gave you the money it was appearing 
five times, now it is appearing six times or eight times - you have done a 
good job”. But that does not really mean translating to it. So it’s a lack of 
strategy of the civil society, where you have a discourse about climate 
change, about what specifically you want to see.’ (Interview, CSO2).  
Another academic expert expressed his view that: 
‘…Civil society as players in environmental governance…we cannot take 
them at face value. One has to go a little further and look at them more 
seriously, mainly from the resources point of view. Because they are not 
funded by foundations locally, not even a foundation within Africa, and 
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therefore that is something that needs to be looked at…the attachment of 
strings, the way that these agencies bring their package - their programs are 
good – [but] their priorities and rules of engagement also have to [be 
assessed according] with what impact they will have on the environment.’ 
(Interview, PROF1).  
 In response, interviewees at foreign donor agencies operating in Nairobi all uniformly insisted that 
their contributions to policy be it directly as stakeholders or indirectly through CSOs, was not done according 
to the interest of the donor country. For instance, one staffer at the Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA) reported that: 
‘The national objectives of policy should really be articulated as part of the 
sustainable development agenda of that country. So Denmark can only 
bring its experiences and examples but the ultimate decision really comes 
from this country's government. So it is really spearheaded by the Ministry 
of Environment and we really believe that is the way to go, whereby 
Denmark should not influence, Denmark should only provide examples that 
are beneficial to this country. For this country to grow, this country should 
set its own agenda and we just support that agenda.’ (Interview, INTL7). 
 Similarly, a staffer at the Swedish Embassy iterated their position on CSO funding:  
‘…There has been criticism in Kenya that some…NGOs are foreign funded 
and they have their own agendas, they are not working for the good of 
Kenya. At least in the case of Sweden I would say that we don't have a 
political agenda, maybe a human rights agenda and a pro-poor agenda, but 
in land – we don't have any interest in land in Kenya…I think we want the 
best for the people of Kenya, but I think there is something also true in the 
criticism that when you have a democratic system with elected 
representatives, if the lobbies are too strong, some of these NGOs that get 
access to sit on committees have access to parliamentary committees. And 
when politicians are not listening to the voters, then democracy is in 
danger.’ (Interview, INTL6) 
 Thus the notion that special interests, particularly in the form of foreign donor groups, direct the 
input of CSOs is met with a mixed range of viewpoints from stakeholders.  
The manner in which foreign agencies operate varies from agency to another, and there is often a 
high degree of coordination between foreign agencies operating in the same sector to avoid the duplication of 
resources. This is done through the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy (KJAS), a multilateral (albeit non-legally 
binding) cooperative agreement between 17 development partners created to harmonize donor activities in 
the country (USAID Kenya, 2007). Fundamentally, it creates a platform for donor agencies to interact with 
one another and plan out their sector support strategies, harmonize budget contributions, and track progress. 
However, the KJAS also creates a situation where funding support is directed based on the priorities set by the 
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local government, thereby aligning monetary support behind the regime. While such a scenario may be 
necessary to avoid intrusive actions from foreign donors, it also reduces the capacity of the informal, private, 
and CSO sectors to lobby for support for more marginalized causes. Foreign policy agents in the Kenyan 
context are embedded in the transnational flow of knowledge, operating as policy entrepreneurs (meeting the 
description laid out by Mintrom and Norman (2009)); while these actors may not be consciously mindful of 
their cultural influence on policy directions, their capacity to shape policy directions through numerous 
channels is bolstered by the requirements of foreign trade and partnership agreements and international 
environmental regulations such as those adopted through UNEP.  
 
5.1.3 Private Sector and Academia: Support through Intellectual Capacity 
The private sector would be considered another important stakeholder in the policy process from a 
theoretical standpoint, and yet in the case of Nairobi and in Kenya generally this resource for knowledge and 
expertise appears to have gone largely untapped. Interestingly, the views of private sector participants 
interviewed in this study are discordant with the documented level of opportunities for participation in 
environmental policymaking. The National Environment Council (NEC) offers two seats to business-
oriented participants (Kibugi, 2011), and both the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) and the Kenya 
Association of Manufacturers (KAM) attest to having specific committees to aid in environmental policy and 
regulatory coordination with the government (Ibid.). In addition, KEPSA has cited both environmental and 
urban development as key areas of interest in their strategic plan (Kenya Private Sector Alliance, 2010). 
However, the role of private consultants in general does not appear to consistently extend towards 
aiding in informing policy itself (Interviews, PLANNER1, PLANNER2).  For instance, one private sector 
planner recalled that ‘we’ve tried [providing input] a number of times, we even had a conference where they 
invited us, but unfortunately politicians just hijacked the meeting that and they started complaining…’ 
(Interview, PLANNER1). This point of view has been reflected frequently in the literature where 
participatory processes in governance are concerned, as Kapoor (2001: 274) explains, ‘local participatory 
decision-making may sometimes proceed as though all participants have an equal say, oblivious to the fact 
that, outside the community meeting hall or participatory workshop, elites wield socio-economic power that 
can influence or silence people’s voices inside these spaces. Frequently, elites do not have to be present or 
directly represented in these spaces; the perceived threat of their power is sufficient to influence participants.’  
Furthermore, the relationship between government and private entities forms the basis for the 
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manner of interaction engaged in – a case in point would be the attitude observed by Mwangi (2000: 91) 
towards involving the private sector in urban environmental strategies in the city of Nakuru, which 
neighbours Nairobi: ‘The public and private sectors have little experience of working together except on the 
basis of supplier and procurer’. Given the limitations of private sector involvement in policymaking, some 
interview participants in this study suggested that the initiative to contribute towards governance and policy 
should come from within the private sector itself. ‘It is the responsibility of the private sector to step up, not 
pointing fingers or relying on one-sided engagement from the government, and contribute towards planning 
and policy development’ (Interview, PLANNER2). More recently, there has been an emerging trend of 
greater private stakeholder participation in projects requiring direct investment through the use of Public-
Private Partnerships (PPPs), which are considered a boon for underfunded development projects (Interview, 
GOVT1; Interview, CSO2). The overlapping of private and government interests from a business perspective 
is of some concern to other stakeholders in the process who suggested that the merit of private involvement in 
policymaking may not be entirely philanthropic: ‘The private sector really…get a document and then look at 
it from a business perspective, they tell you if you put this tax, then business will not be as usual. You see 
them informing so many things because the government looks at the private sector as a donor - which is 
unfortunate, but that’s how they look at it.’ (Interview, CSO2).  
To some extent, the separation of environmental interests from economic interests, perceived to be 
championed by the private sector, is also the result of existing policy. Going back to the early stages of 
environmental regulation in Kenya, the EMCA (1999) and National Environment Action Plan were 
anticipated to act in lieu of a National Environment Policy, as one academic involved in the formulation of 
these statutes stated: 
‘…If policy won’t drive law, then law will drive policy…So we drafted a law 
that provided for adoption of national environment action plans as a policy 
instrument every five years…If the policymakers were slow to develop 
environmental policy and lawyers are ready to move to adopt law, then they 
adopt a law and prescribe in it…as a legal obligation - that every five years 
there would be a new national environment policy in the form of a national 
environment action plan.’ (Interview, PROF3). 
Unfortunately, the authority of the National Environment Action Plan, a core piece of policy for Kenya, has 
thus far failed to achieve its objective to integrate environmental considerations cross-sectorally. As Kibugi 
(2011: 179) asserts: ‘even though the private sector is a key player in development, the policy is not 
sufficiently forthright as to induce the integration of environmental sustainability into business decision-
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making processes’. This concept of environmental mainstreaming is discussed further in Section 5.3 of this 
chapter.  
Nonetheless, the private sector remains crucial to providing resources which the government may not 
have access to due to its own limitations in capacity. This base is particularly relevant in the area of data and 
information to inform policy, which the private sector is privy to but may not necessarily share with the 
government. One UNEP staffer, taking from his own experiences working in Nairobi, elucidated: ‘I would 
say there is more comprehensive data through the private practices than you'd get from a government office. 
But if you get it from the government office, you will find that it will have been developed by the private 
firms.’ (Interview, INTL2). However, some firms treat the data gathered in the course of their projects as 
intellectual property and withhold it from the public domain (Interview, PLANNER1), while others share it 
through web-based channels for open-source use (Interview, PLANNER2; Interview, RESEARCHER1).  
 Similarly, the academic sector in Kenya generally and Nairobi particularly is a key resource for 
data, research and expertise, although this sector is perceived to have fewer special interests and is therefore 
received more openly than the private sector. One example of recent developments in cross-sector cooperation 
has emerged in the form of the Environment for Development (EfD) Initiative, set up in 2007 and supported 
by the University of Nairobi School of Economics, the government think tank Kenya Institute of Public 
Policy Research and Analysis, and the Swedish Embassy (EfD Initiative, 2013). These types of joint ventures 
may be seen as existing outside the direct influence of the State, and with the resources necessary to conduct 
and publish research. Within the academic setting of Universities on the other hand, some researchers find the 
conditions stifling to innovation and honest research. One academic at the University of Nairobi described his 
experience of engagement in research:  
‘It is just superficial. The government does not fund research, and that's why 
most people who publish, like us, what we do is…we combine efforts in the 
private sector. Sometimes I have got a collaborating program with a certain 
university so what we normally do is that…once the work is done for the 
organization, part of that money I will use to write academic papers. That's 
how we fund studies…The universities also have no money for research, 
because also of the way that the management of universities is architecture - 
a lot of the resources are political…What has started to happen is that some 
people in academia are appointed directly by government to go and work in 
certain places. All those appointments are also political appointments. There 
is now a pattern whereby the government advertises the job contract so if 
you want to apply you can…But even the decision they make is also really 
political. So one would say that the government is hostile.’ (Interview, 
PROF1). 
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Despite this purported limited public support for academic research, one of the main avenues of policy 
engagement with the academic sector is through the direct recruitment of researchers and University faculty 
to be part of policymaking committees and strategic teams. The National Environment Council (NEC) has 
members of University institutions on its panel (Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2010). 
High-level academic faculty are often called upon to take on leadership positions in development projects and 
strategic planning committees, and the academic sector represents an enclave of skill and expertise which can 
act as a driver for setting new policy agendas, especially when combined with support from other sectors.  
One environmental researcher described their involvement in jump-staring the content of the 
National Urban Development Policy: ‘the need for urban policy was there but…the stakeholders lacked the 
means to pursue the goals. The initiative nevertheless started from a small group of individuals working with 
Non-Governmental organizations and the universities who developed a concept, and they approached the 
Kenyan Government [through the] Ministry of Local Government’s Department of Urban Development and 
also various donor organizations’ (Personal Correspondence, PROF2). Donor agencies also provide funding 
for academic research as part of their support to non-state actors (Interview, INTL6), and rely on local 
universities to provide data for their development projects (Interview, INTL5). In this way, the nexus between 
academia, government, and foreign agencies is formed with academic expertise lending itself to whichever 
funding source is available at a given time. This potential reduction in academic and research independence at 
the university level could have important implications for the investigative integrity of studies performed 
under external support for specific purposes.  
 
5.1.4 The Public Domain: Participation and Consultation 
Public participation was another key area that the interviews focused on from the perspective of 
policy decision-makers, with a view to deciphering the true relevance and influence of public input to policy 
formulation. In Kenya, members of the public are required to be included in EIA proceedings as mandated by 
law (under the Environmental Management and Coordination Act of 1999), but there are no specific legal 
guidelines for how consultations should be conducted in policy development. Nonetheless, public 
consultations are routinely organized and conducted by the MEMR during policy formulation, although the 
diversity of participants involved and the value of the collected input in improving policy is still a matter of 
contention. From a general Africa-wide perspective, one interviewee noted that ‘sometimes you might even 
have too much participation and it takes away the attention from what needs to be done - sometimes you 
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might also have specific interests that take over’ (Interview, INTL1). Government informants held that the 
input gathered in consultation sessions was integrated into the final drafts of policies; indeed, many of the 
vagaries of public participation that exist in Western democracies are experienced in Nairobi as well. One 
NEMA official explained:  
‘…You can put all the adverts in the newspapers, the radio and so on and 
you find that at the initial stages where you have room to capture as much 
input as possible, the interest is not that high…So it can become a bit 
frustrating when you think you have finalized the document…people now 
wake up and start saying “what is this? No…we are not interested, let's start 
again, why were we left out”, and so on…you have to now go back and start 
proving to people who were not alive to the process that it actually took 
place...In some instances the whole process can come to a complete 
standstill. It is important to carefully invest in stakeholder engagement.’ 
(Interview, GOVT4).  
At the level of Nairobi in particular, many of the local policies appear to have been constructed 
primarily on the basis of consultations within the City Council departments internally, leaving out the public 
component. In common with participation exercises the world over, some policy consultation settings 
translate to token approaches (Arnstein, 1969) rather than true engagement, as one interview participant 
observed:  
‘…It’s a fine balance between having these consultations just for the sake of 
it, sometimes – especially when they go out…in the counties or the 
regions…just with an empty piece of paper. They've come a long way [from 
the Capital] and so they say [to the communities] “what do you expect?” 
And you get all these expectations [like] “you will give us our land 
back”…And so they take notes… Instead of trying to translate the real issues 
and…really get [the peoples’] views on things…It is supposed to be 
participation friendly and we have to be as open as possible, but then if you 
don't guide consultations…I think you are tricking people…definitely in 
Kenya there [are] very few informed people but so many people that lack 
information.’ (Interview, INTL6). 
  An NCC official admitted that ‘what we lack as a Council that we need to improve on, is the 
component of public awareness, that is key and we are doing poorly on that…’ (Interview, GOVT7).  The 
difficulty in implementing policies developed without the input of the local populace becomes ever more 
apparent in the urban setting, particularly in Nairobi where the majority of residents are indigenous to other 
cities and counties, and therefore do not truly associate their identity and hometown with the Capital (Otiso, 
2005; Njeru, 2006; Interview, CSO1; Interview, RESEARCHER1). Ownership of the policy process thus 
needs to be shifted closer towards those most greatly affected, and it is anticipated that the mechanisms of 
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devolution and decentralization through the new Constitution will help to achieve this. Some key informant 
views that exemplify this view included: 
‘For me the key [issue] is just to push for public participation, because 
within a centralized system of governance it is actually limited - how much 
you can influence any process, the assumption is that once you decentralize 
it and at least now it's written in the Constitution’ (Interview, CSO2).  
‘It doesn't occur easily, there must be an educational process, building up 
awareness and getting people to appreciate that the powers to move things 
are with them…Takes a very long time. The law doesn't say that 
organizations will do it, the law empowers individuals to do it…’ (Interview, 
PROF3).  
‘The…question [of]…whether or not comments from these meetings or 
input in these meetings is meaningfully utilized to shape the policy itself - I 
might actually say not really. In general, the government has thought it 
through and knows what it wants to do, and these kinds of workshops or 
consultations are more as validation of their proposals than as an 
opportunity to listen to the people and improve upon the policy. But…it's 
really tricky because you can't expect the general public to have much 
understanding of the implications of many policy measures. So it has to be a 
mix of experts, expertise and people willing to listen to each other.’ 
(Interview, INTL5).  
The implications of Constitutional reform for environmental policy and planning are 
discussed further in Section 5.3.  
The current format for involving the public involves official notices in mainstream newspapers and 
the Kenya Gazette, a publication issued by the Government of Kenya which provides details on consultation 
forums open to public, along with information on the content of policies and regulations (Matiru, 1999; 
Interview, GOVT4). However, this system does not seem to attract a wide audience, perhaps due to the lack 
of general public knowledge regarding the impacts of environmental policies (Ibid.). One of the ways to 
motivate interest among the general public as well as stakeholders would be to highlight environmental 
considerations within the context of greater economic, social, and development plans (Wamicha & Mwanje, 
1999). One interviewee expressed their view that ‘…it's dangerous if you just talk about environmental 
protection and conservation because it gives a bit of a flavor that you’re just looking more at the environment, 
but if you reframe the discourse and look at it as a basis for all development, for everything and also an 
important dimension of social development and social life, then I think it works better and it think it's more 
true.’ (Interview, INTL1). 
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In addition, even in cases where stakeholder and public input makes its way into a policy draft, there 
would be limited accountability regarding the ultimate use and implementation of feedback to make changes 
on the ground. One UNEP expert explained:  
‘…There is a major gap - there is no report back for accountability. There is 
this perception that…you will participate, you will make your input. I may 
reflect your input, but am I going to…be subjected to an audit later during 
implementation? So that's what you need to have, the dynamic system and 
put things in a way that you can go back to what was discussed and maybe 
we are also expecting too much because it takes skill…to put the 
information together in an easy way of reading…we really need very 
abridged versions of some these things…I think whether people's opinions 
are captured in the report through dialogue, I think they do, but there is this 
sense that who will ever follow through? It's only comes back to be dealt 
with when something really, really, serious happens, then a lot of people 
collect information – [otherwise] they get away with a lot of things.’ 
(Interview, INTL2) 
The quote above makes reference to two important issues with the participation process: the capacity 
for collecting and incorporating input and communicating the same back to stakeholders, and secondly the 
need for transparency and continuous review, both of which relate also to the implementation of policy. The 
view that policy should be clearly articulated but is often ambiguous instead was also supported by the 
testimony of another interviewee, in describing the new National Land Policy that was recently instituted by 
the Ministry of Lands:  
‘I can't figure it out…I’m reading this and I'm thinking, so how does this 
work?…They talk about the National Land Commission, and…if 
allotments are planned then they make the allotments, and sometimes the 
County governments are [actually] responsible for [allocating land]…and 
I'm [thinking]: when is a county government [responsible], and when is the 
Land commission? What is the interface, and at what level do they interface? 
Do they interface with the governor? Do they interface with the sub-county 
committees?...I'm not clear at all!’ (Interview, CSO3).  
This limited communicability of policy is a clear barrier to improving public participation, and yet 
does not appear to have been met with significant attention or attempts to reduce complexity.  An NCC 
official concurred: ‘the best way to do it, [is] not necessarily to put it on hard paper, [but] to call some forum 
and break it down to the consumers, that way we really interact and get quicker feedback. Because it has been 
said that if you want to hide anything from a Kenyan, put it in a book….but when you call a one-on-one 
meeting with the stakeholders, you tend to get quicker and more practical suggestions from the consumers’ 
(Interview, GOVT7).  
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Numerous interviewees evinced the conviction that non-state local actors are instrumental in 
achieving environmental policy goals across sectors, indicating at least a theoretical acceptance of the idea of 
inclusive participation in decision-making. However, insofar as CSO participation specifically was concerned, 
one interviewee from this sector expressed skepticism regarding the capacity for and commitment to quality 
input, particularly with regard to the drafting of the National Environment Policy:  
‘It can only be to the extent to which they have the capacity to engage. So 
the input has been there, the question will probably be has it been good 
enough to inform the process… I can say they have had their chance. I don't 
know how best to say [it] - probably it has not been the best input from civil 
society, but to say the truth, much of that document has been informed by 
some civil society groups but they are interest groups.’ (Interview, CSO2).  
The narrative of public consultation that emerges from the interview data thus indicates a disjointed 
and inconsistent approach to public consultation in policymaking, where consultative processes are arbitrarily 
applied at the national (Ministerial) level and far more rarely at the municipal level in Nairobi city. However, 
there remains a distinctive sense of optimism and hope for the future through reforms to the decision-making 
process as envisaged by the new Constitution. Onyango and Namango (2005) offer a basic breakdown of 
development policy decision-making that also fits with this narrative of environmental policy formulation 
(Figure 5).  
This discussion of the major actors in the policy process provides some insights into the ways that 
roles and authority are managed and distributed among stakeholders. However, in order to better understand 
the mechanisms of the policy process, it is important to explore the particular motivations that guide the 
formulation of new policies, and the methods that stakeholders use to bring issues to the policy table. These 
impetuses are discussed in the following section.  
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Figure 5 GENERALIZED POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORMS. Source: Onyango and Namango, 2005: Fig. 20.1 
 
5.2 Customary Policy Triggers and Policy Information Sources 
The policy process in Nairobi may be triggered by any of a diversity of factors, and in some cases by a 
combination of several. Four of the main policy pathways described by key informants are discussed in this 
section, along with the roles and types of data sources that inform policy.  
Firstly, one of the main triggers of new environmental policies under stable political conditions in 
Kenya (as opposed to current conditions of rolling out the new Constitution) is the influence of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs), such as those instituted through UNEP (Kaniaru, 2002), which then 
create a mandate for all such agreements ‘that the country has ratified…to be customized to fit into the local 
context, and we do that customization by rolling out regulations’ (Interview, GOVT4). In this manner, the 
content of the policy as formulated by a foreign agency would create the template for local policy and ensuing 
regulations. Similarly, donor agencies may provide a push for the creation of policies modeled on 
international standards, particularly if such documents are a pre-requisite to cross-national partnerships or 
collaborative projects. The influence of foreign powers in creating domestic policy has received scrutiny and 
criticism, particularly as the motivations behind such efforts may be seen as indicative of neo-colonial 
practices (Ryan, 2004).  
A second pathway is in the context of needs-based policy, where often Ministerial or Local 
government agencies may internally determine the requirement for new policy interventions, based on their 
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experiences in implementing policies and enforcing regulations on the ground. In some instances, the 
influence of non-state stakeholders has aided in outlining problem areas that are then adopted as priority 
issues by state actors. For instance, one UNEP informant described how the decimation of the Mau forest in 
Kenya was illustrated to local government officials, which then led to the development of a forest policy: ‘we 
told the Minister for Environment, “let's take a flight over the Mau, let us see with a GPS and…all that 
guidance [what the damage is]”. We were able to see the destruction on the ground, [and] when they landed, 
they were fuming…that's how the policy process was triggered.’ (Interview, INTL2). In local agencies such as 
the Nairobi City Council, the decision to formulate new policies is driven primarily by needs identified by 
technocrats within the various departments of Council. An NCC official outlined the process:  
‘…The technocrats do the initial [policy] plans based on their needs…Once 
they’ve identified the needs, they can either formulate policy, or…hire 
consultants to do that…But for the consultant to be effective, you need to 
give him some framework to work on. So once that has been done, we 
consult within the department, as technocrats, then lift it and take it to the 
departmental committee for further scrutiny and approval. Once that has 
been done it goes to the full council for a final approval. And again within 
that period, we usually have around fourteen days for scrutiny by members 
of the public.’ (Interview, GOVT7).  
This procedure indicates that there is limited involvement of higher environmental institutions in the 
creation of local policies, unless such input is sought during the consultation stage one the draft policy has 
been formulated. While this approach does grant local authorities the autonomy to create policies specific to 
their needs, it also limits their access to resources and expertise that are available at the national level.  
A third pathway to creating policy is through local research and reporting, particularly in the form of 
environmental monitoring by agencies such as the MEMR, NEMA and UNEP, which may reveal a need for 
new policies to address contemporary challenges (Interview, GOVT4). These reports in turn may also point 
to areas where further research is needed, thus prompting data gathering exercises which are needed to make 
policy decisions. For instance, NEMA’s State of the Environment Report reveals significant data gaps, such as 
in relation to biodiversity statistics, freshwater resources, and forestry statistics, which limit the ability of 
policymakers to create effective solutions to urgent challenges (Businge, Ondimu, Maina, Mutai, et al., 2011). 
Unfortunately, given that the environmental mandate is segregated among multiple agencies, determining the 
best source of information can be a complicated exercise. A NEMA official explained:  
‘The data is there but it is in isolated pockets within different institutions 
and therefore that makes it a problem because many of these institutions do 
not want to share that data for free, they want to sell it - and once that 
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monetary aspect comes into play and you don't have the money to pay for 
that data, you will make a decision without it, and it might not be the best 
decision…Kenyans don't have a culture of sharing data, they have a culture 
of hoarding it unless someone is paying for it. So it is an unfortunate 
scenario but…it becomes a bit of a contradiction because then this data is 
not available for use based on the reason for which the data was produced.’ 
(Interview, GOVT4).  
The cultural limitations to cooperation and coordination between the numerous agencies involved in 
environmental management, alluded to in the quote above, has been found across government agencies in all 
sectors. Although attempts have been made to share information and data through the country’s ‘Open Data 
Initiative’, the validity of the data made available (much of it through the Kenya Bureau of Statistics) remains 
in question (Interview, CSO2; Interview, GOVT4). A local Kenyan news article on scientific innovation in 
the country stated that ‘barely two years after the Open Data Initiative was launched, Dr. Ndemo [Permanent 
Secretary of Information and Communication] declared that it had stalled as government agencies remained 
tight-fisted with their data.’ (Mumo, 2013). Another initiative called the Kenya Environmental Information 
Network was set up by NEMA in conjunction with UNEP, but has not yielded any results due to a lack of 
available funds (Mayhew & Karani, 2012). This reticence combined with an apparent lack of capacity to 
increase the transparency of policy-making through the public availability of crucial research adds further 
barriers to the flow of information, and partly explains why the various ministerial policies are in some 
instances at odds with one another.  
Given that foreign consultants are frequently drawn on as part of policy formulation in Ministerial 
teams (as discussed earlier), the strategies and approaches employed in environmental policies are often 
modeled on experiences and best practices beyond Kenya’s borders. As a governance expert attested: ‘local 
broad-based policy is informed by best practices elsewhere…we are committed in our millennium goals with 
specific targets of an environmental nature - so that is set out in broad terms, but in the process of…breaking 
down the broad goals into projects and programs that actual data, factual information about how it is done, 
and what are the challenges, and how shall we measure success, become an issue.’ (Interview, GOVT8). A 
government researcher agreed that simply adopting foreign models would not be sufficient to ensure success 
on the ground: ‘I believe we can be the [model for] best practice for Africa, and that is why when we look for 
benchmarks we usually go beyond Africa. We looked at other places that have worked, and while it is true 
that there are idiosyncrasies and the Western countries are very different in terms of culture, even climate, that 
is why there is a great need to contextualize some of those lessons, and that is what we are trying to do in an 
adaptive manner.’ (Interview, GOVT9). This process of translating foreign approaches to fit a local context is 
   82 
also frequently hindered by a lack of local information and gaps in data, which could lead to less successful 
policy interventions.  
 To aid in filling data gaps, non-state actors often play a key role in research and monitoring. As one 
informant described, the particular types of data collected to fill spatial and environmental data gaps include:  
‘…Questionnaires, and under…the infrastructure division we use mapping 
tools…to integrate statistics with geographical data...We do also get some 
data from our [Kenya] Bureau of Statistics, but even for those mapping tools 
we hire companies to do them for us…in the private sector through 
competitive bidding…but we have to offer supervision so that we get the 
quality we want from them.’ (Interview, GOVT9) 
Private firms are therefore instrumental in data gathering and research, but as mentioned previously 
this information is often proprietary unless it has been produced for a Government office and been made 
available to the public. As a UNEP officer stated, ‘the best data you can get I think would be through the 
universities, through the papers that have been written depending on whether that area has been so much 
researched on…But if you get it from the government office, you will find that it will have been developed by 
the private firms.’ (Interview, INTL2). Several stakeholders also identified consultative forums as a main 
component of data gathering (Interview, GOVT3; Interview, GOVT5; Interview, GOVT6; Interview, 
CSO1; Interview, PROF2), although it is outside the scope of this study to ascertain the specific extent to 
which the views gathered in such forums have in fact affected policy content, given that the transcripts from 
consultation sessions are not made available to the public. The availability of data is connected to the practice 
of monitoring and evaluation that follows policy implementation, which is discussed in Chapter 6. If 
monitoring were not conducted on a consistent basis, then reliable data that would indicate the success, 
failure, or gaps in policy would not be available. A CSO participant noted ‘It’s actually a cycle that is never 
completed. We don't have enough data that then influences policy’ (Interview, CSO2).  
The academic sector is also a key contributor to environmental data; however, studies performed by 
international researchers and students from abroad are less accessible unless they have been widely published, 
which suggests that significant knowledge is being lost: 
‘Sometimes there is this lack of collaboration, maybe some students going 
do their fieldwork or traineeship in the institutions, but you don't know 
what research findings. And it's also probably built into the world of 
research that when you want to publicize your article and if it means that 
you don't want to give a hint along the way of what you're working on, then 
it means that once the results are out, the practical usefulness has passed. But 
that's difficult.’ (Interview, INTL6).  
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Universities, however, are also dependent to some extent on external funding, and as such do not necessarily 
provide a broad range of holistic environmental data, rather focusing on specific issues and areas (Interview, 
PROF1).  
Fourthly, in cooperation with academia, civil society is another important source from which a 
demand for policy may arise, particularly in conditions where the lack of a guiding policy creates operational 
constraints for NGOs on the ground. Local CSOs often inform policies based on real-world experiences, and 
can therefore bring great value to the policy table given their ability to draw on academic expertise as well as 
local knowledge. Indeed, local CSOs have shown tremendous initiative and influence in policy practices 
(Gikang’a, 2006). Foreign agencies participating in policy processes in Kenya also rely on CSOs to inform 
their practices and research studies, in addition to government and academic sources, as one informant 
explained: ‘…any study that we might do specifically for Kenya will always draw on existing information 
that’s available, even in academia or on the government’s side. Almost all the data itself will be coming from 
the government, or from CSOs. So the entire universe of information would be drawn upon in order to do 
these analyses.’ (Interview, INTL5).  
Unfortunately, policy pressure from CSOs is often mobilized when significant threats to the 
environment have already materialized, partly because it is difficult to convince State actors as to the necessity 
of a policy from a proactive perspective - as one informant commented: ‘When you're trying to influence 
from a proactive [stance], trying to get people to take a lead in enforcing policy action and in opening up 
space…we still have a problem with…policy arrangements in terms of the way institutions are organized. It's 
more of “is there a problem? Then we'll go there...” (Interview, CSO1). As such, there is much room for 
improvement in widening the arena for CSOs to actively initiate policy processes. 
Often, it is a combination of factors that results in policy formulation, and with the involvement of a 
constellation of actors, it is sometimes difficult to determine the particular impetus or impetuses behind a 
given policy initiative. As one informant recounted with respect to the National Environment Policy currently 
in draft, ‘I have never quite determined where the force was coming from, whether it was the 
minister…wanting a document on the table…you never really quite know what's informing the process’ 
(Interview, CSO2). Nonetheless, these policy triggers and information sources will undoubtedly continue to 
be very important in Nairobi, given the County’s status as an emerging urban economy with a strong 
presence of foreign agencies, CSO activity, and academic and research institutions. The current environment 
of Constitutional reform, however, presents important implications for the ways that policy will be 
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formulated going forward, and the ways that actors will interact in these processes. The following section 
turns to an exploration of some of these implications. 
 
5.3 Impact of Constitutional Reform on the Decision-making Process 
The Constitutional referendum of 2010, paired with new planning agendas for Nairobi (through the 
Metropolitan 2030 spatial plan) and for Kenya (through the Vision 2030 strategy) creates a strong impetus 
for changes in the way that policy development in approached in the urban environmental arena. Ownership 
of policy creation is expected to shift more strongly towards the local citizenry in Nairobi County, particularly 
where environmental justice is concerned. During the course of this study, the views collected from 
stakeholders ranged from a high degree of optimism and conviction that the new Constitution would spell a 
new era of better environmental governance and more inclusive decision-making in policy formulation, to a 
much more cynical view that the Constitutional reform could overturn an age-old system of poor policy 
practice. The Vision 2030 and Metro 2030 strategies have been considered here in the context of 
environmental mainstreaming, in order to determine the extent to which environmental considerations have 
factored into each of these documents and the policy formulation processes associated with decision-making. 
As such, this section discusses a broad range of the views collated through participant interviews in order to 
reflect the current climate of change and the challenges to effectively realizing their potential benefits for 
Nairobi County. 
 The Constitution of Kenya (2010) has a number of facets that hold promise for improved 
environmental governance. Among those most salient to the policy formulation process are greater public 
participation and citizen engagement, and improved opportunities for environmental mainstreaming, which is 
the integration of the environmental agenda with all levels of administrative, economic and social planning. 
With regard to the first benefit, the accomplishment of more inclusive participation is dependent upon 
citizens claiming their rights as afforded under the Constitution. Here, the issue of ownership of the policy 
process is highly relevant, because the smaller size of government authority at the county level creates 
potential for more efficient decision-making and the building of social capital (Sundar, 2001). However, as 
noted earlier, fostering a local identity and desire to own the policy process is problematic in for residents of 
Nairobi, because a large percentage of the population hails from alternative counties. As one informant noted, 
for these residents the city is ‘alien in many ways – culturally, they don't identify with it…how do you 
remodel that? How do you turn that around?...The Constitution gives you the power to do it, but the know-
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how, and how to go about it, will require quite a bit of new tools, new thinking, even new movements.’ 
(Interview, CSO1). Without a keen interest from the public and non-state actors to actively engage with 
policy and claim their voice at the table, minimal change can be expected to occur.  
Interestingly, the overlapping of land and environmental management policies, combined with the 
strong socio-cultural context of tribalism and attachment to land in Kenya (Ryan, 2004), may create 
bottlenecks when attempting to create policies that affect natural resource management in multiple counties 
simultaneously. An MEMR policy officer expressed his concern over this issue: ‘we have a lot of tribalism 
[and] nepotism, where people say this [resource] will become ours. And you see once we go through 
devolution, it will give birth to the commodification of the environment. That is one thing we are trying to 
avoid, [but]…it will be there. As much as a river goes all the way from that [County] to this [County], people 
will say this is our part of the river.’ (Interview, GOVT1).  
The emphasis of the Constitution on collaborative governance in policy formulation would be a 
boon for policy implementation as well, particularly in cases where the policies in question are codified 
through legal provisions – one academic informant noted, ‘the only way you get efficacious implementation 
of laws, especially like environmental law, is by broadening public participation…there was considerable 
scope for public participation in EMCA [Environmental Management and Coordination Act of 1999]…but 
now that has been broadened also further by the Constitutional provisions.’ (Interview, PROF3). However, 
the Constitution does not provide a clear procedure for how consultation should be approached or integrated 
into policy decision-making. A CSO participant warned, ‘with the new Constitution, despite having a lot of 
hope, we have not gotten our political process of how policy should be formed correctly. It has a lot of 
interference and interests from outside; I just don't know when we'll get it right. I say this with a lot of 
frustration on our end, because you find ways to work on it and after three years we still don't have it.’ 
(Interview, CSO2). This level of ambiguity could be particularly fatal for participation in the policy process, 
given the current formation of a devolved government consisting of 47 separate counties, each essentially 
acting autonomously. The mechanisms for policy formulation in each county will remain at the discretion of 
the County governing board, made up of elected representatives, with a potential decentralized unit at the 
sub-county level which has yet to be clearly laid out in the Constitutional provisions (National Council for 
Law Reporting, 2010). 
 In this new setting of devolved and highly decentralized government, a key concern for policymaking 
under the new scheme will be the level of political involvement in decision-making – with a devolved 
government, there will be greater splintering of natural resources across County boundaries, creating policy 
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formulation and implementation challenges. For Nairobi, the issue of local governance is further complicated 
by the large size of the county, and the current uncertainty as to how small-scale decisions will be made in 
terms of stakeholder engagement given the potential subsuming of the Nairobi City Council into a newly 
formed County Board. An academic expert cautioned for wary optimism in this regard:  
‘When you have a new Constitution, sometimes there is room to push 
certain aspects of the law in purely a political context. So that's an issue in 
policymaking, that sometimes in policy processes when the discussions take 
a partisan or party line angle in the agenda of the legislation we are likely to 
have a tragedy in the law…because the new county government  - it will 
have some politicians, County assemblymen and women – who in their 
conception of their role, are no longer the typical City Council. They are 
quite high, somewhere along the lines of the provincial MPs in Canada... So 
they are not going to deal with the nitty-gritty of the site location and 
environmental issues, and now you have removed the role of the city 
Council – what happens?’ (Interview, PROF1).  
It is expected to some extent that these inconsistencies and uncertainties will be managed over the 
first few years of devolved government. With a reinforced capacity for citizens to represent themselves in court 
against the government (locus standi) as initially envisioned under the Environmental Management and 
Coordination Act (Kameri-Mbote, 2005), there is hope that persistent issues of environmental neglect will 
receive attention. 
Yet, past experience indicates that even with a more democratized government, there is no guarantee 
that anthropocentric interests will not rule supreme and that policy decisions will be made in the best interest 
of the environment – as Kabiri (2004: 384) concludes from his research in East Africa, ‘It is theoretically 
implausible to demonstrate that liberalized environmental governance necessarily translates into desirable 
environmental outcomes.’ With further complications relating to funding for policy decisions made in each 
county, the access to financial resources via the central government would present another layer of 
considerations when formulating policies (Kramon & Posner, 2011), particularly those that relate to 
environmental management issues that would potentially add further strain to a local budget. A NEMA 
official alluded to this point as well: ‘…as we move to the county establishment…there are certain 
responsibilities that have been given to the counties for example to deal with agriculture, air pollution, noise 
and so on. But…these are already…a challenge even as we speak at the National level. So although it is good 
to decentralize these functions, there is always the risk that during the changeover to county governments 
these issues could lost, [if] it is not a priority...[and] people want to deal with more urgent issues.’ (Interview, 
GOVT4). Thus there is still no definitive mechanism to guarantee environmental prioritization in the policy 
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agendas of individual counties, least of all in Nairobi where consumerism reigns, infrastructural development 
is a recognized priority over environmental considerations (Mérino, 2010), and industries are often expected 
to self-regulate with regard to environmental compliance (Kamau, 2005).  
 The second main advantage of the constitution comes in the form of environmental mainstreaming 
opportunities in the public agenda. As all existing ministerial policies and plans are being reviewed to align 
with the new Constitution, there is great potential for environmental policies to integrate principles across 
sectors. For instance, the National Environment Action Plan is considered a tool under the EMCA (1999) for 
bringing environmental issues to the forefront of economic and development planning, and is part of the 
strategic guidance documents for the Ministry of Planning and Finance, so that, as a NEMA official 
explained, ‘…in development going forward, that environment considerations are taken into account.’ 
(Interview, GOVT4). However, the NEAP has not in fact succeeded in guiding developmental planning, as 
evidenced by the structure of the Kenya Vision 2030 Plan which highlights Economic, Social, and Political 
pillars of the Strategy, while minimizing environmental considerations as being a limited component of the 
social and economic growth areas that are focused on. Given the high rate of environmental degradation in 
the wake of urban development in Nairobi (Mundia & Aniya, 2005, 2006; Ndiritu, Gichuki, Kaur, & Triest, 
2003), this disregard for the importance of the environment as the cornerstone for economic growth is 
particularly perturbing.  
It is interesting to note how the dedication to public participation in decision-making enshrined in 
the Constitution has been adopted on an ad hoc basis in major developmental planning decisions like the 
Vision 2030 and Metro 2030 strategies, even though officials involved in formulating these documents insist 
that consultations were conducted (Interview, GOVT6; Interview, GOVT5). A CSO participant commented 
derisively:  
‘I'd have to be too imaginative to tell you that we have engaged, because 
from the very beginning how Vision 2030 came about, there was limited 
participation. People saw a document talking about Vision 2030 and we 
were told to embrace it, adopt it and love it and deal with it. So the 
engagement with civil society at that level has never been, in my point of 
view, taken to actually influence the whole process, because for you to 
actually miss the environment pillar, it tells you they didn't consult, they 
took some consultants and you got your consulting with the public. So it’s a 
document I would have to read but I've never really quite owned it.’ 
(Interview, CSO2).  
Although the environment does not take center stage in the Vision 2030 strategy, recent meetings through the 
Rio +20 Summit have begun to push more forcefully for a ‘green economy’ approach to sustainable 
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development. However, this concept remains largely open to interpretation, as a member of the Vision 2030 
team commented: ‘I don't think people have got really the concept of what “green economy” is all about. I 
don't think it has been internalized, at least within the Kenyan society or the rural community, I think to me 
its more of high-level talking, because really when you talk about green economy, what is green economy? But 
I suspect that the end of the day…It's really just buzzwords.’ (Interview, GOVT6).  
Likewise, the Metro 2030 spatial plan for Nairobi purports to be a holistic plan, yet its most 
significant component is a massive expansion of the County boundary from approximately 700km2 to 
32,000km2, a decision that does not appear to have been taken with important environmental considerations 
in mind. An official with the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development (MNMD), the agency that 
created the plan, recalled:  
‘I wouldn't think that the growth boundaries were set entirely based on 
environmental considerations…initially the Metropolitan region was given a 
100 km radius from the city center. Not really because of environmental 
concerns, it is the way the population has migrated…just to be able to look 
for an integrative way of dealing with these interlinked towns. Now, political 
considerations came in…so that’s why I am saying that the factors…some 
were actually even political - political, economic, and social…’ (Interview, 
GOVT5).  
The comments of a researcher involved in the process of creating the Metro 2030 plan confirmed 
that the primary considerations revolved around population growth and infrastructural development 
(Interview, GOVT9).  Indeed, a perusal of the Nairobi Metro 2030 plan reveals that environmental 
management is addressed primarily in the context of sustainable transportation systems, waste management 
and sanitation systems (Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development, 2008). Natural ecosystems including 
wetlands, forests, and waterways are listed as potentially fragile components of the growth region, which 
require protection, although no strategy or methodology is laid out to ensure this (Ibid.). Given that the 
current system of environmental policy formulation has significant limitations with respect to stakeholder 
engagement, co-ordination, and data sources, it can be expected that these issues will only be compounded 
with a larger area to deal with, a challenge that holds concern for stakeholders at both the National and 
County levels (Interview, GOVT1; Interview, GOVT7).  
 In summary, the Constitution of 2010 provides a number of opportunities for improved 
environmental governance and policy input for stakeholders, albeit with challenges in altering the prevailing 
institutional and cultural attitudes towards participation and engagement. Environmental mainstreaming as 
envisioned in the Constitution attempts to reduce the sectorial segregation of the environmental mandate 
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from that of economic planning and development, as has been the status quo to date (Oulu & Boon, 2011). 
One CSO participant described the principles behind this objective: ‘…in…indigenous systems…you do not 
separate…political governance, from environmental governance, from governance of livelihoods and your 
resources – it's all into one…it's a continuum…Now, when you have that then you see people at the center, 
and people's livelihoods are at the center, and then when you say livelihoods, then obviously the health of the 
environment is paramount.’ (Interview, CSO1). Furthermore, the mere existence of a reform agenda or 
reformist policies are not sufficient to guarantee changes to the status quo; backtracking often occurs in the 
Kenyan context and is exacerbated when several levels of policy and government must be unified (Ryan, 
2004). While some limited progress has been made towards greater harmonization of environmental 
management and development goals, there are still significant areas for improvement both in the content of 
policies and strategies as well as the processes that create them. Some of these persistent gaps are discussed in 
the next section.  
5.4 Culture, Communication, and Clarity: Systemic Issues in the Formulation Process 
Given the importance of actors in the policy process, this section examines systemic challenges to 
effective and collaborative policy formulation in Kenya and in Nairobi from the perspective of the study 
respondents. To begin, as the environmental policy process in Kenya is led by elected and appointed officials 
in the Government, the issue of integrity is of particular concern in the formulation of policy. Unfortunately, 
Kenya has a history of corrupt governance practices that have created an environment of mistrust and 
skepticism among stakeholders (Over three-quarters of key informants cited integrity issues and corruption as 
barriers to environmental governance). This mistrust then breeds a sense of apathy, which is lethal to 
engaging in honest discourse over legitimate policy interventions. In fact, in a study conducted in Nairobi, 
over 80% out of 132 respondents cited corruption as a ‘very significant’ factor in environmental and 
development problems in the County (Shisanya & Khayesi, 2007).  
The issue of corruption as a deterrent to policy success is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6; 
however, it should be noted that in the transition from one administration to the next following a national 
election, the approach to policy creation and enforcement changes as well, and any relics of malfeasance in 
decision-making from the previous regime will have implications for the public in the future. One MEMR 
policy officer recalled: ‘you look at even the way they do their planning…the motive is purely corrupt. That's 
why in the long run, after so many years, we have environmental disasters…And then you look at the issues 
we have had with the road reserves and houses – these are people who built their houses a long time ago, they 
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were given title deeds. But now in this government they are being told, you have built on a road reserve! 
Imagine!’ (Interview, GOVT2). This point takes on even more grave relevance in light of the recent General 
Elections held in March 2013, and the implementation of the new Constitution by members of the old 
regime who have remained in positions of authority within the national government (Klopp, 2013).  
 Secondly, the ethos that dictates both consultative processes as well as policy content will also by and 
large impact on the direction that environmental policy takes. Currently, environmental management in 
Kenya is viewed as a secondary priority to urban development (Ryan, 2004), and this creates conflicts in the 
formulation of effective policies. As one informant noted: 
‘We still manage resources purely from what I would call a very techno-
developmental kind of outlook. We still don't manage resources from an 
ethical livelihood angle…Policy is still driven from going “we want to 
develop, and we want to develop very fast”…So what you have is a 
consumer society that is very lazy in terms of involvement…Because [the 
public is] not asking questions, [the government] do(es) whatever they want 
with the natural environment. So to change the way we do things, the way 
we plan, the way we whatever –it will require a whole paradigm shift…’ 
(Interview, CSO1) 
Indeed, studies from around the country have shown that unless the principles of environmental 
protection and resource conservation embodied within policies are embraced by decision-makers at the local 
level, the mere existence of environmental laws and regulations is insufficient to achieve these objectives (Hirji 
& Ortolano, 1991). This also points to the importance of the cognitive characteristics of actors involved in 
the policy process – as one NEMA informant pointed out,  
‘The most important, critical factor is to get all the important players 
looking at the things from the same perspective - so that I might not be in 
one agency and looking at issuing [a development] permit for purposes of 
revenue generation, and another [official] is looking at issuing a permit for 
purposes of sustainable development – these people, their focuses will be 
quite different…you can find an appropriate balance that serves the greater 
good. But left to play out on its own, then…you are heading towards a 
dangerous abyss.’ (Interview, GOVT4).  
The research indicated that the belief systems of the informants interviewed were highly variegated 
and tended to stand in conflict rather than concert. Some state actors, particularly in national-level agencies, 
tended to view the public as agents of degradation and therefore as entities that required control, rather than 
collaborative engagement to improve environmental conditions (Interview, GOVT3; Interview, GOVT5; 
Interview, GOVT6). In contrast, civil society and academic actors showed a stronger bent towards the 
consideration of the environment as a holistic issue with ties to every aspect of governance, and were more 
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inclined to advocate for greater recognition of the public voice in policymaking (Interview, CSO2; Interview, 
CSO3). Foreign funding institutions were perhaps best placed to lead environmental policy initiatives given 
their standing as donors to the process, and yet there was a wide diversity in the extent to which these actors 
leveraged their position to exert authority in the policy positions and pathways that emerged from these 
initiatives. Similarly, private organizations that were involved largely in implementing policies but also as 
informants in data gathering and research, showed a preference towards advocating for more progressive 
policies that would lead to improved planning on the ground (Interview, PLANNER1; Interview, 
PLANNER2; Interview, RESEARCHER1). 
Furthermore, the relationship between environmental agencies and the public has fostered a sense of 
disconnect between communities and their roles in resource management, transforming the dialogue from a 
stewardship orientation into a more political and economy-centric one, in line with Cohen’s (2004) 
evaluation. As Matiru (1999: 20-21) contends, ‘Historically, the relationship between members of local 
communities and the institutions mandated with natural resource management has been characterized by 
suspicion, punitive measures and limited dialogue.’ The significant weight of state authority in governing the 
policy process hence limits the ability of other stakeholders to provide input and be included in decision-
making, particularly where there are high monetary stakes involved – as one donor informant noted, during 
water sector policy consultations ‘They consulted with water sector institutions, and they were of course all 
full of self-interest, worries about their own future, but the general public, the consumers, rights activists, all 
these guys were somehow kept out of the loop.’ (Interview, INTL6). Although the new Constitution may aid 
in mainstreaming environmental considerations across policy sectors, there is still significant headway to be 
made towards changing the overall perception of conservation and resource management. 
Thirdly, the lack of a comprehensive national-level environmental policy has allowed for the 
splintering of the environmental mandate among various state agencies, which impedes the creation of a true 
natural resources management sector in favour of a highly politicized process rife with discrepancies and 
disputes over authority. A NEMA informant explained: 
‘…Issues that touch on environmental matters are scattered, and there are 
very many players. If you were to look at for example, just ministries with an 
environmental mandate, there are very many. Then after the ministries you 
go down to parastatal and other actors, government and others with an 
environmental mandate. There are very many and sometimes it is possible 
that the left hand might not know what the right hand is doing. So this has 
been a challenge, a difficulty, and sometimes it can be…not a good 
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environment to determine what is sustainable under such circumstances.’ 
(Interview, GOVT4).  
Even at the micro-level, intra-agency communication appears to be problematic. A Nairobi City Council 
official explained how the various departments within the Council often operate in silos: 
‘There is no cohesion; there is no focused targets vis-à-vis the different 
mandates within the departments. A case in point again is – take the issue of 
solid waste, vis-à-vis urban development…whereby you have…flats coming 
up. But…when they come here for approval, nobody looks at the issue of 
waste management…So the ideal situation like in other countries would be 
for those flats to be approved, they need to go through the city department 
of environment, city planning department, for further input from technical 
officers. Those are some of the challenges that we have even within the 
Council.’ (Interview, GOVT7). 
This lack of communication reduces the overall understanding of technical officers as regards the 
interconnections between development and environmental goals, and as such limits the capacity of 
policymakers to create truly holistic policies. In addition, the final stages of policy formulation require 
submission to the National Economic and Social Council and subsequently to a Parliamentary Committee; at 
both levels, there is a risk that content will be modified to reflect political or economic priorities, without the 
explicit consent of all stakeholders.  
A fourth key challenge is in the content of environmental policies, where the issue of urbanization 
arises as a complicating factor - within the context of environmental management, population movement has 
been considered primarily from the lens of development goals rather than a cross-cutting issue (Interview, 
CSO2; Interview, GOVT1). While the Environmental Management and Coordination Act (1999) mandates 
impact assessments for construction projects, without sound cross-sectorial environmental principles to guide 
the overall scheme of development there is significant room for political interests to take over in the case of 
individual projects (Bird & Kirira, 2009; Kameri-Mbote, 2000). This may in part may be due to the fact that, 
as one NEMA informant suggested, ecosystem services have not been adequately quantified in economic 
terms: ‘…from a developmental perspective, because some of these issues are political decisions…and the fact 
that these environmental goods and services have been treated as free goods and services for a long time, no 
one considers them.’ (Interview, GOVT4). Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) can be classified in a 
variety of ways; Boyd and Banzhaf (2007: 625) offer a twofold definition: ‘First…ecosystem services should 
be isolated from non-ecological contributions to final goods and services…Second, that economic accounting 
is concerned with ecological end-products, not the far larger set of intermediate processes and elements that 
make up nature.’ The notion of PES has been touted as a crucial link between environmental and economic 
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policy, and scholarly work in this area indicates that the use of this type of environmental valuation is integral 
to achieving conservation goals (Fisher, Turner & Morling, 2009; Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, 2008).  
It is hoped that approval of the National Environment Policy (NEP, currently in draft) will go some 
way towards aligning environmental goals across the board; nevertheless, one CSO informant involved in the 
drafting of this document stated that ‘some of the recommendations…do not make specific references to how 
we deal with issues of urbanization. They are those blanket statements that you don't know how to 
operationalize as such’ (Interview, CSO2). The vagueness of the policy is intentional, as it is has been 
designed as an ‘umbrella document’, from which multiple more specific policies can be derived (Interview, 
GOVT1; Interview, GOVT2). However, as the quote from the CSO informant above indicates, there is some 
concern that the lack of specificity could lead to the policy becoming just another unimplemented or 
disregarded item in the overall environmental regulatory framework in the country (Interview, 
RESEARCHER1; Interview, INTL6; Interview, CSO2). 
Fifth, environmental awareness remains disproportionately distributed, even among the key policy 
stakeholders interviewed in this study. Interviews with key respondents revealed an interesting conflation of 
the natural and built environs in the urban setting - several informants when asked what they considered to be 
the key environmental challenges for Nairobi, cited issues of transportation, waste management, and 
overcrowding, without recognizing critical concerns such as water management, loss of arable land, and 
deforestation. This confirms the results of previous studies, for instance as Bird & Kirira (2009: 9) found:  
‘Permanent Secretaries of some of the sectorial ministries identified in 
EMCA as key players openly admit not to be aware of what NEC does, nor 
do they attend its meetings. Such a situation means they are not involved in 
the formulation of environmental policies and therefore cannot be expected 
to implement them. This can only increase the disconnect between those 
policies stipulated in various planning documents (Vision 2030, the 
Medium Term Plan) and the prioritization of programmes and activities by 
ministries and agencies.’  
It is therefore critical for the environmental discourse to better translate goals and objectives in 
economic and developmental terms, particularly since ‘threats to socioeconomic security take precedence over 
threats to the physical and living environment in Nairobi’ (Shisanya & Khayesi, 2007: 280). These challenges 
at the formulation stage of the policy process also create overlap with implementation efforts, and require 
sound monitoring and evaluation practices in order to update policies based on the realities on the ground.  
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5.5 Summary: Critical Findings on the Environmental Policy Formulation Process in 
Nairobi 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, there are a number of interesting factors that bind decision-
makers together in alliances or keep them on opposing sides of environmental issues. The findings and 
analysis of the environmental policy formulation process strongly echo the views of policy theorists both in 
the region and beyond. For one, the study data confirms Leach & Mearns (1996) contention that the state 
agency in a given policy matter holds the highest authority because of its position of control over the 
environmental assets under its mandate. Private organizations are looked to for their expertise as an authority 
on practical planning implications of policies (Fritzen et al., 2009), while CSOs are seen to some extent as 
representatives of the public interest but also as doing the bidding of supranational institutions in the form of 
foreign aid agencies and multilateral organizations (Thomas & Grindle, 1990; Goode, 1984), particularly as a 
result of the conditionalities attached to aid which affect the policy positions they adopt and advocate for 
(Thomas & Grindle, 1990; Bratton, 1989).  
This network of local ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Mintrom & Norman, 2009) converges with foreign 
experts (who form an epistemic community of their own as they cross transnational boundaries to spread their 
knowledge, as described by Adler and Haas (1992)); these foreign experts who take up residence in local state 
policymaking agencies are the crucial link to understanding the motivations of foreign institutions in Nairobi, 
and the insights provided by informants from the Swedish and Danish Embassies as well as the World Bank, 
UNEP and UN Habitat are pivotal to elucidating some of the key considerations that go into the policy 
formulation process. The NEMA officers and other experts represent the type of technical ‘knowledge elite’ 
that Fischer (2000) describes.  
The distribution of the environmental mandate across several institutions increases the likelihood of 
conflicts between state decision-makers who are interested in protecting their own political interests, as well as 
non-state stakeholders who have to coordinate with a diverse range of agencies and institutions in order to 
make contributions to policy. Environmental policy issues are separated from other crucial policy arenas such 
as economic, social, and urban development, which creates further conflicts between interacting policies in a 
practical sense. In addition, CSOs and the Academic and Private sectors are forced to compete for space at the 
policy table, and the weight of their influence is often predicated on their capacity to bring material or 
intellectual resources to bear. As a result, alliances are often formed with donor institutions both foreign and 
local, leading to shifts in their advocated policy positions. 
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The local environmental committees in Nairobi County represented by the City Council have 
limited space to influence higher-level environmental policies, and as a result the separation between 
formulators and implementers presents a challenge to the ownership of operationalized policy. As Figure 4 
illustrates, there is a high level of complexity in the organization of state and non-state actors, with a 
disproportionately high level of authority assigned to Ministerial leaders. Further, the requirement for 
Parliamentary approval by elected officials who have their own personal and political motivations has often 
led to changes in final policy content that did not involve the input of stakeholders.  
The recent Constitutional and strategic planning reforms aim to increase the democratic value of 
governance and policy processes. Nonetheless, the long-standing history of corruption and a lack of public 
investment in these levels of urban life will likely remain persistent barriers to the future of wider stakeholder 
involvement in policy formulation activities in Nairobi. The following Chapter (Chapter 6) explores the 
mechanisms for coordinating environmental policy and regulatory implementation in Nairobi, and several of 
the themes discussed here are revisited in the context of challenges to operationalizing policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   96 
 Chapter 6
Linking Theory and Practice through Implementation 
The policy implementation process represents the crucial bridge between theoretical policy goals and 
planning practice. Environmental policies have a significant impact on development planning and urban 
growth, and with respect to Nairobi, this relationship has long been considered a tenuous one (Mundia & 
Aniya, 2005; Kamau, 2005; Mérino, 2010). As Mundia and Aniya (2004: 106) observe:  
‘Urban sprawl has been converting forests, agricultural land and rangeland 
into built environment beyond the edges of urbanizing areas at an alarming 
rate. This sprawl is affecting water supply, wildlife habitat availability and 
overall habitat quality and is leading to serious environmental degradation of 
Nairobi City. Sprawl not only consumes natural habitats but also fragments, 
degrades and isolates remaining natural areas. Urbanization has been 
characterized by ad hoc landuse planning with little consideration for 
environment impact or physical constraints.’ 
 Unfortunately, environmental research in Kenya thus far has not lent itself to exploring the intricacies of 
actor arrangements in policy implementation, particularly with regard to politics, corruption, and gender 
(Mwangi, 2000). In addition, given the influence of international donor agencies in the environmental arena, 
it is important at this juncture to differentiate between ‘espoused’ policy and ‘in use’ policy (Argyris & Schon, 
1974). Espoused policy is often the result of pressure from interest groups such as donor organizations on state 
decision-makers, and may not be integrated into local strategic goals. Policy-in-use on the other hand 
conceptualizes the relationship between policy statements and actual behavioural results, hence indicating the 
true effects of policy on the ground (Honadle, 1999: 29).  
With these issues in mind, this Chapter explores the dynamics of environmental policy 
implementation from the point of view of the actors and institutions involved, although it is outside the scope 
of this study to do a comprehensive review of the specific results of particular policies. Such scrutiny is 
however warranted, and would be a useful source of comparative data over the next phase of urban 
development in Nairobi under the umbrella of reforms and new policies that are now emerging. Given the 
sectorial nature of environmental management in Kenya, and given the lack of national-level environmental 
policy, the reviews and evaluations of existing policy activities have tended to focus on specific areas, such as 
water, agriculture, and forestry. In contrast, this Chapter examines the implementation process with particular 
regard to the ways in which state and non-state actors interact to operationalize policy on the ground, and the 
challenges that have emerged. 
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6.1 Institutional Dynamics of Policy Implementation 
6.1.1 State Actors: People, Politics, and Policy  
Following the Parliamentary approval of a policy and its formal institutionalization, the policy 
process can take a number of paths to implementation. Of critical importance are the development of 
strategic and investment plans that provide the budgetary support for policy implementation (Interview, 
GOVT3). These are then followed by the drafting of acts and regulations that provide the legal weight to 
enforce policy principles; while Kenya has is perceived to possess significant intellectual capacity that has been 
harnessed during the policy formulation processes in the past, in some cases instituted policies are simply not 
implemented at all, particularly if political considerations are at play. As Ryan (2004) notes, ‘though Kenya 
has a well-established international reputation for preparing high-quality policy documents, such written 
statements do not necessarily constitute policy – a term that implies a state action supported by many facilities 
and personnel.’ (Ryan, 2004: 95). All the informants interviewed agreed with this point, with one interviewee 
from the Kenya Vision 2030 team conceding that, ‘…it's very challenging in terms of implementation, not 
many ministries actually can [state] that they have implemented - I think it is one of the most difficult things 
in Kenya…in one financial year, if perhaps how much [a policy] has been used in the budget is a measure, we 
are averaging about 20 to 25% of the implementation [of all policies].’ (Interview, GOVT6). Another World 
Bank informant explained how a lack of political will is a major barrier to appropriate implementation of 
policies: 
‘…To implement a policy…sometimes it will be [through] an actual act of 
parliament or law, and the regulations and by-laws…So it often is the case 
that aspirational policies are not implemented. We sometimes implement it 
through a court process, it’s quite common to drag the government to the 
court, whenever we feel a policy is not being implemented as intended…But 
in Kenya it doesn't work so well because the judiciary…doesn't have much 
capacity, there is a lot of corruption, people who pay are more likely to 
win…things like that.’ (Interview, INTL5).   
The vulnerability of policy implementation to political factors ties into the transparency of the 
decision-making process that creates policy, and the involvement of those subject to compliance (Kimani, 
2010b). As one NCC Official recognized, `It’s very unfortunate where you wake up one morning with A and 
B policy or new regulations without the awareness component, and we are now supposed to implement that.’ 
(Interview, GOVT7). Unless the local population is able to claim ownership over policies and the ensuing 
laws, both enforcement of and compliance with these frameworks will be inhibited. This is particularly true 
for new policies and their corresponding strategic plans, as introducing novel measures for environmental 
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management requires an adjustment period. One informant from the Kenya Institute of Governance 
acknowledged: 
‘Many times implementation capacity lags behind, but also depends on what 
kind of policy because there are quite a few which are consistent with the 
installed capacity already, and also the political ranking and prioritization of 
new policy initiatives has a lot to do with how much the state targets 
resources for implementation. So it varies with the political priority, the 
sensitivity of the matter at hand, the urgency of the matter at hand, and the 
novelty of what it takes.’ (Interview, GOVT8). 
The key institution responsible for overarching implementation of environmental laws and policies is 
the National Environmental Management Authority.  The Environmental Management and Coordination 
Act (EMCA) of 1999 (which also mandated the creation of NEMA) is the main piece of environmental 
legislation in the country; numerous policies and acts have been fashioned after the EMCA in the absence of a 
National Environmental Policy (Interview, PROF3).  
However, each of the alternate ministries involved in environmental management in the country have 
their own enforcement bodies – the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife for instance delegates these 
responsibilities to the Kenya Wildlife Service and Kenya Forests Service, while the Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation operates through Public-Private Partnerships with parastatal corporations across the country to 
provide municipal water services to the population (K’Akumu & Appida, 2006). As such, policy 
implementation requires the cooperation of multiple state and non-state actors. As a NEMA informant 
pointed out, ‘if you are talking about wetlands, we can also have a department within NEMA in charge of 
wetlands conservation, but the role of protection of wetlands, the mandate is with the Kenya Wildlife Service, 
so we have to work with them.’ (Interview, GOVT3). Another informant from the foreign aid sector added 
that there was the added consideration of aligning environmental sector support with Kenya’s overall financial 
and development plans:  
‘When we were undertaking the environment program support, and at the 
same time also an agriculture sector program and a water sector program, we 
realized that there was a lot of overlaps in these three silo programs, and a lot 
of transaction costs were being incurred. Because relatively the country 
being of course a very strong agriculture-backboned sort of economy, 
natural resource management actually transcends the costs of all three, and 
engagement really should be done multi-sectorally…in order to [provide] 
support as a donor, you would want to influence even the Ministry of 
Planning and Finance because that's where business happens.’ (Interview, 
INTL7). 
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Hence, and returning to a previous point made in Chapter 5 (regarding the policy formulation 
process), the wide diversity in institutions responsible for environmental management, each with their own 
individual agenda, creates major pitfalls in acquiring a consensus on planning decisions. One NEMA 
informant explained how overlapping and sometimes conflicting interests and mandates between agencies 
complicates the implementation process:  
‘If for example our key partner like the [Nairobi] City Council was looking 
at the environment as an important thing…They would take time to look at 
a proposed development project, they would have an environment desk if 
you want to call it that, to help in the decision making process. But often 
times we would send these EIAs to lead agencies and they do not have the 
time to look at it, they just send it back with “no comment”. When the 
development starts to come up then acrimony starts, [they say] “where is this 
report?” I said, “you wrote that you had no comment!” Then everyone starts 
to make noise and there's politics all over. So these supervision and 
coordination aspects need to be streamlined…that by itself has been a 
challenge - now we have increased numbers because under the act it is stated 
clearly that if an institution does not carry out its mandate, then NEMA will 
do it, and therefore sometimes we have personnel doing stuff that should be 
done by a lead agency and this is not an ideal setup. We want to look at 
what would be an ideal staffing level…but it was not factored in very well 
from the outset.’ (Interview, GOVT4).  
The issue here in particular is with regard to the ‘lead agencies’6 delegated under the EMCA (1999) as 
partners in cooperation with NEMA to ensure compliance with policies and regulations. Indeed, as Mireri 
and Letema (2010) confirm, ‘In many cases, lead agencies have their own legislative mandates to implement 
as such environmental management is seen as an incidental activity. It becomes even more difficult in cases 
where decisions of environmental authority conflicts with that of lead agencies. In such cases, it is unlikely to 
expect much needed co-operation of the lead agencies.’ The notion that environmental considerations are of 
concern in a post-hoc fashion with regard to development activities explains many of the issues with poorly 
planned projects. As one international consultant remarked:  
‘NEMA is supposed to control and collect fees for…pollution and generate 
income etc., then in the water sector there is the water resource management 
authority that also collects fees and is also supposed to generate its own 
                                                      
6 The term ‘lead agency’ refers to ‘any Government ministry, department, parastatal, state corporation or local authority, 
in which any law vests functions of control or management or any element of the environment or natural resources’ 
(EMCA, 1999). 
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income. So it's a bit conflicting – who is doing what, and we see the 
institutions not releasing the point in paying all these fees; and sometimes 
one gives a permit when the other one doesn't…But you never really see 
anybody taking a stand…in stopping some dangerous environmental 
development, or taking any difficult decisions…they don't really manage 
[the environment], they [instead] resource the environment.’ (Interview, 
INTL6). 
In addition, NEMA’s wide mandate includes the creation of guidelines and regulations, enforcement, 
technical support to agencies involved in natural resource management, monitoring and reporting on the 
environment, and conducting research and surveys, among other duties (NEMA, 2013). The breadth of these 
responsibilities is a point of contention for some of the stakeholders interviewed, who believe that the 
institution does not have the resources and capacity to successfully execute due diligence (Interview, PROF1; 
Interview, INTL2; Interview, CSO2). 
‘One of the other things that NEMA is having a problem in is competent 
people. They are really suffering from a lack of competent people, and also 
the number. So they are not able…to visit the hotspots…when you have a 
project…to send their experts to verify whether the mitigation measures that 
have been suggested…and…the strategies that have been taken to curtail 
environmental degradation… Will actually work. So you find that…many 
projects are approved without them going to the site. Even when you offer 
transport, they are not available…that's a major problem, the issue of 
capacity – vis-à-vis the demand and the…multiplicity of the issues that need 
to be addressed almost simultaneously.’ (Interview, PROF1).  
Interviews held with NEMA informants confirmed that there are often lengthy delays in responding 
to issues and carrying out required surveys and inspections following the submission of EIA reports to the 
Agency (Interview, GOVT3). A NEMA informant described the challenge of existing capacity within this 
institution as being primarily related to the strength in numbers of enforcement agents: ‘capacity has got two 
facets to it: the capacity in terms of technical expertise and then capacity in terms of numbers. The technical 
expertise is very good; the challenge has been numbers. But if we found a new working model - because the 
main function is coordination and supervision - if this could be gotten right so that we map this properly, we 
might not need to increase the numbers.’ (Interview, GOVT3). A similar situation was found at the level of 
the Nairobi City Council, where limited capacity is part of the reason for poor implementation of existing 
policies. A Council informant remarked: ‘To a big extent there are reasonably well-qualified people but again 
it is a question of commitment, because…the Department of environment is really understaffed, the 
Department of city planning are highly understaffed. So that understaffing, you combine that with the inept 
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policymaking and leadership and governance issues, you have a whole lot of things going wrong.’ (Interview, 
GOVT7).  
The above quote also makes reference to the issue of integrity within institutions, which in turn is 
tied to the public conception of environmental stewardship and a willingness to conform with regulations 
whether material incentives exist or not. While NEMA is expected to act in a watchdog capacity (Interview, 
PLANNER1), the agency has been structured as a political institution answerable to the Ministry of 
Environment. One CSO informant gave his view on NEMA’s functions: ‘[NEMA] is actually under the 
Ministry of Environment, its budget comes from the Ministry, and yet it is supposed to be an independent, 
trying to even tell the Ministry “this is where you're doing it wrong”. [The Ministry] would basically just cut 
[NEMA’s] funding, and then that means it limits the kinds of engagements [NEMA] is having.’ (Interview, 
CSO2).  As a result, there is no existing agency or authority that can act as an ombudsman in the 
environmental arena, creating a gap that has had significant implications for transparency and accountability 
in environmental governance in the country. This issue of integrity and accountability is further explored in 
Section 6.2.  
 Non-state actors also showed concern over the matter of institutional capacity within NEMA and 
other implementing authorities. Donor agencies attested to providing funding to strengthen human resources 
within these agencies, including DANIDA and the Swedish Embassy (Interview, INTL6; Interview, INTL7). 
There was also some criticism from CSO and academic informants, with some insisting that the issue of 
capacity building was often used as a method of finagling foreign aid, and ignored the real issue of integrity 
and diligence within public institutions charged with policy implementation (Interview, CSO2; Interview, 
PROF1). Interestingly, this point of view was also subscribed to by a NEMA informant, who held the view 
that capacity limitations are an inadequate rationale for implementation failure, particularly when such 
limitations were apparent during the policy formulation process: ‘you don't build capacity in the institution 
when the program starts, it should have been thought of before, so when it comes down to the starting of the 
financial year the capacity is there…but I think at times the ministries overdo the issue of capacity’ (Interview, 
GOVT3).  
In order to address these capacity deficiencies, some agencies including NEMA have invested 
resources in recruiting and training new officers; however, the type of training they receive is of some 
contention. The key pathway to employment as an enforcement officer with NEMA is through a two-week 
intensive course on the policy and legal framework in Kenya, particularly with regard to the EMCA (1999) 
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(Interview, GOVT3; Interview, GOVT4). The short duration of the course is cause for skepticism with 
regard to the true competency of trained officers. As one planner stated: 
‘I like the idea of NEMA…but NEMA has one fault…anybody can become 
an environmental officer. Sounds good, but it's bad - because what happens 
is, if I have nothing to do, I just take a two-week course and call myself an 
environmental expert. That is where the fault is. If you ever hear any 
controversy about a project, that an EIA was not done well, that is where it 
comes from. You have got an expert who does not understand 
environmental issues…They might not necessarily know if that [type of 
proposal] fits for [a] piece of land.’ (Interview, PLANNER1).  
In addition, the cost of this training course is almost prohibitively high, and there is a continuing 
shortfall of funding to support training exercises in all required areas of enforcement and prosecutorial 
procedure for environmental offences (Kamweti, Osiro & Mwiturubani, 2009).  
As NEMA also has the mandate and authority to bring legal action against environmental offenders, 
the agency faces the uphill task of educating their own personnel as well court representatives and officials 
with regard to existing legal provisions, many of whom have limited knowledge of these provisions despite 
their positions within the justice system (Bird & Kirira, 2009; Interview, GOVT3; Interview, GOVT4; 
Interview, PROF1). NEMA thus retains the services of a branch of the Kenya Police on its premises 
(Kamweti, Osiro & Mwiturubani, 2009; Interview, GOVT3; Interview, GOVT4), a move that has added 
weight to the agency’s interventions in private sector development activities, leading to conflicts between the 
two groups (Kibugi, 2011).  
 In addition to the political and resource aspects of policy implementation, the institutions involved 
are also constrained in their environmental management activities by the content of policy and legal 
frameworks. In particular, the sanctions and penalties mandated for environmental offenders present an area 
that has been met with high degree of controversy. Thus far, sectorial policies have largely indicated penalties 
insufficient to deter nefarious activities with regard to environmental protection. As the National Wildlife and 
Conservation Policy (2012) notes, ‘Inadequate law enforcement, ineffective regulatory mechanisms, low 
penalties, lucrative markets for bush meat and rising poverty indices have contributed to escalating illegal 
taking of wildlife, illegal international wildlife trade and bush meat trade.’ (Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, 
2012). In point of fact, several informants criticized existing policies for prescribing penalties that are ‘not 
commensurate with what is actually happening to the environment’ (Interview, CSO2) and are not taken 
seriously by entities subject to compliance with environmental regulations such as development corporations 
because they ‘have a lot of mechanisms for absorbing the shock of the penalties’ (Interview, PROF3). The 
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issue of penalties and sanctions is tied to the factors that motivate compliance with environmental policies and 
regulations in the public arena – these are further discussed in Section 6.1.3. First, the next section discusses 
the roles of non-state actors in policy implementation. 
 
6.1.2 Non-State Actors: Dynamics of Partnerships 
International and local non-state actors have a range of opportunities to participate in policy 
implementation in Kenya. There are three main categories of such actors discussed in this section: Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs), foreign and donor agencies, and private entities. The natural resource 
management sector, as an area of continuing policy growth and reform, is understood to be an area that can 
gain from the synergistic effects of multi-level cooperation and greater access to democratic decision-making 
on the ground (Brinkerhoff, 2000).  Local CSOs and those involved in grassroots activities have a particularly 
important role to play, given that ‘they have detailed knowledge of the resource base, and because they 
depend directly upon those resources for survival they have an interest in using them sustainably over time. 
This is as opposed to the limited time perspective of public agency staff who may be reassigned to another 
function or geographic region.’ (Brinkerhoff, 1999: 138).  
As civil servants have a high turnover rate in state agencies in Kenya, including the environmental 
sector, (Ryan, 2004; Interview, GOVT1; Interview, GOVT2), is it not surprising that non-governmental 
organizations often provide functions such as the provision of consultation services to local communities, as 
well as undertaking development projects to create profits that can then be fed back into the institution to 
expand its programs (Kameri-Mbote, 2000). Local contextual knowledge is critical to ensuring that policy 
objectives are operationalized in a way that is relevant to existing challenges on the ground, creating a meeting 
point for research, policy, and action (Wacker, Viaro & Wolf, 1999). One of the barriers to expanding the 
roles of CSOs is the hesitation of the state apparatus to share control and accept co-operative arrangements 
with non-state partners (Carr & Mpande, 1996). From case studies on CSO involvement in environmental 
policy and practice in Africa, Young (2005) concluded that often these two entities (state and CSO actors) are 
often separated on the basis of their principles and experiences, creating a chasm that is particularly 
cumbersome to bridge when developing partnerships.  
In Nairobi, CSOs have had some success in acting as a conduit between the public interest and 
government sanctioned development, particularly where the voices of the underprivileged and marginalized 
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sectors of society are concerned. One informant recounted an experience associated with a slum-dwelling 
population on the city’s periphery: 
‘We were basically working with the government as a negotiator and 
assisting them to prepare a proposal for financing to the World Bank. And 
in that particular case, the government wanted to expand the railway and 
they wanted to evict all the people that were on the [land] reserve so we 
negotiated with them to not evict everyone, to provide some space for 
relocation and for services such as water, sanitation… And then basically the 
government approached the [World] Bank and they got financing.’ 
(Interview, CSO3).  
 In this way, the environmental agenda in Nairobi is furthered by integrated activities involving the 
state, local CSOs, and foreign agencies, although it would appear that development interests often precede 
those of the local population. Environmental activism has grown in Kenya in the decades since Independence 
from Colonial rule, yet as Brinkerhoff observes, ‘most environmental court cases are thrown out on 
technicalities, and grassroots environmental groups are harassed and threatened’ (Brinkerhoff, 2000: 603).  
In the case of large organizations such as UNEP, their ability to offer expert advice as well as technical 
assistance is a critical resource in achieving policy objectives, particularly since such organizations have in-built 
mechanisms to oversee and provide continuing support to projects on the ground. As one UNEP informant 
explained, when it comes to operationalizing a policy, ‘translating it into action is two things: You roll it out 
into a work plan with targets and milestones, and also resource it, give it funds and finances to implement 
that within a particular period and you can report that, that our policy, our work plan or whatever is 
working.’ (Interview, INTL2). Environmental projects are often developed with specific targets in mind, such 
as the DANIDA-funded natural resource management program developed in collaboration with NEMA – 
this initiative recognizes the need for support to non-state actors (in particular CSOs and the private sector) in 
order to align communities with policy goals and create forums for continuous integration of environmental 
considerations across economic sectors (NEMA, 2013; Government of Kenya & Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2009). Perhaps one of the most crucial resources offered by aid institutions is the training and tactical 
capacity building activities that are undertaken in order to ensure that civil servants are able to carry out their 
responsibilities and mandate afforded by formulated policies. Several of the informants from international 
agencies referred to training programs funded by their institutions aimed at this purpose (Interview, INTL5; 
Interview, INTL6; Interview, INTL7).  
Furthermore, the threat of aid dependency allows major ‘transnational CSOs’ like the World Bank to 
wield significant influence over development outcomes in countries like Kenya, particularly with respect to 
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policy areas that may not have been locally prioritized, such as the environment and human rights (Schmitz, 
1999). In such cases, these foreign organizations can create pathways for local CSOs, academic and research 
institutes to acquire resources (both intellectual and technical) and leverage these assets in practical settings 
(Young, 2005; Interview, INTL6; Interview, INTL7). However, the success of these ventures is predicated on 
a secure understanding of the local context on the part of international consultants, which is not always the 
case (Ibid.; Honadle, 1999). As one informant explained, particularly in the case of land development, ‘you 
would want someone local to look at…what needs to work, as opposed to…some donor driven 
process…[where] you begin to look for authenticity’ (Interview, CSO2). Nonetheless, civil society 
involvement across the various areas of practical environmental and natural resource management remains 
highly variegated, with opportunities to engage dictated by those with the monetary power behind projects 
and programs (Interview, PROF1; Interview, CSO1).  
Interestingly, the role of donor organizations is closely intertwined with the involvement of the 
private sector in natural resource management – for instance, as K’Akumu & Appida (2006) observe, water 
sector policies have long been inclined towards Public-Private Partnerships and yet it was only through the 
pressure applied through donor agencies during the 1980’s that water supply services were privatized; several 
donor groups have been involved in the commercialization of water resources, in particular the World Bank 
(Sammy, 2004). Unfortunately, this partnership has failed to achieve objectives of more efficient supply due 
to a number of factors, including political interests and lack of cooperation from municipal governments, a 
poor legislative framework, and conflicting authority roles between private and public sector actors (K’Akumu 
& Appida, 2006). As a World Bank informant conceded, there is a clear market interest for donors involved 
in the outcomes of such privatization efforts (Interview, INTL5).  
Hence, while collaborative arrangements with non-state partnerships can aid in improving the 
transparency and accountability of state-based policy implementation (Brinkerhoff, 1999), there are 
important considerations in terms of conflicting interests that ought to be taken into account, such as the 
extent of donor authority over long-term resource use and management (Interview, CSO2). Nonetheless, it is 
in the interest of democratic practice for there to be a space for private sector planners to engage with state 
agencies, but the opportunity for non-state actors to intervene in the public interest at the level of 
development plans which implement policy remains highly restricted. For example one planner described a 
case involving a commercial and residential section of the city called Upper Hill:  
‘[In] Upper Hill, for very long time, they were building the KCB [Kenya 
Commercial Bank] Tower - this was going to be their group head offices. 
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When we did that [environmental] impact assessment, we realized the 
minute that tower is occupied… The number of cars coming in that place 
would cause massive traffic… So it happened [with permission of] the city 
Council together with the Ministry of lands… But what they always do, is 
they put a tiny advert in the newspaper [saying that] the plan for this 
development has been finished, come and view it in this office. They had to 
expand the road, they had to expand the water infrastructure… But 
development plans - the way they had done it is not the right way. They 
don't ask us.’ (Interview, PLANNER1).  
The growth of local technical capacity in the private sector has also allowed for the introduction of 
emergent and innovative technologies and solutions to urban environmental challenges, and this appears to be 
an untapped resource in policy implementation thus far.  
The integration of environmental safeguards and best practices into projects on the ground through 
private initiatives has the potential to grow from arbitrary or experimental practice to the status quo as the 
benefits of these measures are realized over time. In Nairobi, the lack of strategic urban plans and policies has 
apparently prevented the creation of standards for sustainable intersections between the built and natural 
environs. However, some technologies have made their way from elective use to common practice. For 
instance, the use of rainwater recycling for domestic use has grown out of a basic necessity for reliable water 
resources through the success of such implements, as one planner noted, while ‘environmental 
[considerations] are extra. The client has to demand it…[but] at least some things…like collecting rainwater – 
that's become almost now standard, and everybody has that, because they don't otherwise get [sufficient] 
water. But other things…like maybe now building the densities so that you can now have green spaces, 
doesn't really work. Sometimes it works, but not everywhere.’ (Interview, PLANNER1).  
While it is anticipated that the new Constitution will aid in improving the access to democratic 
environmental governance for the local populace, some informants hesitated to show confidence in the ability 
of reforms to plug the policy implementation gap. In Nairobi in particular, as one academic informant 
contended, the continued uncertainty over the County and sub-County authority structures and the focus on 
urban and economic growth versus sustainability is cause for trepidation: ‘The issues of neighborhood 
environmental concerns, household environmental concerns, site issues, core community issues – these are 
issues that have been left almost unattended in terms of the services in policy implementation and processes. 
And that is a major gap that you can expect that this Constitution will make things worse.’ (Interview, 
PROF1). Indeed, it will be of great interest to see how the new County-based governance scheme will impact 
urban environmental management, which is affected by both the capacity of implementing institutions and 
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non-state actors, as discussed thus far, as well as public compliance, which is discussed in the following 
section.  
 
6.2 Embedding Compliance in the Public Arena 
The stakeholders examined in the preceding sections have been considered from the point of view of 
their influence and authority in creating the existing conditions for environmental management on the 
ground. However, as Wacker and her colleagues observe, ‘environmental problems often have a temporal and 
a spatial dimension which expands the urban boundary and extends beyond the capacity of different actors 
and actor groups involved in decision-making to act.’ (Wacker, Viaro, & Wolf, 1999: 117). As a result, 
overall policy outcomes are often at the mercy of compliance on the part of the population, a highly 
heterogeneous group whose actions cannot be easily assessed, controlled, or predicted. The notion of 
compliance, as defined by one informant, refers to ‘measures that are taken by the role occupants [of] the 
prospective agents of degradation to do the right thing’ (Interview, PROF3). In this section, compliance is 
discussed from the perspective of policy decision-makers, examining the methods in place to embed 
compliance as a practice, the overlays between compliance and enforcement, and the gaps in policy 
implementation that are at the root of compliance performance in Nairobi.  
There are a number of options that environmental policies use to manage compliance; Honadle 
(1999) categorizes these in three key ways: command and control, approximating negative reinforcement 
strategies such as the use of sanctions and penalties; direct incentives, approximating positive reinforcement 
through economic instruments such as tax rebates; and stakeholder self-management, in that resources will be 
allocated for management and protection to involved sectors of the population. Each of these policy options 
has particular implementation tools that operationalize them, and have been used to varying degrees in 
Kenya’s urban context, as discussed below. The concept of stakeholder compliance with enforceable 
regulations is explored in this section from the perspective of the various informants included in the study. 
While this is not a comprehensive review of the issue, the discussion offered here provides some insights into 
how policy directions manifest in enduring perceptions of the environment, shaping the relationships that the 
urban population has with the natural environment.   
In the first instance, negative reinforcement consists of the use of various penalties for non-
compliance with legally prescribed behaviour, such as industrial pollution and development that contravenes 
EIA requirements or planning regulations. There has been much discourse and debate over the sufficiency of 
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these penalties to effectively motivate and ensure compliance, the majority of which were created under the 
EMCA in 1999 and have not been updated since (Interview, GOVT4; Interview, CSO3). A NEMA official 
lamented: ‘we need greater sanctions on one hand, because the kind of penalties that are handed out to 
people… Are the bare minimum…therefore there is no need to go travel on the high road, and they know 
that if they are arrested or something, it is [a paltry fine]...’ (Interview, GOVT4). Several other informants 
from various sample sectors (Interview, CSO2; Interview, PROF1; Interview, RESEARCHER1; Interview, 
INTL2) echoed this perspective.  
On the other hand, some informants viewed the existing scheme of economic disincentives to be 
sufficiently high as deterrents for egregious behaviour, and pointed to a lack of oversight and political 
malfeasance instead as the source of poor success in instilling better environmental practices in the public 
domain: ‘…in terms of agents of the private sector…invariably the perpetrators are people in the government 
whose agents are frequently involved in violation of the law - they have a lot of mechanisms for absorbing the 
shock of the penalties. Pay the penalty, the fine, and pass it on to the consumer. So I can say yes, the 
provisions in the law are quite severe but there are other gimmicks for the role occupants.’ (Interview, 
PROF3).  
Nonetheless, while the existing measures may be sufficiently punitive at least in some respects, the 
lack of adequate enforcement has not instilled a high level of confidence – for instance, as a UNEP report 
accounts: 
‘The penalty imposed under the EMCA 1999 for offences related to 
pollution or dumping of hazardous waste under the Act is the payment of a 
fine of not less than one million shillings or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 2 years or both fine and imprisonment. However, there is no 
documented case in which offenders…which includes corporate entities 
such as municipal authorities, hotels, and others have been fined or 
imprisoned for polluting or dumping waste along the Kenyan coastal zone.’ 
(UNEP, 2009:13).  
Given that these market-based approaches are predicated on a commitment to enforcement, the lack 
of such a record explains in part the spirit of impunity redolent in the public domain, particularly on the part 
of the private sector. Furthermore, without an adequate system of assessing the payments due for ecosystem 
services (as discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.4), there are major gaps in the enforcement of regulations with 
respect to enforcing the applicable penalties for offenders. Ultimately, unless the public is made more aware of 
the precise implications of environmental offences both in terms of the legal as well as environmental 
ramifications, these gaps in compliance will continue to persist.  
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 The second policy option to embed compliance is through positive reinforcement, or more 
specifically the use of direct incentives, economic or otherwise. For instance, one NEMA official described the 
approach that the agency has been trying to adopt in this regard: ‘[in the case of] people who receive less 
inspection effort [during environmental licensing assessments], when we do their renewals they pay [lower 
fees] than someone who is a constant headache where we are spending a lot of time and effort. This must be 
noted on so that when we renew their annual licenses and whatever it is, they should pay more…then people 
will see that it pays to comply.’ (Interview, GOVT4). Currently, environmental policies have focused on the 
use of sanctions instead of incentives, an approach that is expected to change under the new National 
Environmental Policy. A Ministry of Environment official agreed that direct incentives are a useful tool in 
encouraging compliance, particularly if they involve a monetary aspect: ‘we should not just put a penalty [for 
offences]…we need to back it up with some incentives that will incite the public to adhere to that kind of law, 
and currently we are working on those economic instruments’ (Interview, GOVT2). Another academic 
informant concurred: ‘the best thing to motivate compliance would be for the government to demonstrate 
that the monies that they have paid for [protection and ecosystem] services have returned to the people.’ 
(Interview, PROF1). 
Perhaps the main reason why such measures have not been embraced thus far stems from the 
development-intensive approach to policy and planning in Kenya’s political establishments (da Cruz, 
Sommer, & Tempra, 2006), which prevents them from viewing the protection of natural resources (except 
where tourism is concerned) as a profitable venture. One informant suggested:  
‘you could use mechanisms such as a fiscal incentive…And through that 
mechanism you can talk to people on Harambee Avenue, which is where the 
treasury is, all the powerful ministries are on Harambee Avenue and get 
them to appreciate that the government still benefits if there is compliance 
with environmental standards. So if the economists will demonstrate to 
them that pollution prevention pays and therefore if we have incentives that 
will induce people to prevent environmental degradation and net benefit 
accrues to the government, to the public sector, to the environment as well.’ 
(Interview, PROF3). 
It would therefore appear that the benefit of economic incentives for environmental stewardship is 
recognized among policy informants, and yet these measures have not made their way into policy or legal 
documents.  
The third policy option described by Honadle (1999) is that of stakeholder self-management; while 
natural resources in the urban domain have not been expressly allocated to certain populations for 
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stewardship, there is a general approach of ‘negotiated’ or ‘voluntary’ compliance that has been embraced by 
implementing institutions, NEMA in particular (Interview, GOVT3; Interview, GOVT4); this is a common 
approach to environmental management in countries in the region, although it has not achieved favorable 
results as evidenced by the continuing deterioration of  environmental assets in the urban environment. This 
is partially due to uncertainty as to the chain of authority and accountability in resource management. As 
some scholars have contended, ‘ambiguity in decision making authority provides great flexibility for 
production in an uncertain environment, but also raises real challenges for resource management plans’ 
(Haro, Doyo & McPeak, 2005: 29). Informal processes take over that may result in favorable outcomes in 
some instances, but given the ethnic ties between land and communities in Kenya, there is reason for concern 
as to the potential for intra- and inter-county conflicts over resources. This is particularly true for arable areas 
and those that provide livelihoods, and in areas where essential resources are trans-boundary in nature 
(Interview, GOVT4).  
In the case of urban Nairobi, the poor rate of voluntary compliance thus far can be traced to a 
number of causes – first, the fact that a large number of residents in Nairobi are native to other parts of the 
country, and have not cultivated a sense of ownership or stewardship for the environment (Interview, 
RESEARCHER1; Interview, CSO2; Interview, CSO3). Secondly, the public awareness of the implications of 
detrimental actions on the environment and, by extension, on economic resources and quality of life, is highly 
limited (Interview, GOVT4; Interview, RESEARCHER1; Interview, CSO2; Interview, CSO3). While the 
importance of environmental education was extolled by numerous state officials during interviews with key 
informants (Interview, GOVT1; Interview, GOVT3; Interview, GOVT4; Interview GOVT7; Interview, 
GOVT9), awareness initiatives are still a long way from providing measurable results (Interview, GOVT1; 
Interview, GOVT3).  
Thirdly, private industries in Nairobi are often given a significant degree of leeway in their 
relationship with natural resources and the environment, also in part because there are gaps in the regulatory 
framework of the city. As Kamau (2005: 235) notes, ‘the Nairobi municipality does not have any pollution 
control standards. Having seen how deficient de jure regulation of environmental abuses in Kenya is, it is clear 
that there is no de facto practice to deal rigorously with pollution. Industries are therefore in a position to take 
full advantage of the situation.’ In the urban setting, livelihoods are less commonly economically hinged on 
the vigor of natural resources in the same way that they would be in agrarian and pastoral regions of the 
country, hence limiting the commitment of residents towards environmental protection. However, quality of 
life is intertwined with environmental factors and access to natural resources, and in the urban realm poverty 
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is a significant barrier to equitable access to water and sanitation (Da Cruz, Sommer, & Tempra, 2006).  
Fourthly, residents of Nairobi have appeared to have a conceptualization of the environment that 
separates it from that of livelihoods and well-being. As a CSO participant explained, ‘the problem is 
now…This thing of separating livelihoods, spirituality, social welfare, and development…That's why the 
urban space…people don't see it as theirs…That this is our town, this is our environment and we can actually 
influence it politically…there's somebody else who manages, who is supposed to do other things, and the best 
you can do is complain and look helpless.’ (Interview, CSO1). With the expanded Metropolitan boundary for 
Nairobi, the issue of urban expansion and sprawl looms as a significant threat to the protection of fragile 
ecosystems. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the issue of urbanization has been noted in existing policies from 
various Ministries, including Housing, Lands, and Water. Yet informal settlements continue to mushroom on 
the urban periphery, to the extent that UN-Habitat estimates indicate that at least 60% of Nairobi’s 
population is housed in informal settlements (UN-Habitat, 2006). This carries implications for 
environmental policy implementation because these populations do not adhere to regulations and, as a result 
of inadequate infrastructure, are often the greatest agents of environmental degradation. As one land CSO 
informant decried:  
‘The challenge then is just with…the social and political complexity of the 
problem because you have first overlaying land interests…because everyone 
is a squatter…on either government or private land…of course if you have a 
very large urban area then…you are faced with the…high cost of provision 
of infrastructure…And…issues of sufficiency of infrastructure, then 
obviously the strong link with the environment, because…there is… the 
inevitable pollution, to the aquifers…And then of course…if we just 
continue with a market-based solution to many of the problems then…we 
don't have a solution for the poor.’ (Interview, CSO3).  
Even with ongoing policy formulation exercises, the environmental aspects are often not detailed out, 
leaving the onus on the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources to appropriately deal with issues that 
may be only superficially mentioned. As one academic informant involved in the drafting of the National 
Urban Development Policy noted: ‘the issue of [the] environment was well considered although it was 
clustered with the thematic group dealing with land. Although, it was kind of running through other thematic 
chapters…I think there was some feeling that the issues of environmental policy could have been dealt with 
conclusively by the Ministry of Environment.’ (Interview, PROF2). 
From the foregoing discussion, a pattern of delinquency regarding compliance with environmental 
regulations emerges, one that applies not only to the public but also to local officials charged with ensuring 
that environmental considerations are brought to the forefront in development decisions. The following 
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section explores some of the main challenges and issues for environmental policy implementation arising from 
the emerging scheme of devolved and decentralized governance in Kenya.  
 
6.3 Impact of Constitutional Reform on Environmental Policy Implementation 
The new Constitution has brought with it a slew of land and environmental reforms, many of which 
require an unmet demand for financial resources to ensure implementation (Mwathane, 2013). The various 
ministries involved in environmental management under the national government prior to Constitutional 
reform are expected to merge to form a more streamlined and focused arrangement, with reports of the 
Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife and Ministry of Water and Irrigation to be subsumed into the Ministry of 
Environment (Ongiri, 2011; Ndonga, 2013).  The individual counties are expected to take on autonomous 
environmental management and policy operations, with oversight but not direct, day-to-day instruction from 
national state institutions (The Constitution of Kenya, 2010).  
With these new demands placed on county and national level institutions, it would appear that the 
process of operationalizing environmental policies is set to grow in cost and complexity – as one NCC official 
commented: ‘one thing I know for a fact, we are very short of both qualitative and quantitative human 
resources, and for us to achieve our goals vis-à-vis the new Constitution and the devolved government act, we 
really need to invest in skills, and the numbers because it gives us specific roles to play and we need to have 
equivalent manpower to achieve that.’ (Interview, GOVT7). The body responsible for rolling out the process 
of transitioning towards devolution, known as the Transition Authority, has also raised the issue of county 
capacity, demanding that counties ‘prove their competence before taking over functions previously conducted 
by the national government’ (“Counties Challenged to Prove they can Govern”, 2013). The counties 
themselves have accused the Authority of hamstringing their progress towards development (Ibid.). This early 
period of adjustment towards devolution will therefore set in place an important precedent for the future 
functioning of Nairobi County and its relationship with the national government. 
The success of devolution and decentralization is also predicated on a commitment to reform, which 
is not a guaranteed outcome of the new system of governance. A NEMA informant noted that existing 
national-level challenges with regard to educating judicial and prosecutorial parties as to the conventions of 
environmental law and practice would become all the more complicated under devolved government, with a 
significantly larger number of parties requiring training (Interview, GOVT4). Furthermore, the authority and 
control over natural resources to provide services, particularly in the water sector, is a source of contention for 
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those formerly associated with the privatization of water as a utility. Recalling a quote from a World Bank 
informant first mentioned in Chapter 5: 
‘The Constitution gives the [private] water companies back to the county 
governments…and the local authorities have an incentive to use the 
revenues raised for every other thing aside from water and sanitation 
provision. So that makes us very nervous, that all the investment that we’re 
putting in right now, we won't be able to recover the costs ultimately, and 
that the services will not be provided. So that's a very concrete example of 
why policy matters to the projects and why we pay careful attention to the 
policy areas that are of interest.’ (Interview, INTL5).  
There has been much discussion in the literature over the involvement of supranational institutions 
such as the World Bank in local environmental affairs in the global south, with a significant proportion of 
scholars leaning towards a negative perception of such partnerships (see Goldman, 2007 for a discussion). It 
would then appear that a decentralized form of environmental management would aid in reducing corporate 
monopolies in environmental management and services, potentially improving the affordability and 
sustainable management of resources. Nonetheless, the issue of pervasive corruption in the state apparatus 
remains an important consideration for all stakeholders involved in policy implementation in Nairobi 
County. The following section focuses on the underlying issue of integrity in environmental institutions from 
the point of view of policy stakeholders and decision-makers.  
 
6.4 Integrity and Public Trust in Governance Mechanisms 
From their research in Cameroon and Kenya, Nasongo & Kabsa (2000: 73) observed that ‘the 
undemocratic application of rules that govern the environment has also manifested the bad faith in the way 
decision-makers and rule enforcement officials implement environmental policies.’ This issue is multifaceted, 
and relates to a commitment to integrity on the part of policymakers and implementers, the technical and 
numerical capacity of implementing agencies, and the willingness to respect policy and law on the part of 
those subject to compliance. Each of these three elements feeds into the other, and the various sides are 
discussed here from the perspectives of the actors interviewed.  
  Firstly, the intent and veracity of policymakers and implementers is an important component of the 
policy process, in that these factors affect every level of decision-making. At the implementation stage, the 
majority of actors belong to the public sector, where the issue of impunity arose repeatedly during interviews 
with informants. In some cases, elected officials and official environmental officers have been found to engage 
   114 
directly in corrupt practice – as Matiru (1999: 20) notes in the case of Nyeri, a town on the periphery of 
Nairobi, ‘Collusion between government officials and perpetrators of illegal activities in gazetted forests has 
also regularly featured in the media’. In addition, the culture of land appropriation by political elites extends 
to the years following Independence from British Colonial rule, and has cemented a lack of confidence in the 
State’s intent to protect the public interest (Bubba & Lamba, 1991; Medard, 2010). This feedback loop is not 
permanent however and can be broken with the commitment of all stakeholders involved. One quarter from 
which the impetus to improve environmental governance could emerge is the international and foreign donor 
sector, because international perception of corruption is a deterrent to monetary support to the Government 
(Smith & Walpole, 2005; Interview, INTL5; Interview, INTL6; Interview, INTL7). Since the State remains 
the key engine of policy formulation in Kenya, by extension policy exercises would also face limitations if 
donor funding were cut, as has happened in the past in periods of political instability and uncertainty.  
The second facet relating to integrity is that of the capacity of implementing agencies to adequately 
carry out their mandate. This element has been addressed earlier in this Chapter (Section 6.1), but it also has 
a strong effect on the policy process from the perspective of convincing the public that non-compliance with 
environmental policy will have repercussions. With the current state of agencies like NEMA that are 
responsible for policy implementation and enforcement of sanctions, there are many potential ways for poor 
governance practices to in fact impede conservation – as Smith and Walpole (2005: 252) have determined, 
corrupt practice on the part of environmental officers can have manifold effects which can be summarized in 
two key areas: ‘(1) reduced effectiveness of conservation programmes through a reduction in available 
financial resources, law enforcement and political support, and (2) an incentive for the overexploitation of 
resources.’ Indeed, as one government informant recognized, ‘land governance in terms of...defining the limits 
of personal discretion on certain fragile ecosystems - is what is lacking. In spite of saying that we will limit 
how far you can go in the design of what you want to do with your land, particularly if it is part of the major 
urban area, we haven't done enough in growing the sense that the state can limit you if you are found doing 
things that are inconsistent with the broader projected viable and sustainable use of land resources.’ 
(Interview, GOVT8).  
Thirdly, compliance is the flip side of the implementation coin, and the effects of sporadic and ad 
hoc enforcement are reflected in the attitudes of the local populace towards environmental responsibilities. 
There is a cultural as well as a moral complexity to the issue of environmental compliance, shaped by the 
belief systems of actors on both sides of the fence (Jack, 2009). To provide an example, a NEMA official 
stated,  
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‘…There is the issue of general attitude…have a category of people breaking 
the law because they can get away with it and they know it. You see once the 
old system is not robust enough from the inspections, enforcement, 
prosecution and so on sending out a clear message, also providing alternative 
approaches, giving out education, giving out awareness – it must be a 
multipronged process.’ (Interview, GOVT4).  
In order to change this attitude, then, some stakeholders believe the sea change would have to be 
initiated by the electorate: ‘As long as we make issues of integrity not to become political, but we make it 
become a moral issue to the public, that would be good. And the strongest moral force to change the habits 
and attitudes in terms of integrity and accountability is the public perception. If in the public it is okay, it has 
always been like that, people will continue with that.’ (Interview, INTL2). 
 At the level of Nairobi specifically, the political nature of land ownership and planning creates an 
even more complex scenario where corruption and integrity are to some extent institutionalized. ‘…There 
is…poor planning on the part of the City Council, and I think there must be some reasons why it happened 
that way, maybe some processes like corruption and also a lack of professionalism on their part. So we have 
those challenges with the City Council, and there was also a bit of politics – the moment politics comes in, it 
messes things up.’ (Interview, GOVT3). A Council official admitted, ‘we need to really improve on 
governance and integrity across the board. For some of these policies, it really makes sense, because we have 
blatant abuse of office and procedure, and non-enforcement of acts, policies and regulations right from the 
very top.’ (Interview, GOVT7). The lack of performance of the NCC attributed to corruption is well 
recognized by stakeholders. Even at the planning level, decisions made are perceived to be largely arbitrary 
and in many cases going against the public interest. One private sector researcher was highly critical of the 
NCC’s capacity to perform: ‘we have a city Council which is dysfunctional. When you get people putting up 
structures that collapse, when you get buildings which are 10 floors when only eight have been approved, and 
then the city Council agrees after the person has built the 10 [floors] to amend the plan - it points to massive, 
massive corruption.' (Interview, RESEARCHER1).  
Hence from the testimony of informants and evidence from other research, a narrative emerges of 
corrupt practice within government that has nurtured a lack of responsibility and the tendency to act with 
impunity on the part of those developers and those subject to compliance. One measure that is intended to 
reduce such behaviour is through a rigorous and transparent system of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). 
The following section examines the current trend of M&E practice in the environmental policy realm in 
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Kenya, and looks at how such systems can aid in fostering a culture of accountability in environmental 
practice. 
 
6.5 Monitoring and Evaluation of Environmental Policy Implementation 
As has been discussed thus far, policy implementation is a process that in some ways is separated from 
that of formulation, in that there are often no specific mechanisms for ensuring appropriate implementation 
within the content of policies. Similarly, operationalized policies require monitoring and evaluation to track 
the achievement of policy goals and ensure that adequate resources are apportioned for this purpose. As one 
informant admitted, ‘policy [formulation] is done separately, we rarely tie it to implementation. And that is 
also a weakness because we need to go the whole hog, and the best way to do it is to tie it to evaluation, 
implementation and monitoring to make it complete…But that is still lacking in the civil service…there have 
been some changes, if you look at what we call strategic plans, they have all those components in one outfit. 
So there are some positive directions.’ (Interview, GOVT7). The monitoring and evaluation of environmental 
policies in Kenya is an area that has received some scrutiny, albeit on a sporadic and sectorial basis. Such 
exercises are twofold: monitoring and evaluation of a policy’s performance in order to identify issues and gaps 
for review and rectification; and secondly, monitoring of the agents charged with implementation to ensure 
delivery of policy objectives. Both levels are discussed in this section, with a view to further highlighting some 
of the uncovered reasons for poor environmental policy performance. 
 At the first level of scrutiny, the efficacy of policies based on content is usually tracked through an 
M&E strategy outlined in the policy itself. At the core of any effective M&E process is the requisite for a 
continuous and rigorous data gathering process and an effective legislative framework to ensure procedural 
legitimacy, both of which are severely lacking with respect to the urban environment in Kenya (Onyango & 
Namango, 2005). A CSO informant stated,  
‘You get the feeling that we never collect our data. It's not there. That to me 
speaks about two things: we are not able to implement a policy to the very 
letter because we don't have a reference…[and] we don't have a full cycle for 
policymaking here…There is problem identification, we go through the 
whole length up to the point where we’re talking about how do we 
implement, but for the last 10 years what we've been implementing, how do 
you then evaluate so there you are able to inform the next phase of the 
policy?’ (Interview, CSO2).  
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While some fragile ecosystems and environmental assets such as wetlands, forests, and river basin 
systems do receive monitoring from both local and international agencies, there continue to be gaps in 
available data due to lack of coordination and sharing of research funding among institutions (Matiru, 1999). 
Without accurate and continuous data collection, the impacts of policies are difficult to interpret and 
evaluate. For instance, in a study on how state policies can affect soil conservation among farmers in some 
semi-arid regions of Kenya, Pagiola (1996) concluded that ‘no simple relationship should be expected 
between policy changes and conservation’, partially because the data available for such a study was severely 
limited. Indeed, as one NEMA informant agreed: ‘The polluter pays principle, you can also look at it as one 
of the deterrents, but that one also has to be informed by research. If there is an oil spill in the Indian Ocean, 
how do we find out what Marine life we have lost? So that's why in NEMA under this act we have the 
institutions and also we have a coordination role our research, what is being done for other institutions, but 
also we must have our own people who would be able to give that kind of information or understanding.’ 
(Interview, GOVT3).  
In Nairobi County, the lack of capacity to formulate and implement policies has also extended to 
monitoring and feedback activities as well. A UN-Habitat report issued a scathing critique of the NCC: 
‘The [Nairobi] City Council has no institutional organ for policy 
development or monitoring and evaluating service effectiveness and policy 
impact. Councilors are reported to interfere in staff matters in the past and 
have put their own self-interest ahead of the public good. Corrupt practices, 
lack of transparency as well as poor and inequitable revenue collection are 
encouraged by lack of computerization and an otherwise inadequate 
information technology systems.’ (Da Cruz, Sommer, & Tempra, 2006: 
12). 
Such political interference in policy implementation and monitoring protocols is of concern for foreign aid 
agencies as well, which often have problems ascertaining the impact of funding on policy goals and identifying 
gap areas that require attention. A Swedish Embassy informant noted:  
‘We are not imposing our own indicators [for reporting] but we have real 
problems with the fact that [Ministries] hardly use any…we have put some 
money into helping…the development of their M&E system, baseline 
studies, [we] put comments on the report…The analysis of the financial 
[project aspects] is really weak, and I think they don't want to show where 
the money going. And, there is no civil society to ask those questions, like 
where did all this money go…So we try to influence that.’ (Interview, 
INTL6).  
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One NEMA official ascribed the shortfall in the capacity of implementing agencies to collect 
feedback and manage resource allocation to staffing issues (Interview, GOVT3), while a UNEP informant 
indicated that inadequate technical resources might be to blame (Interview, INTL9).  
However, in the case of some policy programs funded by international institutions, foreign partners 
do put in place systems for monitoring activities, such as DANIDA’s environmental program support. An 
informant from the Danish Embassy explained that evaluation meetings were held with Kenyan state agencies 
‘in line with the fiscal year planning of the government. And in those meetings we assess performance, we 
assess the expenditures, and we also assess impact per se, and we have systems in place to process and assess all 
that. So we have ensured that success, failures, performance, expenditures are actually measured throughout 
the planning process.’ (Interview, INTL7). Indeed, a review of the country’s State of the Environment Report 
(Businge et al., 2011) shows that the large majority of data references were derived from academic references 
as well as reports from international agencies operating in in Kenya, including the World Bank and various 
UN bodies. Unfortunately, since these projects do not represent the totality of environmental programs in 
Kenya, there are still significant gaps in the protocol for environmental monitoring and data collection. Due 
to the cross-linkages between urbanization and environmental conservation, it becomes increasingly 
important for policy exercises in Nairobi to be supported through an M&E framework that meets the needs 
of decision-makers.  
 At the second level of scrutiny, the implementing agencies and parties charged with operationalizing 
policies have a distinctive role to play in determining the success or failure of a policy. As Thomson (2000) 
contends, ‘The way in which policy is implemented can change the effective content of policy, either because 
policy interactions have not been fully understood, or because the policy is subverted by those responsible for 
implementing it.’ (Thomson, 2000: 4). Policy performance is therefore a function of the accountability of the 
agents responsible and transparency of the implementation process. The Ministry of Environment & Mineral 
Resources One of the emerging tools in Kenya for tracking these two measures (accountability and 
transparency) is through ‘performance contracting’, a system of public reckoning for government ministries in 
Parliamentary sessions led by the President, in order to ensure that annual policy goals are successfully 
undertaken and seen through. A government researcher described the intent behind this tool: 
‘Monitoring and evaluation has also been a weak area that needs to be 
advanced and that also calls for greater political commitment, 
[through]…parliamentary oversight committees and performance 
contracting to ensure that there is delivery on promised goals and also that 
commitment is not to only look at performance at one epoch but to 
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consider periods so that we can monitor the trend, who has been gaining 
from performance, who is declining, and what could be the problem. So you 
can see we have a lot of energy but it is scattered everywhere, there is need 
for synergy now.’ (Interview, GOVT9).  
Performance contracting has received a mixed response among the policy decision-makers interviewed in this 
study. In particular, the highly politicized nature of policy implementation brings into the question the 
motivations of implementing agents and the allocation of resources to the entire set of activities from 
implementation to evaluation. As an academic informant noted, performance contracting in Kenya  
‘Has been positive because performance contracts work where staff say what 
they want to do and you give them the resources to do that…But the issue is 
delivery - and also expectations of specific outputs is a problem, because you 
see a permanent secretary for example is a chief officer in a ministry. He has 
been given a job, appointed by his political party - his performance activities 
are actually based on his staff - the output of his staff is what he will use to 
prove what he has done.’ (Interview, PROF1). 
However, once again the high turnover rate in state agencies has implications for the undertakings of high-
level officials, many of whom may favour short-term goals and projects that are not in the public best interest 
over more long-term and sustainable programs that would last through the headship of multiple agency 
leaders. On this point, the same academic informant went on to add - ‘because politicians are so artificial they 
don't understand these things, and you cannot tell them that [sustainable projects] are not feasible to produce 
within [a short] timeframe…because in politics the minister cannot think beyond tomorrow. So finally there 
is a lot of waste of government resources. It comes back to the issue of integrity.’ (Interview, PROF1).  
In addition, lack of ministerial performance is not supported through specific penalties, public 
disclosure and the associated potential political embarrassment notwithstanding. One state official 
acknowledged that ‘the sanctions are not really well spelled out…if somebody is not performing, really 
nothing happens. So maybe that's something we need to work on, so that the officers perhaps know the 
sanctions and what they mean.’ (Interview, GOVT5). As a result, both state and non-state informants were 
highly cynical of the true impact of performance contracting as a mechanism for ensuring policy 
implementation. An NCC official scoffed, when asked if this system would yield desired results: ‘not at all. 
It’s purely, I would call it a PR exercise to get donor funding.’ (Interview, GOVT7). This point of view was 
supported by some of the opinions collected from aid agencies - as a Swedish Embassy informant relayed from 
their experience in the water sector: ‘Reform very often isn't prioritized. There is this big parastatal in water 
that's really corrupt and inefficient, and they're just supposed to be thoroughly reformed but the CEO just 
keeps going around asking for more money to do things that they are not even supposed to do, and then you 
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realize in her performance contract, it doesn't reflect the reform agenda, so because it's uncomfortable she will 
definitely not do anything about it.’ (Interview, INTL6) 
Ultimately, it would appear that policymakers continue to rely on data sources from non-state actors 
with regard to holistic environmental planning, although some resource management bodies such as the 
Kenya Wildlife Service and Kenya Forests Service do perform monitoring and reporting activities on a fairly 
regular basis (Businge et al., 2011). This speaks to an important role for non-state actors in informing policy 
decisions on the basis of evidence. The next section summarizes some of the main observations and findings 
of this study in relation to the policy process following formulation. 
 
6.6 Summary: Critical Findings on Environmental Policy Implementation and Related 
Processes in Nairobi 
The discussion of environmental policy implementation, monitoring, and evaluation processes in 
Nairobi confirms the link between policy processes and planning results on the ground, forged through the 
creation of strategic plans and environmental laws that guide development (Keeley & Scoones, 2003; Leach & 
Mearns, 1996). Unfortunately, the research data show that a lack of strong linkages between formulated 
policy content and strategic plans to implement them leaves many policies un-operationalized in Kenya. In 
addition, in cases where policies require an act of law to be fully operational, the legal drafting process can add 
further wait-times and present an impediment to seeing the intended results of that policy materialize. As 
these additional processes of creating laws and strategic plans progresses, often public input from non-state 
stakeholders falls by the wayside, and the views of CSOs, academia, and the private sector are often not 
invited, or in cases where they are, these parties face contested conditions in consultation sessions.  
The segregation of the environmental mandate between numerous state agencies has led to a situation 
where the laws that are created to govern the environment have not always stemmed from sound policies, 
leaving a sense of disconnectedness and even conflict between the regulations emerging from different sectors 
of the environment such as land, water, and forestry. Further, the philosophy behind policies appears to treat 
residents of Kenya as a whole and Nairobi in particular as the de facto agents of environmental degradation, a 
position that can be traced back to colonial attitudes towards local populations and the ‘received wisdoms’ 
that Leach and Mearns (1996) have discussed (See Chapter 2). These top-down approaches to the creation of 
policy are expected to shift toward more bottom-up oriented strategies through the influence of devolution 
and decentralization; however, the unintended consequences of such reform (Adger et al., 2003) need to be 
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borne in mind as Nairobi County faces greater challenges in developing local capacity and operating more 
autonomously from the national government in policy issues going forward. 
Moving further along the policy process, in the case of policies that have been implemented, no clear 
pattern or protocol for monitoring the effects of these policies and their associated laws was detected. In part, 
failures to adequately implement, monitor, evaluate, and provide feedback on policies is due to resource 
constraints, particularly where capacity within implementing institutions is concerned. The shortage of 
appropriately trained technical officers applies to enforcement officers as well as environmental law 
practitioners within the judiciary and legal system. Another reason for the lack of results in improving 
environmental and urban planning on the ground stems from poorly regulated or inadequate sanctions for 
environmental offenders. Informants attributed the root cause of this gap to corruption among enforcement 
officers and official agencies, or to the structure of sanctions which are not commensurate with offences or 
representative of harm to the environment. In addition, voluntary compliance is a major challenge in Nairobi 
because of the cognitive attitudes of residents, many of whom are thought of as unable to identify with 
environmental goals or claim a sense of space within the urban realm.  
The following chapter (Chapter 7) provides a more coherent look at the interlinks between policy 
actors in Nairobi’s environmental realm, in order to better understand how the facets of authority and power 
have affected and will potentially continue to affect the policy process, from formulation to implementation. 
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 Chapter 7
Theoretical Analysis of the Policy Process 
7.1 Introduction: The Policy Process Through the Network Theory Lens 
The notion that networks govern policy has existed for over four decades (Kenis & Schneider, 1991), 
and theoretical and empirical contributions to this aspect of policy studies have been prolific since the early 
1990’s (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). The term ‘policy community’ is applied to all the various individual actors 
and institutions engaging in environmental policy dialogue, including journalists, activists and academicians. 
However, within this larger group there is a ‘policy subsystem’ consisting of a network of actors ‘in which a 
small set of actors-such as business and government - may interact on a regular basis affecting day-to-day 
policymaking.’ (Howlett & Ramesh, 1998: 469). It is this core group of actors that this study has focused on. 
The discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 addresses the first two questions posed in this thesis (see Chapter 4). 
Thus, this Chapter takes on the task of applying policy network theory to the research data to test its 
applicability in explaining the processes and phenomena revealed in the foregoing discussions.  
There have been several theories that address particular aspects of the network, and various scholars 
have attempted to create organizational models to depict the policy process on the basis of network 
parameters. These various contributions hold certain commonalities, most importantly that the various levels 
in the network may be seen to constitute a hierarchy within which authority, power, and knowledge is 
distributed (Schneider, 1992). Depending on the nature of analysis, both the horizontal as well as the vertical 
relations in the hierarchy may be the point of focus (Ibid.). The literature has more recently placed greater 
emphasis on the importance of horizontal as opposed to vertical arrangements (Coleman & Perl, 1999), 
wherein policy actors interact across a spectrum from conflict to cooperation (Adam & Kriesi, 2007; Figure 
6). There have been some opponents of the use of early policy network theories, who have argued that such 
frameworks are severely limited and lacking in strong theoretical underpinnings (Dowding, 1995). In 
addition, more recent approaches to applying network theories have shown their value in explicating the 
mechanics of policy processes and their links to policy outcomes (Thatcher, 1998; Adam & Kriesi, 2007). For 
this reason, this chapter adopts a critical qualitative analysis approach to applying policy network theory in the 
form of Adam & Kriesi’s (2007) Network Approach, as laid out in the volume ‘Theories of the Policy Process’ 
edited by Paul Sabatier (2007).  
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7.2 The Network Approach and Related Concepts: An Overview 
While many approaches focus on quantitatively mapping (c.f. Reed et al., 2009) and visualizing 
policy actor networks (c.f. Brandes et al., 1999; Prell & Reed, 2009) through sociometric network analysis 
(SNA), this study adopts a qualitative approach that examines the actor network more metaphorically. To 
accomplish this goal, the following discussion combines a description of Adam and Kriesi’s (2007) Network 
Approach (along with additional complementary concepts from other policy network theorists) with 
observations from the policy discussion in Chapters 5 and 6. 
7.2.1 Categorizing the Policy Network Type – Theoretical Labels 
The Network Approach provides a method for identifying the existing actors in a policy subsystem 
without actually describing a ‘new’ governing structure (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). The Network Approach is 
designed for application in situations where change is considered a potentiality, because policy frameworks are 
perceived to be in a regular state of flux. There are five key variables used to describe a given network: the 
number of actors; the complexity of the network, which is also a function of the number of actors within it; 
the degree of self-referentiality of the network, which is to say the extent to which the network is permeable to 
external actors or conditions; conflicts of interest between the actors involved; and the costs of network 
management, in situations where this is a formal arrangement. These variables cover many of those 
summarized by Jordan and Schubert (1992), except for the issue of ‘network stability’ which Adam and Kriesi 
(2007) do not explicitly take on, but which can be considered as a function of the conflicts present between 
actors and the permeability of the actor network to outside interests. Section 7.3 applies these variables to the 
research data to determine their applicability to the environmental policy context in Nairobi. 
 The Network Approach thus builds on the tripartite typology using the aforementioned network 
variables, and proposes a typology for identifying the specific type of network in a given policy subsystem by 
employing two key dimensions: the attributes of actors in the network, expressed in terms of their 
capabilities, power, and authority, exploring whether these elements are concentrated in certain institutions or 
agents (creating ‘policy monopolies’, as termed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993)), or distributed more evenly 
across the network. This dimension is also related to the centrality of the governance scheme – more 
centralized systems allocate more power to specific state agencies (creating what Schmitter (1979) calls ‘peak 
associations’), while decentralized systems are more likely to share power and policymaking activities with a 
wider range of actors. Hence, there are both homogenous and heterogeneous network forms, depending on 
the diversity between the actors involved.  
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The second dimension in of the typology is the interactions between actors in the network, based on 
the character of the relationship that actors hold relative to the state, typified by the level of conflict or 
cooperation that emerges during policy process exercises. This echoes the work of Jordan and Schubert (1992: 
7), who state that ‘There are two basic types of relationship possible between interests and the State. In the 
first there is competition between interest groups to gain access to the policy making procedures of the State 
to influence political decisions. In the second approach there is cooperation between the interests and the 
State.’ The Network Approach provides a continuum to gauge the status of a network, shown in Figure 6 
below: 
 
 
There are a number of factors that contribute towards determining the nature of interactions between 
actors, one of which is their belief systems, whether shared or disparate (Sabatier, 2007; Henry, 2011). While 
examining the formation of policy networks, it is important to note the reasons why different actors occupy 
the roles that they do, in order to better appreciate the motivations behind their policy positions. For 
instance, some actors hold a place in the environmental policy network as a result of a legal mandate ascribed 
to them, while others are connected as a result of informal objectives, such as ideological ties with the 
functions of the policy network (Henry, 2011). Granovetter’s (1983) hypothesis of the ‘strength of weak ties’, 
which are relationships between distantly related individuals in a policy network, has been applied to policy 
research in the environmental arena. Reed and colleagues (2009) provide a discussion of the various types of 
stakeholder analysis that can be undertaken, drawing the conclusion that Granovetter’s theory manifests 
strongly in environmental policy networks:  
‘Diverse information and new ideas have been shown to travel best through 
weak ties. Research has shown that weak ties tend to exist between dissimilar 
individuals, and as such, offer stakeholders access to diverse pools of 
information and resources by bridging otherwise disconnected segments of 
the network. Within the context of natural resource management, weak ties 
that link diverse individuals and groups together and bridge disconnected 
segments of a network can make it more resilient and adaptive to 
environmental change.’ (Reed et al., 2009: 1940).  
Actor attributes and interactions are therefore interlinked and feed into each other to produce complex 
networks which various actors may occupy numerous roles and have varying degrees of power based on the 
Conflict   Competition   Bargaining   Negotiation   Cooperation 
Figure 6 Generalized policy decision-making processes prior to implementation of 
Constitutional reforms. Source: Onyango and Namango, 2005: Fig. 20.1 
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influence they are able to corral in any given policy position through the use of both their strong and weak 
ties in the network. 
Nonetheless, the two dimensions of attributes of actors and the type of interaction between them and 
the state aid in assessing their position in the network. Using the variations of these two dimensions, Adam & 
Kriesi (2007) propose six potential categories of policy networks, as shown in Table 1 below: 
 
 
Distribution of Power 
Type of Interaction 
Conflict Bargaining Cooperation 
Concentration Dominance Asymmetric Bargaining Hierarchical Cooperation 
Fragmentation Competition Symmetric Bargaining Horizontal Cooperation 
Table 4  TYPOLOGY OF NETWORK STRUCTURES. Source: Adam & Kriesi (2007: Figure 5.1) 
   
Adam & Kriesi’s typology then carries forward from a descriptive approach to explaining the network 
structure, to link to the phenomenon of policy change and the potential for certain kinds of policy change 
based on the types of interactions between actors in the network. As the authors describe this typology, 
‘The type of interaction within a policy network determines the form of 
policy change. In conflictual situations we expect rapid (serial) policy shifts, 
whereas incremental changes are most likely to result in bargaining 
situations. Cooperative policy structures are likely to maintain the status 
quo. The degree of concentration of power is expected to determine the 
potential for change: we assume the potential for each type of change to be 
greater if power is fragmented. If power is fragmented, the scales are more 
easily tipped in favor of the challenging actor coalition. By contrast, if power 
is concentrated, challengers lack resources to break the “policy monopoly”.’ 
(Adam & Kriesi, 2007: 152, emphasis in original). 
The Network Approach provides a typology that categorizes policy networks on the basis of the dimensions of 
power distribution (either concentrated or fragmented) and interaction type within the network (conflict, 
bargaining or cooperation), producing six ways in which policy change can potentially manifest as a result of 
the attributes of the network (Table 2). 
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Distribution of Power 
Type of Interaction 
Conflict Bargaining Cooperation 
Concentration Moderate potential 
for rapid (serial) shift 
Low to moderate 
potential for 
incremental change 
Low potential for change 
– maintenance of status 
quo 
Fragmentation High Potential for 
rapid (serial) shift 
Moderate to high 
potential for 
incremental change 
Low to moderate 
potential for change – 
maintenance of status quo 
Table 5 POTENTIAL FOR AND TYPE OF POLICY CHANGE IN THE NETWORK APPROACH. Source: Adam & Kriesi (2007: 
Figure 5.2) 
 
In addition, the Network Approach considers the transnational, national, and policy domain-specific 
conditions that influence the functioning of a policy network and provide a contextual basis for 
understanding their actor interactions and policy outcomes. Hence the Network Approach provides a clear 
analytical typology to categorize policy networks and predict the policy outcomes thereof, as summarized in 
Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 THE NETWORK APPROACH: SUMMARY. Source: Adam & Kriesi (2007: Figure 5.3) 
 
Adam and Kriesi’s theoretical offerings of approach meet with the objectives with this study of 
characterizing the policy process in terms of the actors involved and linking these arrangements, phenomena, 
and interactions with the eventual policy implications and corresponding repercussions for environmental 
planning in practical settings.  
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7.3 Applying the Network Approach to the Study Data 
The following section applies the Network Approach to the study data with regard to the distribution 
of power and authority in the environmental policy network in Nairobi, as well the potential for policy 
change given the network arrangements that are revealed. The Network Approach typology is supplemented 
with theoretical analogies from complementary policy network theories as well. 
7.3.1 Key Theoretical Attributes of the Environmental Policy Subsystem in Kenya 
This section provides a description of the research data through the lens of the five key variables that 
the Network Approach identifies. The first two variables, the number of actors and the complexity of the 
network, are addressed together for ease of analysis.  
7.3.1.1 The Number of Actors and Complexity of the Network 
The networks that form to formulate policy often overlap and intersect with those that implement it 
(O’Toole, 1995), and this is certainly the case in Nairobi. In fact, the implementing network may be seen as a 
nested arrangement within the wider policy ‘formulation’ network, with many of the same actors responsible 
for crafting policy also holding a mandate or important role in the implementation thereof. For instance, the 
National Environmental Management Authority is the key implementing agency at the state level, but also 
provides technical input into the development of policies and legislation. In addition, many of the 
transnational actors in Nairobi interact with the state government in both policy formulation as well as the 
funding of implementation, monitoring, and evaluation activities. As a result, the number of actors in the 
overall network structure that share ‘strong ties’ are primarily those that also have a higher degree of power 
and influence, including national-level state actors, funding agencies and private donors, and CSOs with the 
expertise and resources to contribute extensively to policy formulation and/or implementation. 
The complexity of the network is interlinked with the number of actors involved, but also stems from 
a number of additional factors. Firstly, power and authority continue to be largely localized at the state level, 
with non-state actors acting as forces to push for change from outside the state apparatus. The State is ever 
more involved with discrete groups and institutions on a policy level, rather than the general public at large 
(Coleman & Perl, 1999). Environmental policies, among other national policies, are often developed with the 
involvement and resources of various non-state and ‘supranational’ institutions (Ibid.). The discussion in 
Chapters 5 and 6 depict both the direct and indirect influence of foreign institutions through State channels, 
as well as through their funding of CSOs, placing them solidly within the core set of policy network agents.  
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As a result, political relationships with foreign parties as well as stochastic changes in international 
environmental standards render the network as dynamic. The transnational actors in the Kenyan context 
include UN bodies, embassies of foreign governments acting in development roles, donor groups working at 
the grassroots level, and visiting policy entrepreneurs solicited by both state and non-state agencies. Together, 
their shared policy roles establish these foreign actors as an epistemic community (Adler & Haas, 1992), 
fundamentally differentiating them from local actors. Furthermore, in the face of large-scale reform through 
devolution and decentralization, the policy network is certainly in flux. Such reforms bring new opportunities 
for these supranational agents to directly engage with sub-national governing bodies and local elites, whereas 
previously engagement with state actors was confined to national level institutions.  
Academic institutions appear to have very limited authority but do indirectly influence and shape 
policy content through research; however, individual academicians may hold positions of authority if 
contracted by state agencies to be part of policymaking teams. CSOs are crucial to grassroots advocacy and to 
solidifying the space for non-state actors to engage, although their policy positions are tied to aid 
conditionalities and are therefore not necessarily autonomously decided. Private sector actors occupy space in 
the policy network either as donors towards implementation projects, or as experts providing knowledge and 
experience to formulation and implementation activities. In the former case, greater power and influence into 
the policy process is conferred as a result of the material assets, which these private actors are able to bring to 
bear.  
Given that the policy network is dealing with environmental issues in the urban arena (at the 
interface of society and nature), the evidence from the study indicates a high level of what Van Bueren, Klijn 
and Koppenjan (2003) address as three distinctive kinds of uncertainty: ‘cognitive uncertainty’, arising 
because the solutions to environmental problems are difficult to arrive at due to gaps in data provision and 
incomplete feedback loops (through monitoring and evaluation) from existing policies;  ‘strategic 
uncertainty’, because there are multiple actors involved in deciding policy directions who are not entirely in 
agreement; and ‘institutional uncertainty’, because environmental issues are directly affected by developmental 
and economic decisions in other policy arenas which are beyond the control of the environmental policy 
network.  
Figure 8 provides an overview of the various key actors that were identified through this research 
study, and their relationship with the State. The distance of connecting arms between the Ministry of 
Environment and Mineral Resources and other actors metaphorically represents the level of influence that 
each actor carries relative to the MEMR; in addition, some actors occupy dual roles in both formulation and 
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implementation activities, represented as overlap between the horizontal gray and white panels on the 
diagram. The extent of overlap into the gray shaded area indicates the extent of activities of that actor in 
implementation – for instance, NEMA has more of a policy implementation role than a formulation one, and 
is more involved in environmental policy implementation that the Nairobi City Council or the Ministry of 
Nairobi Metropolitan Development. Some actors, such as academicians, are involved indirectly in 
implementation, more in the way of monitoring and evaluation from an academic research perspective, but 
feed their expertise into policy formulation activities when called upon. Civil Society actors are known to 
combine their activities with private organizations and transnational or foreign aid agencies, forming a 
‘hybrid’ type of actor with multiple loyalties.  
 
 
 
Figure 8 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN NAIROBI: QUALITATIVE NETWORK STRUCTURE 
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The environmental policy network in Nairobi displays a high degree of complexity, as indicated by 
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interactions with adjacent policy networks in alternative policy domains. In this regards, there are clear 
divisions in the interests of Kenyan environmental policy stakeholders that limit the convergence of policy 
positions, particularly where the sectorial divides are concerned. As the study data has shown, despite pressure 
to ‘mainstream’ environmental issues across the board, cross-sectorial policy harmonization in Nairobi 
remains limited, particularly where development strategies are concerned. This condition is explicated by 
social systems theory, which as Krott and Hasanagas (2006: 557) explain, suggests that ‘cross-sectorial policy 
is difficult because organizations protect their “turf”; hence collaborations are limited by intra-sectorial 
interests, reluctant to ‘endanger the balance of power’ (Ibid).  
The hope for bridging sectorial divides in Nairobi would be through the actions of environmental 
actors in three ways: the dissemination of information; the application of political influence; and the provision 
of financial incentives for greater collaboration (Ibid.: 559). The authority of state actors constrains these 
efforts, for ‘Within a network where the state is strong, an actor can hardly circumvent the dominant state 
influence in order to build bridges based on interactions between private actors’ (Ibid.). In addition, if the 
policy network is highly formalized, there would be an even lower potential for collaborations to occur (Ibid.). 
As the discussion in Chapter 5 and 6 indicates, the involvement of the wider community in environmental 
policy formulation and implementation is limited partly due to the lack of a sense of belonging and 
ownership among the residents of Nairobi. Another explanation for this disaffection comes from the area of 
social capital, where community agency, defined as ‘the power of a community to maintain and enhance its 
social, economic, and environmental well-being through public participation’ (Parisi, Taquino, Grice, & Gill, 
2004: 99) may be lacking due to the poor economic conditions of residents in an area (Luloff & Swanson, 
1995) – although this phenomenon is common in rural areas in the Western world, it is also evident among 
the significant majority of Nairobians, many of whom live in informal accommodations (UN-Habitat, 2006).  
 
7.3.1.3 Conflicts of Interest between Actors  
As Primmer (2011: 133) summarizes from her review of policy network literature, ‘networks are 
often established in the form of working groups, projects or partnerships’, although political interests and 
authority have an important role in shaping the way that networks organize themselves and carry out tasks. 
This is certainly true in the case of Nairobi, where there the evidence from this study shows that political 
influence remains a strong determinant in the involvement of actors and the extent to which their input is 
considered in policy decisions. In this setting, the main interactions that carry influence are those between 
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institutions and the state, a view that has been found through the work of policy scholars in the west as well 
(Waarden, 1992). However, at the intra-institutional level within state institutions, the head of the agency 
carries a significant degree of authority with regard not only to policy positions, but also to the very policies 
that are formulated and implemented, as evidenced by the attested-to power of the position of the Minister 
for Environment and Mineral Resources, for instance. As a result, corrupt practices have fostered a lack of 
trust in the integrity of state operations to bring the public interest to the forefront. 
Hence conflicts between state agencies and non-state stakeholders are resolved to some extent 
through bargaining during policy consultation forums, but at the same time, the study informants indicated 
uncertainty as to whether their input was truly consolidated into the final policy outcome or not. This makes 
the policy context in Nairobi more elusive to define based on the interactions between partners, because while 
it would appear that both bargaining and cooperation are taking place at a procedural level, there appears to 
be a persistent trend of state dominance in policymaking, leading to conflicts particularly where advocacy and 
civil society groups are concerned. 
Furthermore, network legitimacy is hinged on the participants holding the belief that ‘collaboration 
with one another is beneficial’ (Provan & Kenis, 2007: 243). The research data do appear to indicate that 
stakeholders both in the state as well as non-state levels do agree with this precept, and yet cultural barriers to 
sharing information, resources, and agendas continue to reduce the potential for effective collaboration both 
within the network and with other networks in relevant policy domains in Nairobi as well, as mentioned in 
the previous section. However, cooperation and filial associations between the actors appears to be distinctly 
lacking, as the research data indicates that the various categories of actors involved tend to view one another 
with suspicion, distrust, and in some instances, disregard. This can be considered as a lack of ‘social capital’, 
where social capital is defined as the ‘norms, trust, and reciprocity that facilitate coordination and cooperation 
for collective benefit.’ (Parisi et al., 2004:99). Without the necessary binding ties of trust and cooperation, the 
network is held together on the basis of contested ideas and viewpoints, with no clear consensus on the best 
way forward.  
Secondly, in addition to trust and cooperation, ideological and political similarities are broadly 
recognized as the building blocks of network linkages (Henry, 2011). In Nairobi’s environmental policy 
culture, the research indicated dissimilarity in the approaches to environmental issues favoured by the 
different actors involved (as discussed in Chapter 5). This dissonance in the ‘belief systems’ of core policy 
actors appears to have led to a strong imbalance in the sharing of authority, and as a consequence, in this 
policy environment the views of the funding group and their key government partner take precedence as the 
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favoured policy position. As Henry (2011: 379) contends, ‘networks are held together by power-seeking 
relationships that better enable individual network actors to affect policy change. However, ideological 
similarity appears to be a necessary condition for power-seeking mechanisms to drive the cohesion of policy 
networks’. In other words, linkages between actors in the networks are contingent on power and authority, 
but unless there is some ideological similarity between the actors, the ‘cohesion’ and perhaps ultimately the 
continuity of the network are at stake.  
 
7.3.1.4 The Costs of Network Management  
The environmental policy network in Nairobi appears to have some formal context with respect to 
the actors that are legally mandated to have a role in policy activities, but also has a large number of 
informally associated actors, particularly from the civil society sector. ‘Network participants typically have 
limited formal accountability to network-level goals and conformity to rules and procedures is purely 
voluntary’ (Provan & Kenis, 2007: 232). Although state policy leaders such as the Ministry of Environment 
and Mineral Resources are required to hold consultative sessions with the stakeholders who form the policy 
network, these forums are considered to be a part of the proceedings of policy formulation and do not carry 
forward into the policy implementation stage. At this latter stage, the separate categories of policy participants 
engage with each other when partnering on specific implementation programmes (as indicated by foreign 
funding organizations who participate in the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy, or CSOs who work on policy 
implementation monitoring) but there was no indication from informants as to a wider ‘network’ of 
implementation stakeholders that meet on an ongoing basis. Highly formalized networks with a management 
scheme were not encountered in this study, and as such the material cost of network management is not a 
measurable variable for the study data.  
 
7.3.2 Applying the Network Approach Typology 
The typology of the network approach demands a characterization of the policy network based on 
power distribution and interaction type between the actors involved. With regard to the first dimension, 
power, the foregoing discussion reveals a trend of dominance of state agencies, particularly at the national 
ministerial level, although funding partners often hold significant leeway in influencing the final policy 
content. The structure of policy network holds multiple state environmental agencies at the national level, 
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with a far reduced sense of authority at the local municipal level. Hence, there is a disconnect between the 
decisions made through these Ministerial policy activities and the people that are directly affected by those 
decisions, and charged with implementing them within local Councils. However, the role of the National 
Environmental Management Authority both in policy formulation and implementation allows for some 
connectivity between formalized policy statements and their implementability. This ‘concentrated’ character 
of power in the policy network is linked to the long-standing trend of adopting policy positions that place the 
public at large, as the parties charged with environmental compliance, in the role of the ‘other’, requiring 
control and domination in order to produce fruitful results. In addition, the high degree of self-referentiality 
of the network as a result of the political separation of environmental issues from other key policy areas in 
Nairobi despite a clear intent to mainstream environmental issues is an indicator of the continuing 
domination of state entities in environmental policy.  
 The second dimension of the typology, with regard to the interaction between actors within the 
network, is construed on the basis of the conflicts between the state and all other non-state actors, and the 
complexity of the network. In the case of the environmental network in Nairobi, there appears to be at least a 
procedural acceptance of the practice of stakeholder consultation, although it was not possible within the 
scope of this study to determine the exact extent to which stakeholder input it formally integrated into policy 
content. As such, the conclusions drawn are based on the key informant reports, which largely indicated a mix 
of bargaining and cooperation except in some instances where the state had adopted a position that was 
opposed by a particular subset of actors, such as advocacy groups or private planners. As such, the Network 
Approach typology cannot clearly be applied in a categorical fashion to the entire policy network; instead, it 
needs to be applied systematically based on the particular actors in question.  
Critics and contributors towards the area of policy network frameworks and theories have indicated 
that there are some disjunctures in the ways that networks are conceptualized. Notably, Marsh and Smith 
(2000) have argued for a more ‘dialectical approach’, whereby the relationship between networks, their 
attributes, and influencing factors (both exogenous and endogenous) should be seen as feedback based 
interactions rather than unidirectional effects. Specifically, these authors identify three key areas in which 
dialectical relationships occur: first, the structure of networks and agency of actors within them, whereby the 
actors in the network are integral to defining the nature of the way that the network functions, but the 
network also constrains and defines the roles of the actors within it; second, the network and the wider 
context in which it operates, which consists of economic, social and political conditions that shape and are 
shaped by the network; and third, the network and the policy outcomes it produces, which are indicative of 
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the structure and functioning of the network but also have the potential to cause shifts in the network as well 
(Ibid.: 5-9). 
Policy network theory is concerned with both the types of stakeholders involved (that is, their 
institutional affiliations and social positions relative to the state) and with the characteristics they hold that 
confer their position in the network. In the network approach typology, when attempting to model actor 
relations, the source of ‘power’ that grants them influence in the policy subsystem is of crucial importance. 
Putting all the various facets of the actor network revealed through the detailed narrative in Chapters 5 and 6, 
a schematic of the network typology as applied to the research data was created. The Network Approach 
suggests that power distribution and type of interaction between actors should be examined as separate aspects 
of the structure of the actor network (Figure 7). However, the study data indicate that the type of interaction 
between actors and the state is often determined based on the amount of power and influence that actors hold 
at a given point in time.  
Further, the type of interaction, or the treatment that actors receive from the state, can also feed back 
to affect the power or influence that an actor holds. This dialectical relationship is portrayed in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 ANALYSIS OF STUDY DATA USING THE NETWORK APPROACH 
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As the schematic in Figure 9 illustrates, the factors that determine the power of actors then carry forward to 
aid in characterizing the relationship that actors with that type of power share with the state. The power-based 
determinants of actor involvement in the network have been drawn from the research data, which revealed 
that actors with the strongest influence are those that are either legally mandated to carry authority in the 
policy process, or are in possession of resources, whether political, material, or intellectual. The ‘actor 
resources’ category therefore applies to those actors such as foreign aid agencies or CSOs that have the 
resources to provide expertise or funding to policy formulation and implementation. The greater these 
resources are, the more power they confer, hence pushing for a greater degree of cooperation versus 
bargaining, as indicated by the denser line connecting the first three levels of power types to hierarchical 
cooperation, and lower degrees of the same to asymmetric bargaining. 
The actors with ideological motivations include smaller NGOs that may not have the financial clout 
or capacity to contribute to policy processes at a higher level. Similarly, some actors may have a vested interest 
in policy outcomes in terms of the consequences for their activities, such as private organizations or businesses 
that would be affected by environmental policies, but are not able to make major donations of time or 
resources towards policy activities. These two latter groups may however be able to bind with other actors that 
do have access to more influence through their political influence, resources, or legal mandate, and by 
forming a coalition with such actors, the more marginalized actors would then be able to lobby more 
effectively for their policy positions. The funding of CSOs by foreign aid agencies, for instance, or the 
channeling of the interests of local communities through CSOs that have the potential to carry the public 
interest to the policy table shows evidence of this phenomenon in the data. Thus, a dialectical relationship 
exists between those with less power and resources but a greater ideological or personal motivation to get 
involved in policy activities, whereby those with more power can combine their resources to either support 
ideological movements, or direct the energies of entities (particularly in civil society and other non-state, non-
partisan entities) to push for particular policy positions through conditionalities attached to aid, as discussed 
in Chapter 5.  
 The foregoing discussion thus provides a picture of the complexity of the environmental policy actor 
network in a developing context such as Nairobi, where the structure of the network is perpetually in flux but 
power is concentrated in the hands of a few, particularly the national government. However, as the County 
and the country move to implement Constitutional restructuring of the governing scheme, myriad changes 
are set to occur to the existing arrangements. The following section discusses how policy network theory 
   136 
could aid in considering the effects that devolution and decentralization will have on the network discussed in 
this section.  
 
7.3.3 Addressing Network Change: Consequences of Constitutional Reform 
The environmental policy network in Nairobi is set to change due to the combined processes of 
devolution and decentralization through Constitutional reform. The emerging structure of the actor network 
is not yet possible to characterize clearly, and presents an interesting area for future research. At this point in 
time however, it is possible to apply theoretical knowledge to provide a prediction of how the network will be 
affected by Constitutional change, and by extension, how the policies that emerge from the new network will 
also change.  
The move towards devolution represents a shift towards what Witte, Streck and Benner (2009: 67) 
call a coordination network, which: ‘facilitate(s) broad-based knowledge exchanges between governments, 
international organizations, NGOs and the private sector, and thereby help(s) to identify common goals and 
the development of coordinated action strategies. As a result, coordination networks help to improve the 
allocation of scarce resources and avoid duplication [of actions]’. The ‘resilience’ of the environmental policy 
network in Nairobi has not been established through research, although theoretically it is anticipated that 
such arrangements would tend to persist over time, despite opposing forces (Primmer, 2011, Blom-Hansen, 
1997). However, in the face of such large scale change in Nairobi through devolution and decentralization, it 
would appear that the former policy subsystem that placed the national government as the core of policy 
activities is rapidly shifting towards greater non-state stakeholder participation, particularly where civil society 
is concerned (‘Counties Challenged to Prove they can Govern’, 2013).  
While there is little doubt that the structure of the environmental policy network in Nairobi is set to 
change, particularly from a state perspective with County governments taking on greater roles and 
responsibilities, an answer to the question of whether there will be actual policy change as well remains at 
large. Given that the National Environmental Policy is still in draft and will likely be finalized through the 
cooperation of county governments, and given that individual counties will have to develop policies that 
match their needs and resources, this is an important question for the future of environmental management in 
Nairobi.  
In order to provide some indication of the future of policy change in Nairobi, the Network Approach 
typology for predicting potential and types of policy change was applied to the data, as shown in Figure 10. 
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As per Adam and Kriesi’s typology, in a context where power is concentrated in the hands of a few, there is a 
spectrum of potential for policy change from a low to moderate level, but it not highly probable. As to the 
type of policy change that might occur, there are three categories: first, assuming the highest possible degree of 
cooperation between state and non state actors, the relative harmony in interactions would ensure hardly any 
noticeable policy change, and the status quo would persist. Second, with a more bargaining-oriented 
relationship, there would be incremental change, slower than in the first instance but still showing a trend of 
change spurred on through the influence of various actors leveraging their assets in bargaining positions with 
the state. Third, in a situation where actors have a strongly conflicted relationship with the state characterized 
by dominance, there would be a series of rapidly occurring shifts in policy, but not a major sea change or 
paradigm shift. 
The work of Hogl, Nordbeck and Kvarda (2009) further adds to the depiction provided by the 
Network Approach. Drawing on the work of Howlett and Ramesh (1998), these authors suggest four key 
conditions of policy networks that help in predicting whether policy change is set to occur: ‘closed 
subsystems’, which have stable actor configurations and little change in the prevailing paradigms, and hence 
reinforce the status quo (Ibid.); networks that are open to both new actors and new ideas, which have the 
most conducive and perhaps even vital conditions to ensure policy change; networks that welcome new actors 
but not new ideas, and are therefore capable of integrating additional actors into existing arrangements but are 
ultimately ‘resistant’ to change; and networks that are receptive to new ideas but not new actors, which often 
display ‘contested’ settings between competing actors, hence reducing the potential for effective change.  
Of these four network conditions, the case of Nairobi as portrayed by the study data is perhaps best 
described by the ‘resistant’ or ‘rapid incremental’ (Howlett and Ramesh, 1998) model, because while the 
introduction of ‘new’ actors is inevitable through devolution and the creation of new arrangements in 
authority and state governance, it remains to be seen whether new ideas will also be welcomed by these 
emerging policy networks that may also consist of a number of actors that have carried over from the previous 
regime. Given the acknowledged limitations of a long history of conflicting interests between state and non-
state actors, and the constraints of insufficient capacity and resources, a conservative assessment would be that 
policy change in Nairobi County would take the form of incremental change, best supported by the 
continued evolution of the ideological basis for policy decisions (Henry, 2011).  
The policy strategies that emerge from a particular network arrangement can also be predicted based 
on the two variables of openness to new actors and openness to new ideas, as Hogl and his colleagues describe: 
If the new actor arrangements remain ‘resistant’ to new ideas, the dominant form of policy output would be 
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that of ‘process oriented’ strategies, which focus on adopting the required legal and procedural guidelines 
mandated through international and local laws, without significantly changing existing policy approaches. 
However, in the event that new ideas are able to present themselves and be welcomed in the emerging actor 
framework, the environmental strategies and policies that emerge from future formulation activities would of 
the ‘change oriented’ type, whereby novel policy interventions and approaches are adopted and 
institutionalized (Hogl, Nordbeck & Kvarda, 2009: 358-359).   
 
 
Figure 10 POLICY NETWORK: DIALECTIC RELATIONSHIPS AND POLICY CHANGE 
 
Thus, the theoretical implications of Constitutional reform point to the potential for spurts in policy 
change that will occur as the network stabilizes and a new order of the day emerges with regard to how 
environmental policies are created and implemented, and how the environmental network intersects with 
other networks in adjacent policy arenas, including economic and social development. As a growing urban 
metropolis, Nairobi County faces a high degree of uncertainty as to the kinds of policy change that will 
emerge. 
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7.4 Summary: Applicability of the Network Approach to the Nairobi Context  
The Network Approach as applied to the research data has yielded some interesting insights into 
underlying reasons for why actors interact the way they do, and the influence of power and authority in 
shaping the policy network structure as well as the interactions that occur between actors. A number of 
modifications were made to Adam and Kriesi’s typology in order to suit the environmental policy context in 
Nairobi, which was to be expected given that this typology was originally constructed for applications in more 
stable, developed contexts. There are therefore two main criticisms of the Network Approach in its 
applicability to the research context.  
 First, the linearity of the typology is problematic in that it does not appreciate the dialectic 
complexity of interactions within the actor network and the link to power, authority, and the influence they 
confer. In addition, the feedback relationships between the structure of the actor network as a result of power 
and the eventual outcomes of policy networks are also not given their due credence (Figure 10). Secondly, the 
typology oversimplifies the categorization of actor relationships, in that it assumes that one type of interaction 
dominates and can therefore be used to characterize the interaction of all non-state actors with their state 
partner or partners (Figure 8). As the research indicated however, there is a far greater degree of complexity 
inherent in the policy process in Nairobi, and it is not possible to apply a single label to all the interactions 
present. Rather, it is important to address each type of relationship on its own (Figure 9 and Figure 10).  
As a result, the applicability of the typology in predicting the type of policy outcomes is somewhat 
reduced, but can be applied speculatively with the assumption that within the overall actor network, some 
actors will emerge as more influential than others, and it is the relationship of these influential actors with the 
state that will decide the potential and type of policy change that will occur as Nairobi goes through the 
pressures of shifts in the governing scheme (Figure 10).  
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  Chapter 8
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This study is a contribution towards understanding how the environmental policy process in Nairobi 
is shaped by the decision-makers within it, in order to assess the linkages between contextual factors, the 
attitudes and perceptions of actors in the policy network, the distribution of power and influence between 
them, and the ultimate consequences for environmental planning on the ground. The in-depth, qualitative 
case study approach utilized aimed at the collation of views of a cross-section of actors, allowing for a wider 
range of perceptions to be captured, patterns across sectors to be detected, and ultimately for critical gaps and 
discrepancies in thought and practice to be identified.  
 
8.1 Challenges to Policy Formulation and Implementation 
The challenges to democratic and effective environmental policy formulation and implementation in 
Nairobi can be summarized in two broad categories: systemic issues, and procedural issues. In the case of 
systemic issues, the research data revealed a number of underlying, pervasive factors that are shaping the 
interactions of actors and the decisions they make and that go beyond the institutions and actors to the wider 
socio-economic and political context in which they operate. Chief among these is the issue of corruption and 
political self-interest in state agencies, which all 25 informants in the study referred to as the cause for 
challenges ranging from the lack of inclusive space for non-state stakeholders, to a lack of commitment to 
policy implementation, and shortfalls in adequate enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.  
Second, as Keeley and Scoones (2003) observe from their research in Africa, policy decisions are 
culturally embedded, and the importance of considering cultural factors in the policy process cannot be 
understated. In the Nairobi context, cultural barriers to the sharing of resources and information across 
government agencies and with non state actors have long prevented the collation of in-depth and long-term 
environmental data as a metric for monitoring of policy effects on the ground. In addition, the tradition of 
top-down approaches towards policy development, and the consequent lack of policy ownership among 
County-level institutions and the public at large have reduced the potency of operationalized policies.  
Third, the ethos behind policy interventions often places the public as the perceived agents of 
environmental degradation, leading to command-and-control oriented laws that have failed to instill a sense 
of environmental stewardship among local communities. This confirms the contention of Leach and Mearns 
(1996: 456): ‘It is possible to show that the interests of various actors in development – government agents, 
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officials of donor agencies, the staff of Northern and Southern non-governmental organization, and 
independent “experts” – are served by the perpetuation of orthodox views, particularly those regarding the 
destructive role of local inhabitants’.  
With regard to procedural issues, these relate to the ways that decisions are taken based on the 
hierarchy of authority and power that places government ministries at the top of the decision-making chain, 
with agents that have a legal mandate or political or material resources to leverage holding the greatest degree 
of bargaining power and drawing the cooperation of state agencies. Thus, the network that develops is 
strongly centered around the political priorities and aspirations of national-level institutions. As Leach and 
Mearns attest: 
‘At least in some parts of Africa, the colonial legacy in environmental 
institutions was directly inherited by post-independence governments, 
helping to account for the persistence of received wisdoms. Furthermore, 
by comparison with the colonial period, some notable similarities can be 
observed in the relationship of contemporary expatriate scientists and 
academic advisers to the process of public policy formation in Africa. One 
is the exchange of ideas within a network or community of like-minded 
individuals; a second is the tendency for scientists to be more or less 
directly “in the pay” of policy institutions’ (Leach & Mearns, 1996: 456). 
Further, the requirement for Parliamentary approval of policies presents an opportunity for higher cadre 
national officials to weigh in on policy content, insert amendments, and effectively change the goals of policy 
statements before the document is institutionalized, creating a chasm between the intended contents of policy 
developed during the formulation process and the ultimate content.  
 Implementation processes also face procedural backlogs due to the wide array of environmental and 
natural resource management-oriented ministries, each with their own implementing arms, mandates, and 
ways of approaching their activities. This creates a high degree of conflict between state agencies that should 
ideally be working in tandem. In addition, a lack of capacity both in terms of numbers as well as 
environmental expertise among enforcers of environmental regulations and in the judiciary has created 
another gap through which many cases against environmental offenders have fallen.  
 Thus the complexity of interactions and processes in the actor network that the research revealed 
reflects the interplay between various levels of the policy process, from issue identification through to 
implementation, monitoring, and feedback (Sabatier, 2007). The application of network theory to the data 
(Chapter 7) allows for a critical analysis and scrutiny in terms of the phenomena of power, influence, and 
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authority distribution, and the interactions they produce at all levels, from the nation state to County level 
grassroots organizations.  
 
8.2 Constitutional & Strategic Reform: Addressing the Potential for Policy Change 
Political reform is difficult to achieve, a slow burn process but one that has seen incremental benefits 
over the last decade. The 2010 referendum for a new Kenyan Constitution following several years of reform 
negotiations between government, the civil sector, and international human rights groups, makes several 
amendments to the national land rights policy with a view to increasing ownership security and preventing 
malpractice, corruption and land grabbing (Hansen, 2011). Nonetheless, as the research showed and as the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, ‘land remains closely tied to the electoral dynamics of 
Kenya, meaning that many vested interests will stand to lose if these reforms are successfully implemented’ 
(Kennedy & Bieniek, 2010: 8). Despite this potentiality, the support thrown behind the Constitutional 
review process from all sectors of the nation speaks to the unrelenting faith that Kenyans, especially the 
urbanites, have in their leadership and the hope of a better tomorrow through good governance - what one 
prominent local political satirist calls ‘Kenyans’ unrelenting and, frankly, psychotic sense of optimism’ 
(Gathara, 2011), is an indomitable force for change in the country.  
The interviews conducted reflected a wide variety of opinions on the potential impacts of mandated 
devolution and decentralization on the policy process and future governance in Nairobi. While many high-
level decision-makers remain cautiously optimistic that devolved governance will bring the people and state 
institutions closer together and provide greater power to the electorate, critics warned of the territorial nature 
of County leaderships and the potential conflicts over the control of transboundary resources, persistent 
effects of corruption and political self-interest, and continuing shortfalls in the institutional capacity required 
to govern autonomously. The policy network analysis though the application of the Network Approach 
(Adam & Kriesi, 2007) showed how policy change stands at best a moderate chance if actors are able to secure 
a more equitable distribution of influence and power and reduce the preferential treatment of foreign donor 
institutions and private organizations that wield enormous clout, conferred through their proffered material 
and intellectual assets.  
The results of the descriptive and evaluative components of this thesis are embodied in prescriptive 
knowledge, as represented by the recommendations presented in the following section. These 
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recommendations were drafted in the form of broadly defined areas for improvement in the policy process in 
Nairobi, as developed from the research data and academic resources.  
 
8.3 Recommendations for Future Environmental Policy Undertakings 
8.3.1 Inclusive Stakeholder Participation and Building the Public Trust 
The research data and network analysis (Chapter 7) illustrated how various stakeholders in the policy 
process receive preferential treatment and carry disproportionate degrees of influence based on their capacity 
to leverage their assets at the policy table. In devolved and decentralized Nairobi, there is a stronger 
expectation for inclusivity and democratic governance. To aid this, the County governing will face the task of 
cultivating relationships built on trust and mutual interest with all stakeholders, in order to dispel 
expectations of continuing corruption that have long been the status quo.  
Perhaps one of the most critical challenges in environmental stakeholder reform, within the context 
of Constitutional reform and strategic urban growth, is to aid Nairobians in developing a sense of ownership 
of the urban space. For residents of the County to truly feel invested in protecting the environmental and 
natural resources, the impetus has to come from within, and for this reason, CSOs and grassroots 
organizations will need to mobilize resources to bring empower the populace and encourage more active 
engagement in policy activities. 
8.3.2 Research, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Feedback Systems 
The lack of reliable data gathering and environmental monitoring procedures presents a major 
challenge to formulating effective policies, because there are no clear benchmarks or evidence to suggest what 
types of policy interventions are the most successful and why. There are a number of untapped resources for 
such data, including harnessing the potential for academic involvement through research grants as well 
community information sources. As Haro and colleagues explain, ‘communities can identify solutions to both 
environmental degradation and insecurity if given facilitative support.’ (Haro, Doyo & McPeak, 2005: 31).  
The importance of collecting data for monitoring purposes has been stressed in the literature, but the 
further use of such information in revising policies has no strong precedent in the environmental arena in 
Nairobi. As this study revealed, policymakers often rely on best practices and expert advice when creating or 
revising policies, rather than recommendations developed from locally generated data analysis. Thus, 
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monitoring activities must also be supplemented by mechanisms for feedback and review of existing policies 
at regular intervals, in order to ensure that interventions remain relevant to contemporary challenges on the 
ground.  
8.3.3 Strategic Policy Implementation 
Given the significant gap between documented policies and their implementation, there is a pressing 
need for new ways to ensure that strategic plans are developed and that resources are made available to ensure 
that policy goals are achieved. To do this, County officials have the option to better utilize existing resources 
in the private and CSO sectors both in developing plans as well as facilitating their execution. Given that the 
Nairobi Metro 2030 Plan envisions a much wider metropolitan boundary for the County, there is a need to 
ensure that environmental policies are in place that will regulate development and prevent the emergence of 
greater urban sprawl and the expansion of existing informal settlements.  
 The development of strategic plans to implement policies would allow for a more coherent approach 
to identifying the resources that are available, creating manageable timelines, and soliciting the support of 
stakeholders involved because there are clear goals and a defined approach to achieving them, rather than only 
a broad-strokes policy statement or a specific law that may not be effective due to problems with judicial and 
legal capacity in the County.  
8.3.4 Managing Institutional Resources and Growing Capacity from Within 
The issue of capacity links back to the previous recommendations as well, where in many cases state 
agencies that lack capacity would need to seek resources and support from the wider community and non-
state actors. The culture of resource control and authority, reticence in sharing information, and conflicts of 
interest between state and non-state actors is a major impediment to the realization of cooperative policy 
efforts, and would need to be addressed. As Juma and Clark recommend, 
‘there has to be a recognition among those concerned with public policy in 
Africa that they are dealing with evolutionary social systems experiencing 
rapid and relatively unpredictable change. Their capacity to manage such 
systems will therefore depend greatly on appropriate institutional reforms 
that facilitate continuous social learning on the part of actors at all levels of 
society. Top-down, bureaucratic practices will no longer work’ (Juma & 
Clark, 1995: 134).  
 The twin processes of devolution and decentralization will place greater pressure on Nairobi County 
to responsibly manage urban growth in the face of environmental resource challenges and an apathetic 
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populace. However, as Leach and Mearns (1996) contend, periods of transition in the political regime are the 
greatest conditions for policy change, but this can only be achieved if County intuitions invest in growing the 
technical expertise of their staff and become more reliant on local resources for policy activities, rather than 
falling back on previous practices involving partnerships with foreign experts that often carry their own 
motivations and ideological positions.  
8.3.5 Identifying Opportunities for Better Policy Regulation 
While the current conditions are undoubtedly the result of a long history of poor governance, 
political upheaval, conflicting stakeholder interests, and struggles for power and space, there remains much 
hope for a revival of the spirit of urban democracy and positive change for the multitude of urban residents. 
Planning has an important role to play in aiding the realization of this outcome, through participatory 
approaches and the development of comprehensive strategic growth plans that recognize the diverse needs of 
the population. There is an imperative for the consolidation of the existing legislative and policy frameworks 
under the single roof of an authoritative state body that will have a mandate not only for managing planning 
practice but also have the weight of the law to effect change and provide for the basic rights of land owners, 
tenants, and developers, both private and public. 
Furthermore, gaps in the content of existing policies need to be addressed, particularly with regard to 
harmonizing environmental policies with those in the areas of economic and land development. This study 
indicates how the lack of such harmonization has resulted in an ad hoc approach to the enforcement and 
oversight of environmental regulations, as the political and personal interests of the elite in Nairobi take 
precedence over the public good.  The imperative to improve environmental standards in planning practices is 
contingent on the direction that urban development takes in pursuit of economic goals, and the alignment of 
these would result in more strategically viable plans. 
 
8.4 Research Impact & Theoretical Contributions: A Summary 
The significance and contributions of this study stem from the in-depth, narrative description of the 
policy process from the perspective of the actors involved, an exercise that has not previously been carried out 
in the context of Nairobi, Kenya. In addition, the application of policy network theory to the study data 
allowed for a theoretical analysis of the research findings, another contribution towards a scholarly 
understanding of the underlying reasons for the ways that environmental policy networks in developing 
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contexts are arranged, and the distribution of power and influence within them. The use of Adam and Kriesi’s 
(2007) Network Approach allowed for greater clarity in the conceptualization of the actor network, but was 
not a perfect fit for the local developing context of the study. As such, several modifications were made to the 
Network Approach typology, in order to reflect the complexity of interactions and the dialectical relationships 
between power, interactions, network structure and policy change (Chapter 7: Figure 10). As such, this thesis 
offers a novel, adapted method to applying the Network Approach typology, one which may potentially be 
applied in other developing contexts in the region as well. The key findings from the investigation of policy 
formulation and implementation processes, and the network analysis, are summarized in Table 6 below. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ASPECT VARIABLES 
PART I: Formulation: Decision-making during 
policy formulation 
1) Stakeholder collaboration and public participation in 
decision-making 
2) Authority and power distribution in the actor 
network 
3) Critical environmental concerns in Nairobi County 
4) Gaps in existing policies and implementation 
processes 
5) Uses and sources of scientific or fact-based evidence 
and data 
6) Implications of policy and administrative reform 
 
PART II: Implementation:  Challenges, existing gaps 
between policy and practice and the reasons for these 
gaps 
SUITABILITY ANALYSIS:  
These variables were integral to the inductive level of data analysis, and aided in guiding the narrative description 
applied to the study data. Indeed, the deductive themes that emerged including those relating to integrity, 
conflicts between actor interests, and the interactions between local stakeholders complemented these six core 
variables.  
 
KEY FINDINGS: 
- There is a high degree of conflict between state environmental actors, arising from competing political 
interests and conflicting statutes across the multiple policy and regulatory documents, particularly at the 
interface of the national government and local Nairobi City Council.  
- The above has led to poor management of funds without harmonization of matching efforts 
- There is potential for further conflict in the devolved county system, particularly as regards natural resources 
such as waterways and forests.  
- NEMA’s wide mandate and lack of capacity prevent it from being able to carry out sufficient oversight over 
development activities 
- The growth of environmental expertise among decision-makers has been hindered by inconsistent 
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dissemination of information, a culturally-derived reluctance to share data, and insufficient training to 
develop the technical knowledge and skills required to enforce regulations. 
- Lack of adequate data and indigenous information sources to inform policy, further exacerbated by poor 
monitoring and collation of feedback regarding operationalized policies. 
- There has been a trend of ad hoc and nepotistic stakeholder engagement, with no environmental 
ombudsman or mechanisms to ensure proper integration of stakeholder feedback. 
- Environmental concerns have largely been separated from other key policy arenas, including economic 
planning and development. 
- Foreign organizations hold significant influence in policy activities, both directly in collaboration with state 
authorities and by influencing CSOs and private sector firms as well. 
- Lack of clarity in policies, thereby reducing their approachability for laymen and the public at large.  
- Poor record of voluntary compliance, in part due to the low intensity of sanctions and penalties for 
environmental offenders, combined with ad hoc enforcement of regulations and corrupt practices in judicial 
proceedings of environment-related cases; also attributed to the external provenance of Nairobi’s residents, 
many of whom do not identify with urban life and have therefore not fostered a sense of stewardship for the 
environment. 
PART III: Policy Network Analysis: Explicating the 
interactions, power, and influence in the network and 
the potential and types of future policy outcomes 
1) Number of actors in the network 
2) Complexity of the network 
3) Degree of self referentiality of the network 
4) Conflicts between actors 
5) Costs of network management 
SUITABILITY ANALYSIS:  
The five variables laid out in the Network Approach (Adam & Kriesi, 2007) were useful in distilling from the 
data the key factors that affect interactions between actors, and also aided in producing schematic 
representations of the same. However, the fifth variable, the costs of network management, was not applicable to 
Nairobi’s developing context. 
 
KEY FINDINGS: 
- The Network Approach allows for the policy network to be viewed metaphorically on the basis of actor 
interactions and the power and influence they hold. Although Adam & Kriesi’s typology is highly linear, by 
integrating a dialectic component to their model the environmental policy network in Nairobi is visualized as a 
system of interconnecting motivations and feedback effects. 
- Power is concentrated in the hands of a few state authorities, and actors engage across a spectrum of potential 
interaction types from hierarchical cooperation to dominance based on the resources they can bring to bear in 
policy debates. 
- Policy change has a low to moderate potential for occurrence. Under the new system of devolved governance 
where new actors will enter the network, change is predicated on the novel ideas of these non-state actors being 
accepted and integrated into the dominant ideology. 
Table 6 SUMMARY OF STUDY VARIABLES, THEIR SUITABILITY, AND KEY FINDINGS 
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As Flanagan and his colleagues argue, ‘policy dynamics are probabilistic rather than deterministic’ 
(Flanagan et al., 2011: 711). That is to say, the findings of this study are indicative of the directions and 
motivations of the policy process, but are not a guarantee of the outcomes thereof. Future research into new 
actor assemblages that will form in devolved Nairobi, and the corresponding impacts on policy development 
and policy change, will be required in order to gauge whether Constitutional and strategic reforms have been 
successful in their goals. Some of these future research directions that are of interest are discussed in the 
following section. 
 
8.5 Future Research Directions 
This thesis explored various concepts relating to the policy process, of which the outcome is expected 
to be a policy document. An analysis of the decision-making process that creates policy from a general 
perspective is an essential component of understanding how content is shaped, and that is the core contention 
of this research study. Indeed, as Nairobi now undertakes its roles as both Capital City and an independent, 
autonomous County, it will be interesting to see how the policy process is altered and reshaped to meet the 
new demands imposed by Constitutional reform, population expansion, and development challenges, perhaps 
through new studies undertaken in the coming years. 
However, going into the next phase of the policy ‘cycle’, the actual policy statements themselves that 
form the basis for future legislation and planning activities must be analyzed in order to provide insights into 
the possible consequences and repercussions that would arise from implementing these policy objectives down 
the line. This is particularly important in the case of the National Environment Policy, currently in its fifth 
draft but expected to be finalized in the near future through the cooperation of the now devolved Counties in 
Kenya. Evaluation exercises may take place prior to the policy being deployed (ex ante); during the 
implementation of policy (ex post); or in between these two stages (ex nunc); (Crabbé & Leroy, 2008). Each 
of these stages can take place once the policy is finally institutionalized, but could not be performed for 
purposes of this thesis given the current draft status of the document. 
The effort to evaluate policy, in addition to supporting greater efficiency in content formulation, also 
holds benefits for the operationalization of these policies, in that feedback from the implementation phase 
would provide insights into gaps or challenges that affect the policy’s success or failure. Policy evaluation in 
the ex-ante phase would help to ensure that resources are not wasted on policy proposals that are bound to fail 
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because their proposed interventions or strategies are out of sync with the context in which they will be 
implemented. Under conditions of democratic public involvement in policy decision-making, negative public 
opinion has the potential to cause deleterious outcomes in policy (Burnstein, 1991).  
Furthermore, policy success in the environmental realm is hinged on the qualities of the policies 
themselves – for instance, in the case of national sustainability policy, ‘efficient incentives, transparency of 
measures, consistent sustainability goals in all policy fields, as well as proper regulatory systems, can all be seen 
as factors necessary for success’ (Akgu ̈n et al., 2012: 20). Effective leadership and a sense of shared 
responsibility for policy success with all stakeholders are therefore critical. Besides these, the wider economic 
context and social system must be conducive to receiving and implementing the policy – that is to say, the 
goals of policy should not outstrip existing local capacity to fulfill them (Jänicke, 2002). Thus the 
implementation stage of the policy process is a critical juncture for determining success or failure of an 
operational policy. In situations of devolved government where inter-organizational co-ordination is required 
in order to operationalize policy, the policy content must be strategically geared towards reducing the effects 
of disputes or lack of commitment from any of the involved parties. O’Toole & Montjoy (1984: 495) thus 
warn us that, ‘policies that provide no inducements to implementers (tack-on mandates) will almost surely 
fail, unless they coincide closely with the implementers' goals and world views’.  
Given this wide arc of considerations, an examination of the policy process alone would not be 
sufficient when attempting to diagnose the causes of purported policy ‘success’ or ‘failure’, which are in 
themselves normative concepts. Data collection through the use of in-depth qualitative methods would be 
required in the ex post phase; however, for purposes of the ex ante phase, evidence from similar contexts can 
be drawn upon conservatively to reveal some of the lessons learned and to devise recommendations for policy 
improvement.  
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Appendix A:  
Timeline of Environmental Plans, 
Strategies, Policies (Blue) and Laws 
(Red) in Nairobi 
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Appendix B: Key Informant Coding 
Sector Organization 
Name 
No. of 
Informants 
Position within 
Organization 
 
Sampling Method/ 
Interview Date 
 
ID Code 
G
O
VE
R
N
M
EN
T 
Ministry of 
Environment and 
Mineral Resources 
(MEMR) 
2 Policy Officer 
 
PS 
27 July 2012 
GOVT1 
Policy Officer SS 
27 July 2012 
GOVT2 
National 
Environmental 
Management 
Authority (NEMA) 
2 Senior Official 
(Research) 
PS 
24 July 2012 
GOVT3 
Senior Official 
(Education) 
PS 
16 July 2012 
GOVT4 
Ministry of Nairobi 
Metropolitan 
Development 
(MNMD) 
1 Senior Official (Env. 
Management) 
SS 
03 July 2012 
GOVT5 
Ministry of Planning 
and Kenya Vision 
2030 
1 Senior Official SS 
15 July 2012 
GOVT6 
Nairobi City 
Council (NCC) 
1 Senior Environment 
Official 
SS 
20 July 2012 
GOVT7 
Kenya Institute for 
Governance 
1 Senior Staff SS 
18 July 2012 
GOVT8 
Kenya Institute of 
Public Policy 
Research and 
Analysis (KIPPRA) 
1 Policy Analyst PS 
17 July 2012 
GOVT9 
PR
IV
A
TE
 
Institute for Policy 
Analysis and 
Research (IPAR) 
1 Senior Researcher PS 
26 June 2012 
 
RESEARCHER1 
Planning Systems 
LTD 
1 Architect PS 
20 July 2012 
PLANNER1 
Planning 4 Leaders 
LTD 
1 Senior Manager & 
Planner 
SS 
07 July 2012 
PLANNER2 
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C
IV
IL
 S
O
C
IE
TY
 
O
R
G
A
N
IZ
A
TI
O
N
S Sayari Think Tank 1 Senior Staff SS 26 June 2012 
CSO1 
Institute for Law 
and Environmental 
Governance 
1 Senior Policy Staff SS 
27 July 2012 
CSO2 
Akimba Mashinani 
Trust 
1 Senior Staff PS 
10 July 2012 
CSO3 
FO
R
EI
G
N
 O
R
G
A
N
IZ
A
TI
O
N
S 
United Nations 
Environment 
Program 
2 Legal Officer SS 
09 July 2012 
INTL1 
Program Officer SS 
19 July 2012 
INTL2 
UN-Habitat 1 Human Settlements 
Officer 
SS 
17 July 2012 
INTL3 
Oxfam (UK) 1 Senior Staff PS 
07 July 2012 
INTL4 
World Bank Group 1 Senior Staff, Urban 
Development Team 
PS 
10 August 2012 
INTL5 
Swedish Embassy 1 Senior Staff PS 
27 July 2012 
INTL6 
Danish International 
Development 
Agency (DANIDA) 
1 Program Officer PS 
26 July 2012 
INTL7 
A
C
A
D
EM
IC
 IN
ST
IT
U
TI
O
N
S 
University of 
Nairobi – Dept. of 
Urban and Regional 
Planning 
1 Associate Professor PS 
23 July 2012 
PROF1 
Kenyatta University 
– Dept. of 
Environmental 
Management and 
Planning 
1 Associate Professor PS 
7 August 2012 
PROF2 
University of 
Nairobi - CASELAP 
1 Associate Professor SS 
19 July 2012 
PROF3 
PS: Purposive Sampling; SS: Snowball Sampling 
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Appendix C: RESEARCH MATERIALS 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Issue / problem identification 
a) What is the impetus for policy formulation? E.G. government initiative, donor pressure, stakeholder 
pressure, etc.  
b) By whom and at what level was formal / informal processing initiated? What means (e.g. 
memorandum, ministerial statement, report, meeting) was used? 
 
2. Search for cause(s) of problem 
a) Is environmental policy approached in tandem with other considerations e.g. social, economic, 
political, or in isolation? 
 
3. Fact gathering / analysis 
a) What information was considered necessary for analysis? 
b) Who was / were assigned the task of providing / collecting the information? 
c) Was any or all of the information available within the organisation responsible for the policy area? 
d) Was it necessary to seek information elsewhere? 
e) What was the nature of the information and by what method(s) (e.g. letters, memo's, personal 
enquiry, survey, interviews) was it collected? 
f) How was the information organised / processed for analysis and who was involved? 
g) Who was / were involved in the analysis of the information? 
h) In what form was the outcome of the analysis presented and by whom? 
 
4. Identification of options 
a) Were a number of policy options identified? 
b) In identifying options what reference, if any, was made to experience with issues /problems of a 
similar nature nationally, internationally (especially in countries with similar levels of development)? 
 
5. Specification of objective(s) of selected policy option 
a) Were specific objective(s) articulated? 
b) Did the detailed objective(s) include quantification of expected output; qualitative description of 
outcome to be expected (attitudes, perceptions, etc.)? 
c) Who / what agencies were involved in the process of specification of objective(s) of selected policy 
option? 
d) How does your institution manage priorities for development alongside natural asset protection? 
 
6. Process of policy decision making 
a) Who / what agencies - minister / ministry, cabinet, president, party, etc. – were involved in the final 
decision process and what specific role did each play? 
b) What specific input to the decision process (e.g. memoranda, ministerial / position papers, brief) were 
   154 
utilized? By whom were they prepared and presented? 
c) By what mechanism was the policy decision communicated? 
 
8. Design of implementation strategy 
a) Was an implementation strategy designed? 
b) Was it part of the policy formulation process or a post-decision event? 
c) Who is in charge of implementation, and how is this process approached? 
d) Are there any specific barriers to ensuring compliance, and what steps can/will be taken to overcome 
these? 
 
9. Monitoring and Feedback 
a) Was a monitoring and feedback mechanism / procedure established? 
b) Were roles assigned explicitly to key players? 
c) What mechanism existed or was put in place to facilitate utilisation of information acquired from 
monitoring and feedback? 
 
10. Policy review and reformulation 
a) Has the policy been reviewed and / or reformulated? 
b) If yes, at what point was this done, who were the actors involved in it, what was the process for the 
review / reformulation? 
 
11. The Environmental Agenda in Nairobi 
a) In your view, generally speaking (within the city of Nairobi), how has environmental protection as it 
has progressed to date been managed from an overall perspective, and what do you feel are the gaps 
or pressing issues? What are the successes? 
b) How do you think recent policy decisions, both through the new Constitution and extended 
metropolitan boundary, will affect environmental planning in general and within your institution for 
the city of Nairobi? 
c) Beyond planning and policy, what are the factors that affect land management? 
d) Do you think that the new Constitution and associated policy changes will affect environmental 
justice in urban planning for the city of Nairobi? 
e) What are the implications of greater citizen involvement for participatory planning? 
f) What are the ways that institutions and organizations in Nairobi collaborate in terms of 
environmental protection, given that many of your mandates overlap? 
g) Given that many of the watercourses in Nairobi extend beyond the urban boundary, how do you 
think planning for resource management and the maintenance of these ecological resources should be 
approached? 
h) Are there any other critical concerns in the area of policy and planning for environmental resource 
protection within your institution or in general that you would like to elaborate on? 
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